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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
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BA4: Brodmann Area 4 
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SYNOPSIS 
 
In our daily activities, we all experience a certain degree of control over our 
behaviours and the more we feel ‘in control’ the more we are likely to describe our 
behaviours as self-generated or ‘intentional’. Such intentional control refers to the capacity 
of humans to perform actions based on internal decisions and motivations, rather than 
external stimulation. Within the psychological debate on free will, this evidence raised the 
question on how ‘free-choices’ are taken when decisions are not dictated by immediate 
external imperatives. The core argument concerns whether voluntary actions follow a 
conscious intention to act or whether the feeling of being in control is just an 
epiphenomenon of unconscious neural mechanisms that are the true origin of behaviour. 
Different components of a free-choice can be isolated and investigated. Participants 
can choose what action to make, when to make an action, or whether to make an action at 
all (Brass & Haggard, 2008). Each of these refers to a different aspect of free-choice, but all 
of them involve the presence of a choice between multiple available options. Studying 
voluntary responses in this manner and comparing them with action or inhibition in 
response to a specific external stimulus, allow us to obtain useful insights into the origin of 
endogenous decisions. Among these components, the decision about whether to act – the 
so called ‘intentional inhibition’ – has received less attention. Such decision can be taken 
at almost any stage during motor preparation, until a point of no return (Schultze-Kraft et 
al., 2016). Libet (1983) controversially suggested that last-moment decisions to inhibit an 
action involved a purely conscious form of ‘free won’t’ (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 
1983). However, alike voluntary actions, conscious decisions to inhibit might also depend 
on unconscious brain processes. For this reason, to what extent intentional decisions to 
inhibit are necessarily based on a deliberate choice is still an open question (Parkinson & 
Haggard, 2014). 
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The present thesis will examine how unperceivable – subliminal – information in 
the environment, physiological states of the body and ongoing pre-conscious fluctuations 
in brain activity contribute to generate voluntary decisions to act or to inhibit. Starting from 
the contemporary debate raging around free will and taking into account the most recent 
cognitive models of voluntary actions, the introductory section of the thesis will provide an 
overview on the basic concepts linked to volition (Chapter 1). Particular attention will be 
given to behavioural inhibition and how this component has been studied along a 
continuum from ‘stimulus-driven inhibition’ to ‘intentional inhibition’. For each concept 
introduced, I will provide a review of the current state of the art regarding both the neural 
and behavioural mechanisms involved. In particular, I shall focus on previous research 
suggesting that making free-choices activate a specific network of brain activity. 
Chapter 2 will review current evidence regarding how subliminal information in the 
environment and psychophysiological states act as modulators for free-choice mechanisms 
both at the behavioural and neural level. Indeed, there is consistent evidence concerned 
with the ability of subliminal stimuli to bias our free decisions by influencing the activity 
within the ‘choice network’. Similarly, psychophysiological states such as the arousal have 
been shown to moderate a number of cognitive tasks including response inhibition. 
The second part of the thesis will focus on the empirical work I have conducted to 
investigate some of the theoretical issues previously introduced. The experiment described 
in Chapter 3 exploits a ‘Go/Nogo’ paradigm assessing the effect of subliminal priming by 
highlighting the dramatic effect of congruent and incongruent subliminal information on 
reaction times and free-choices. As the first experiment validated the paradigm as a 
meaningful tool to disentangle between forced and free components of making choices in 
relation to subliminal processing, the functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) experiment 
described in Chapter 4 capitalizes on the same kind of manipulation. A region of interest 
(ROI) analysis was conducted to test whether the degree of intentionality of the response 
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and the information provided by subliminal information might modulate the activity 
within the ‘free-choice network’. In Chapter 5 the effect of an increased level of arousal 
induced by physical exercise on the performance in the same task will be examined. The 
experimental section of the present thesis will end with Chapter 6 in which the neural 
underpinnings of the conscious generation of actions by means of multi-voxel pattern 
analysis (MVPA) has been investigated. 
The thesis will end with a general discussion (Chapter 7). Here I shall rely on the 
evidence presented in the preceding experimental chapters to propose that free-choices are 
determined by the interplay between brain, body, and sensory environment. 
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SINOSSI 
 
Nelle attività quotidiane, tutti noi percepiramo di essere in controllo delle nostre 
azioni e più ciò viene avvertito, più siamo inclini a descrivere i nostri comportamenti come 
‘intenzionali’. Questa sensazione di ‘controllo intenzionale’ si basa sulla nostra capacità di 
produrre azioni basate più su decisioni e motivazioni interne rispetto a decisioni e 
motivazioni guidate da eventi esterni. L’evidenza di ciò ha alimentato il dibattito relativo al 
‘libero arbitrio’ stimolando la discussione su come sia possibile prendere delle decisioni 
unicamente endogene e non basate su indicazioni derivanti dall’ambiente circostante. Il 
problema principale riguarda la definizione dell’origine di questi meccanismi: le nostre 
azioni, quando eseguite intenzionalmente, sono prodotte da processi decisionali consci, 
oppure la nostra sensazione di essere ‘in controllo’ è solamente un epifenomeno dovuto a 
meccanismi neurali inconsci che determinano il successivo svolgimento dell’azione? 
 È possibile differenziare e studiare separatamente diverse componenti decisionali 
di un’azione intenzionale. Le persone possono scegliere quale azione fare, quando farla e 
se farla (Brass & Haggard, 2008). Ognuna di queste componenti fa riferimento a diversi 
aspetti delle azioni intenzionali ma tutte loro sottintendono la capacità di fare una specifica 
scelta tra molte alternative. Studiando in questo modo le azioni intenzionali e 
confrontando quest’ultime con le azioni guidate da stimoli esterni, è possibile ottenere utili 
indicazioni sull'origine delle nostre scelte. Delle tre componenti precedentemente 
descritte, la componente decisionale del se fare un azione – definita “inibizione 
intenzionale” – ha ricevuto minor attenzione in letteratura. La scelta di inibire un azione 
può essere presa a diversi stadi della programmazione motoria, fino a un “punto di non 
ritorno” dove l’azione non può più essere inibita efficacemente (Schultze-Kraft et al., 2016). 
Libet (1983) suggerì che la capacità umana di inibire un azione fino all’ultimo momento, 
sottintendesse la possibilità di una forma consapevole di "libertà di veto" (Libet, Gleason, 
8 
 
 
Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Tuttavia, come per l’origine delle azioni intenzionali, anche 
l’inibizione intenzionale delle azioni, potrebbe dipendere da processi cerebrali inconsci. 
Per questo motivo, la possibilità che la decisione d’inibire un’azione intenzionalmente sia 
necessariamente basata su una libera scelta è ancora argomento di forte dibattito 
(Parkinson & Haggard, 2014). 
 Alla luce di quanto detto, lo scopo di questa tesi è quello di esaminare il contributo 
della presenza di stimoli subliminali nell’ambiente circostante, degli stati psicofisiologici 
del corpo e delle fluttuazioni dell’attività cerebrale precosciente, nelle generazione delle 
decisioni intenzionali di inibire o produrre un’azione. Partendo dalla descrizione del 
dibattito sul libero arbitrio e prendendo in considerazione i più recenti modelli teorici sulle 
azioni intenzionali, il capitolo introduttivo fornirà una panoramica completa dei concetti 
relativi alla volontarietà nel controllo motorio (Capitolo 1). L’inibizione delle azioni verrà 
trattata con occhio di riguardo, introducendo la distinzione tra “inibizione intenzionale” e 
“inibizione guidata da stimoli esterni”. Per ognuno dei concetti introdotti, fornirò una 
descrizione completa dello stato di avanzamento della ricerca sia dal punto di vista teorico 
sia dei correlati comportamentali e neurali coinvolti. In particolare mi concentrerò su un 
network di aree strettamente legate alla produzione di decisioni intenzionali. 
 Il Capitolo 2 esaminerà come gli stimoli subliminali e gli stati psicofisiologici del 
corpo possano agire da modulatori dei meccanismi legati alla produzione di azioni, sia a 
livello comportamentale che a livello neurale. Infatti, studi recenti concordano nel 
dimostrare come gli stimoli subliminali possano manipolare i processi decisionali legati 
all’azione influenzando l'attività di un specifico network di aree cerebrali. Allo stesso modo, 
gli stati psicofisiologici come l'arousal hanno dimostrato di moderare numerosi compiti 
cognitivi tra i quali anche l'inibizione delle azioni. 
 Sull base degli aspetti teorici introdotti nella prima parte della tesi, la seconda parte 
si focalizzerà sul lavoro sperimentale che ho condotto durante il dottorato di ricerca. 
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L’esperimento descritto nel Capitolo 3 utilizzerà un paradigma di "Go/Nogo" per 
evidenziare l'effetto drammatico della stimolazione subliminale sui tempi di reazione agli 
stimoli e sulle scelte volontarie di inibire o produrre un’azione. Poiché il primo 
esperimento ha potuto validare la fruibilità del paradigma come strumento di analisi delle 
componenti volontarie dell’azione ed inibizione, in relazione all'elaborazione subliminale, 
l'esperimento di risonanza magnetica funzionale (fMRI) descritto nel Capitolo 4 
capitalizzerà sullo stesso tipo di manipolazione sperimentale. È stata condotta un'analisi 
su aree cerebrali di interesse (ROI) per verificare se il grado di intenzionalità della risposta 
e le informazioni fornite dagli stimoli subliminali possano modulare l'attività all'interno 
network di aree specifico. Nel Capitolo 5 invece, verrà esaminato l'effetto dell’aumento del 
livello di arousal indotto da esercizio fisico, sulla prestazione allo stesso compito. La 
sezione sperimentale della tesi terminerà con il Capitolo 6 in cui verranno esplorati i 
correlati neurali della generazione delle azioni mediante l’analisi multivariata dell’attività 
cerebrale (MVPA). 
 La tesi terminerà con una discussione generale (Capitolo 7) nella quale, basandosi 
sui risultati ottenuti nei precedenti capitoli sperimentali, verrà proposto come la capacità 
di scelta intenzionale tra l’esecuzione e l’inibizione di un’azione sia determinata 
dall’interazione tra cervello, corpo e l’ambiente circostante. 
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CHAPTER 1 
MAKING FREE-CHOICES: AN INTRODUCTION 
 
During the tense, winner-take-all Uruguay vs. Italy World Cup’s match in 2014, Luis 
Suárez, one of the world’s best strikers over the past years, suddenly sank his teeth into the 
Italian defender Giorgio Chiellini’s shoulder, earning himself a four-month ban. The 
postgame reactions were predictably inflamed and the questions abounded: what was 
Suárez thinking? Suárez himself struggled understanding why he could not avoid doing 
such an infamous and impulsive act. In later interviews he sought to explain how part of the 
way he plays is felt as unconscious, for better or worse, as if he need to “switch off" 
potentially interfering conscious thinking. Nevertheless, considering the multiple referees, 
the TV cameras and perhaps most dramatically, the millions of people watching on 
television worldwide, how does this “switching off” could have been so uncontrollable and 
unconscious? If so, should we consider him responsible for what he did? What were the 
necessary conditions for these accidents to occur? Philosophers, psychologists, 
neuroscientists or simply sport enthusiasts wondered about the variety of plausible 
answers to these questions because of the direct connection with the long-lasting debate 
on humans’ capacity for free will. 
 
1.1. The debate on free will 
Do people have ‘free will’? As healthy adults, from our subjective perspective we can 
vividly experience an intuitive sense of agency and intentionality across our life. Without 
considering reflex movements where behaviour is automatically driven by bio-mechanical 
urges from the body and occurs without a motor command (e.g., yawning, eye blinking), the 
origin of voluntary behaviour is perceived as ‘from the inside’: our conscious intentions 
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precede and cause the physical events that lead us to taking decisions and executing 
actions. In other words we feel ‘in control’ and in this sense, our will is experienced as free, 
a stance that inevitably leads to a dualism where the mind and the brain are separate, 
interacting entities (Caspar & Cleeremans, 2015). Although the folk-psychological 
definition of free will takes for granted the capacity for willed behaviour, there are many 
situations in which such dualistic view of mind-body causation simply does not hold, as for 
the Luis Suárez example mentioned above. Defining free will as the capacity of controlling 
one conscious behaviour give rise to many philosophical questions: what happen when 
voluntary – endogenous – actions are produced (or stopped) without explicit conscious 
awareness? Does this form of control imply the existence of free will? Is it a uniquely human 
capacity? (Frith, 2013). 
In science the question whether ‘free will exists or not’ puzzled researchers for 
centuries and continues to stimulate interests because its implication in many fields of 
study, from philosophy to psychology and neuroscience (Kane, 1998). The precise 
definition of free will is heavily burdened with many ethical implications related to morality 
and responsibility. Across different cultures and societies people are considered causal 
agents and only who can decide and initiate her own course of action is judged responsible 
and deserve punishment (Haggard & Lau, 2013). Psychology’s interests on free will have a 
long tradition starting from the genesis of experimental psychology (James, 1905). With the 
advent of behaviourism however, research lost its interest on the subject, partially because 
of the scepticism of psychology regarding the reliability of introspection for the study of 
human cognition. Only recently, in conjunction with the emergence of cognitive 
neuroscience, psychologists rediscovered the passion for the study of volition. Crucially, the 
focus has moved from the disheartening question of whether free will exist or not, to the 
scientifically approach centred on the mechanisms that govern voluntary actions 
(Baumeister, 2008; Brass, Lynn, Demanet, & Rigoni, 2013). For the first time in history, with 
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the improvement of brain imaging techniques, researchers had the possibility to correlate 
introspective data on the sense of conscious intention with objective measurements of 
brain activity. This combination has made volition an experimental issue, rather than 
exclusively philosophical (Haggard & Lau, 2013). 
 
1.1.1. The scientific study of volition 
Beginning with the ingenious Libet’s experiment, research challenged the dualistic 
view of mind-body causation suggesting that conscious experience of one’s intentions is an 
epiphenomenon rather than the cause of brain activity (Libet et al., 1983; Soon, Brass, 
Heinze, & Haynes, 2008). In the original formulation of the experiment participants, while 
watching a rotating hand clock, were instructed to produce an action (i.e., pressing a 
button) whenever they felt the ‘urge’ to do so, without any time restriction. At the same time 
electrodes were placed on the scalp to record electrical activity related to motor preparation. 
After the action was made, participants were asked to report the position of the clock in 
relation to when they first felt the conscious intention to move (W judgment) or the actual 
movement (M judgment). The authors showed that a slow negative potential shift in 
electroencephalography (EEG) activity in the frontal lobe (readiness potential – RP) was 
recorded approximately 200 milliseconds before participants’ reports of the conscious 
intention to move (W judgment). The emergence of RP demonstrated for the first time that 
unconscious brain mechanisms predicts – and intuitively determined – voluntary actions, 
putting a final nail in dualism’s coffin. Libet’s interpretation left open the possibility that 
conscious awareness might have a more specific role in vetoing unwanted behaviour rather 
than determining action, moving from the concept of ‘free will’ to a capacity of a ‘free won’t’ 
or intentional inhibition (Libet et al., 1983). However, unconscious brain activity has been 
recently recorded to precede, perhaps unsurprisingly, free intentions to stop actions, 
challenging the possibility for a free won’t (Filevich, Kühn, & Haggard, 2013). 
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Is free will therefore a mere illusion? (Wegner, 2003). Although replicated in other 
forms (Fried, Mukamel, & Kreiman, 2011; Matsuhashi & Hallett, 2008) and with much more 
convincing time-scales (Soon et al., 2008) this class of experimental manipulations has 
been criticized because the unreliability of subjective timing judgments in such small 
window of time and for the possible confounding caused by the attentional demands 
required by the task (Lau, Rogers, Haggard, & Passingham, 2004; Trevena & Miller, 2002). 
According to recent bottom-up views of action generation, the conscious intention to move 
is not elicited by the RP, but merely depends on spontaneous fluctuations in neural activity 
that occasionally brings the motor system to the output threshold. For Schurger et al. 
(2012), the RP is merely an artefact produced by the averaging event-related potentials 
(ERPs) based on the reported W judgment (Schurger, Sitt, & Dehaene, 2012). On this view, 
voluntary actions happen to us, rather than us causing them. 
Following Libet’s ground-braking discoveries, researchers took advantage of two 
empirical methods to look into voluntary actions: first, through introspection, voluntary 
actions can be defined in terms of experience or the so-called ‘first-person perspective’. 
Alike Libet’s experiment (Libet et al., 1983) studies in this field are concerned with the 
definition of how people experience the sensory consequences of the intention to move and 
the sense of agency upon their actions (Chambon, Wenke, Fleming, Prinz, & Haggard, 2013; 
Decety & Lamm, 2007; Dogge, Schaap, Custers, Wegner, & Aarts, 2012; Haggard, Clark, & 
Kalogeras, 2002). Second, research on voluntary actions has been defined in terms of 
behaviour or ‘the third-person perspective’ (Frith, 2013). For the purposes of the present 
thesis the next section will review the current empirical knowledge on voluntary action 
espousing the ‘third-person perspective’. 
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1.1.2. Defining volition from the third-person perspective 
Since James original conceptualization, voluntary actions were contrasted with 
reflex actions, thus interpreting them on the basis of the third-person perspective. In James 
view, voluntary actions are performed purposefully because humans wish to fulfil desires, 
with the intention to fulfil certain goals (James, 1905). James’ interpretation capture one of 
the major limits of the empirical approach to volition: voluntary actions are based on 
expectations of future reward guided by an internal set of goals linked to previous 
reinforcements and memories of past experiences. Intuitively, these processes are never 
under the control of the experimenter and the internal causes of behaviour are not 
experimentally tractable (Nachev & Husain, 2010). 
Despite this intrinsic limitation, present research takes the viewpoint of the 
detached observer and typically uses paradigms that contrast actions that are controlled 
endogenously as opposed to reflex actions that are driven by external signals (Haggard, 
2008; Keller et al., 2006; Krieghoff, Waszak, Prinz, & Brass, 2011; Mueller, Brass, Waszak, & 
Prinz, 2007; Waszak et al., 2005). Since a key feature of a voluntary act is that it cannot be 
predicted from the external context then the choices must be ‘free’ or endogenous. 
Neuropsychological findings such as the anarchic hand syndrome, give support to the basic 
dichotomy of external versus internal generation of actions. Patients with anarchic hand 
syndrome have distinct problems in intentionally controlling the movements of one hand, 
while the other hand is still under intentional control. Crucially, the ‘anarchic’ hand 
sometimes acts towards specific objects in the environment suggesting that it is under 
external control (Della Sala, Marchetti, & Spinnler, 1991). 
Standard experimental paradigms manipulate the degree of voluntariness 
associated with an action by asking participants to produce ‘free-choices’. In a typical 
condition, participants are required to produce a specific action in response to the 
appearance of a stimulus (e.g., press the left button when the red light turns on). In another 
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condition participants are instructed to ‘free-choice’ which action to perform between a 
number of alternatives (e.g., press the left or the right button when the green light turns on). 
In the latter – unconstrained – condition, each choice is not fully determined by the external 
stimulus and cannot easily be predicted. The second condition is thus clearly more 
voluntary and more ‘free’ and less predictable as a consequence (Frith, 2013; Frith, Friston, 
Liddle, & Frackowiak, 1991). 
Arguably, the comparison of free-choices with externally guided choices within the 
controlled environment of the laboratory does not allow to draw a clear picture of how 
volitional control operates in everyday life situations: rather than being exclusively 
internally controlled or externally controlled, our actions lay in a continuum along the two 
extremes. However, the study of free-choices it has been very useful to produce theoretical 
speculations. 
 
1.2. Past research on free-choices 
Far from capturing the ‘true essence’ of human volition as it takes place in everyday 
life (there is an intrinsic paradox in asking a person to be voluntary), the scientific study of 
free-choices has the ability to isolate the key generative components of the intention toward 
action (Haggard, 2008). For this reason, an interpretative model has been put forward to 
provide a heuristic framework for the study of voluntary actions. 
 
1.2.1. Voluntary actions: a model 
A quick look at the recent literature on volition shows that voluntary actions cannot 
be studied as a unitary concept. Brass and Haggard (2008) proposed a model that 
distinguishes at least three major decisional components of the intentional choice: what, 
when and whether (Brass & Haggard, 2008). Further, each of this components have been 
related with distinct subjective experiences if considered from the first-person perspective 
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(Brass et al., 2013). The ‘what’ component discriminates between which actions to execute. 
It is usually investigated with paradigms in which participants are free to choose between 
many alternatives of actions (Lau, Rogers, & Passingham, 2006; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 
2004). Since this decision requires participants to resolve the conflict among the available 
response options it is related to the subjective experience of ‘conflict resolution’ (Brass et 
al., 2013). The ‘when’ component relates to the decision of when to execute a 
predetermined action. Paradigms dealing with the ‘when’ component usually compare a 
condition in which participants gave a response at their own choice with a condition in 
which they are instructed to respond by an exogenous cue (Libet et al., 1983; Soon et al., 
2008). This component is related to the subjective experience of ‘urges’ (Jackson, Meltzoff, 
& Decety, 2006). The third component (the ‘whether’ component) is concern with the 
intentional process of deciding whether to execute the action at all and it relates to the 
subjective feeling of ‘disappointment’ (Brass & Haggard, 2007). The latter component has 
been relatively less explored given the complexity of collecting empirical data on a 
mechanism that does not produce a behavioural output (as the action is intentionally 
inhibited) and there are no external stimuli that time-lock the decision process. However, 
paradigms have been created exploiting neuroimaging techniques. 
Based on this theoretical approach in the next section behavioural and 
neuroscientific evidence for the What, When, Whether (WWW; Brass & Haggard, 2008) 
model of voluntary actions will be reviewed. 
 
1.2.2. Neural and Behavioural correlates of free-choices 
Several studies suggest that intentional and reflexed actions seems to be controlled 
by different neural pathways in the brain: while stimulus-driven actions are controlled via a 
lateral network including the parietal and the premotor cortex, voluntary control involves a 
number of brain regions within the frontomedian cortex (Jenkins, Jahanshahi, Jueptner, 
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Passingham, & Brooks, 2000; Krieghoff et al., 2011; Waszak et al., 2005). In particular, the 
rostral cingulate zone (RCZ) and the pre-supplementary motor area (preSMA) have been 
consistently shown to be involved in different aspects of intentional control of action 
(namely the ‘what’ and the ‘when’ components). Accordingly, the next section will review 
some empirical evidence in support of a functional (Krieghoff, 2009) and behavioural 
(Becchio et al., 2014) dissociation of these two components. Following, in the second part 
of the chapter an exhaustive description of the third component (‘whether’) will be 
provided. 
 
1.2.2.1. Deciding what to do 
In neuroimaging studies, when participants have to make free action choices, 
activity is typically seen in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). However, it is unclear 
whether the activity of this area reflected the attentional demands of action selection or the 
freedom of choice. To address this issue Lau and colleagues (2004) compared a free 
selection condition, where participants randomly choose a stimulus out of many 
alternatives, with a condition in which the selection was specified by the task. Crucially, the 
involvement of attentional and working memory demands was minimized across task 
conditions by using novel stimuli in each trial. Results showed that the activation of DLPFC 
was not significantly different in the two conditions. Consistently with other studies 
reporting activations in different parts of the frontomedian wall (Cunnington, 
Windischberger, Robinson, & Moser, 2006; Lau et al., 2006) they reported activation in the 
parietal cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), the preSMA and the RCZ for the free 
selection condition (Lau, Rogers, Ramnani, & Passingham, 2004). These studies however 
often confound perceptual and motor factors inducing some inconsistency in the exact 
anatomical location. 
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Mueller and colleagues (2007) address the yet unsolved question of the differential 
role played by the preSMA and RCZ in internally guided actions if compared to cued 
conditions. They conducted an fMRI study asking participants to temporally bisect the 
interval between the stimulus displays by making left and right key presses at the midpoint 
of isochronous appearing signals (a sequence of ‘×’ presented to the left or the right of the 
fixation point). In the internally guided condition, subjects selected left or right key presses 
determining the side on which the next stimulus would appear. In the externally guided 
condition, they had to react with a button press corresponding to the side where the 
preceding stimulus appeared. By means of this manipulation, the action and the 
perception of the action in the two conditions were balanced. From a cognitive perspective, 
however, they differ substantially. Results showed that the RCZ was activated differentially 
by internally as compared to externally guided actions. The preSMA showed an equal level 
of activity in both conditions and thus did not differentiate between the two modes of action 
(Mueller et al., 2007). This suggested a primary role for the RCZ in internally selected actions 
(the ‘what’ component). Since timing was identical in both conditions, the activity related 
to preSMA determined the right moment for the execution of the action (the ‘when’ 
component). 
 
1.2.2.2. Deciding when to act 
Ever since Libet’s innovative experiment there has been great interest in discovering 
whether brain activity preceding the ‘when’ decision might be manipulated and/or 
predicted (Lau, Rogers, Haggard, et al., 2004; Soon et al., 2008). In this kind of experiment, 
conditions in which participants decided when to act are compared with trials in which the 
time of execution was externally triggered by external visual and/or auditory stimuli. Typical 
results include activations of different areas located in the frontomedian wall for internally 
versus externally timed actions (Debaere, Wenderoth, Sunaert, Van Hecke, & Swinnen, 
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2003; Deiber, Honda, Ibañez, Sadato, & Hallett, 1999; Wiese et al., 2004). Although further 
activity has been reported in the DLPFC, basal ganglia, parietal cortex and insula it has been 
proposed that this activations reflect attention, maintenance of the information and motor 
related processes due to random generation of button presses for the intentional but not 
for the externally timed conditions. In contrast, activations in the frontomedian wall are 
assumed to reflect processes involved in internal action timing. In the study of Deiber and 
colleagues (1999) participant performed intentional movements of the right finger 
(intentional condition). The movement of the finger produced a visual signal that was 
recorded. In a second condition participant watched the recorded movement and were 
required to move again the right fingers in response to each signal (externally triggered 
condition). During the task they collected fMRI data on four regions of interest of the 
frontomedian wall (preSMA, SMA, RCZ, ACC). Results showed that in the preSMA, RCZ and 
ACC activation was more extensive for the intentional condition if compared with the 
externally triggered condition (Deiber et al., 1999). 
Other brain imaging studies used a different approach to investigate the when 
component of intentional action. In a recent study Lau and colleagues (2004b) used Libet’s 
paradigm to investigate the brain correlates of the intentional generation of an action. In 
their version of the task, the authors required participants to either attend to the intention 
to act or at the actual implementation of the movement. By directing attention to the 
intention (or urge) to act they found an increase of preSMA activity if compared to the 
condition where participants were attending the bare movement (Lau, Rogers, Haggard, et 
al., 2004). This evidence clearly support the involvement of the preSMA in the ‘when’ 
decision. 
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Figure 1.1: Schematic overview of brain regions in the frontomedian wall, along with their assumed 
functions within the ‘WWW’ model of intentional actions (Brass & Haggard, 2008). Image displayed 
in neurological convention. RCZ, rostral cingulate zone; preSMA, pre-supplementary motor area; 
SMA, supplementary motor area. 
 
1.2.2.3. Dissociating the ‘what’ and ‘when’ components 
Based on the aforementioned results, the activations reported to support the ‘what’ 
and the ‘when’ decisional component appear to be very similar, with most consistent 
activity within the RCZ and/or preSMA (Fig. 1.1). Although RCZ seems to be more involved 
in processing of ‘what’ decisions and the preSMA seemingly in ‘when’ decisions the 
evidence appears not very convincing. A recent study by Krieghoff and colleagues (2009) 
aimed to dissociate the neural correlates of internally selected and internally timed actions. 
Subjects were presented with a cue and had to decide as quickly as possible which action to 
perform and when to do so. Further, the two decisions were either taken voluntary or 
triggered by an external cue enabling the authors to differentiate between internal and 
external what and when decisions. Crucially they dissociated the moment at which the 
subjects had to make the decision of what to do and when to act, from the moment at which 
the subjects actually executed the action. Based on the results of Mueller et al. (2007) they 
hypothesized that the RCZ might be involved in deciding which action to perform, whereas 
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the preSMA might be involved in the decision of when to perform the action. The results of 
the whole-brain analysis revealed a functional dissociation between the two areas in the 
frontomedian wall. The RCZ was involved in the decision of which action to perform, 
whereas a brain region in the posterior frontal cortex, close to the preSMA, was sensitive to 
the when decision. Post-hoc analysis revealed an interaction between the ‘what’ and ‘when’ 
component in the area close to the preSMA, suggesting that the two processes are not 
completely dissociated, but are interdependent (Krieghoff, 2009). 
Further evidence for a double dissociation of this component came from a recent 
studies of Soon et al. (2008). Using MVPA in a novel implementation of the Libet’ task, the 
authors showed that brain activity occurring several seconds prior to the movement, 
allowed to predict both the choice (left or right button presses – ‘what) and the timing 
(‘when’) of participants’ responses. They showed that the frontopolar (FP) cortex and the 
precuneus (P) best predicted the ‘what’ decision while information related to the ‘when’ 
decision was decoded in the preSMA and SMA (Soon et al., 2008). 
An elegant demonstration of how the ‘what’ and the ‘when’ subcomponent of 
intentional action can be dissociated up until their actual motor implementation came 
from a study of Becchio and colleagues (2014). In two consecutive experiments they 
explored the kinematic patterning that characterized reach-to-grasp movements in free and 
cued conditions. While in the first experiment compared voluntary and stimulus-driven 
movements directly, the second experiment investigated whether selective intentional 
components of intentional actions affected different characteristic of the reach-to-grasp 
movement. In the latter experiment the ‘what voluntary’ decision (conceptualized as a 
choice between small and large objects) was compared with a ‘what constrained’ condition, 
while the ‘when’ decisions for ‘voluntary’ and ‘constrained’ condition were mutually 
compared. Results showed that movement time was longer and maximum grip aperture 
was reached later in time for the ‘what voluntary’ compared to the ‘what constrained’ 
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condition. The influence of the when decision component was confined to the time of 
maximum grip aperture. This was reached earlier for ‘when constrained’ actions in 
comparison to ‘voluntary’ actions, indicating that the intentional selection of the timing of 
the action influenced the approach parameters. This behavioural results are the first 
evidence that the movement parameters of an action are distinctly modulated by the two 
subcomponent of intentional action, namely the ‘what’ and the ‘when’ component 
(Becchio et al., 2014). 
To sum up, there is strong evidence for a functional dissociation of the ‘when’ and 
‘what’ component both at the neural and at the behavioural level. 
 
1.3. The importance of inhibition for everyday function 
In everyday life, alternative action programs must be inhibited to achieve optimal 
goal-directed behaviour. Choosing whether to perform an action or not is a fundamental 
process that allows people to flexibly interact within a complex social environment. 
Without this ability, actions would be impulsive and would leave little space to correct 
misguided decisions. Sometimes such decisions might be taken ahead of time, such as 
when planning whether to go for a run in the morning or deciding to sleep an extra hour. 
Often, however, one has to take an in-the-moment decision to accomplish or to stop a motor 
plan that has already partially implemented. Football athletes for example, continuously 
regulate their interactions with other players by both deciding 'the best athletic feat' for that 
specific game phase, but also through being able to inhibit the motor plan in reaction to an 
opponent's unexpected move. In that circumstances an effective balance between action 
and inhibition could be a very important factor to decide that a predicted change in the 
environment will be inappropriate thus preventing the execution of the motor plan and any 
of its causal external effects. 
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Response inhibition is generally considered a prominent sub-component of 
cognitive control which is part of executive functions (Bari & Robbins, 2013; Veen & Carter, 
2006). According to the past literature, the processes by which such higher-order 
supervisory system allows to halt a lower-order behavioural impulse, might arise from two 
possible mechanisms. On one hand, ‘stimulus-driven inhibition’ describes the ability to 
inhibit actions in response to some exogenous signals that are present within the physical 
environment or within the current set of appropriate social rules (Severens, Kühn, 
Hartsuiker, & Brass, 2012). On the other hand, in everyday life situations a more intentional 
mechanism might be recruited to withhold from executing a pre-potent action tendency, 
the so-called ‘intentional inhibition’ (Brass & Haggard, 2007; Filevich, Kühn, & Haggard, 
2012). 
 
1.3.1. The study of stimulus-driven inhibition 
Most of what we know regarding inhibitory control has been investigated over the 
years employing paradigms that required participants to stop an ongoing behaviour in 
response to an external sensory stimulus (van den Wildenberg et al., 2010). In these tasks, 
desisting from action is a reactive response linked to the presentation of an unambiguous 
signal in the environment which directs the inhibition of the response, excluding any 
component of spontaneous choice of the individual, but just to implement the ‘stop’ 
instruction. In this respect, ‘Go/Nogo’ paradigms and ‘Stop signal’ tasks (SSTs) have been 
frequently adopted to investigate inhibition (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). 
In the Go/Nogo paradigm participants are exposed to one of two cues that instruct 
them to either act or withhold action. Usually ‘go’ stimuli are presented in a sequence, in 
alternation with ‘nogo’ stimuli, triggering the inhibition of a tendency to respond, a 
phenomenon termed ‘action restraint’. The Go/Nogo task manipulates action pre-potency 
by varying the probability of ‘go’ and ‘nogo’ cues (Eimer, 1993). For example, increasing the 
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frequency of ‘go’ cues in a block of trials, would boost the urge toward action so that 
participants would be more ready to act. As a consequence also the level of inhibition 
required to withhold the response at the appearance of the ‘nogo’ cue would be increased. 
Differently, the SST (Logan, 1994) requires an active search for the ‘stop signal’ to 
trigger inhibition for an already started action, eliciting a process of ‘action cancellation’ 
(Bari & Robbins, 2013). In a classical SST, participants are forced to respond to well-defined 
go stimuli presented on every trial, while they are required to halt key presses in response 
to a pre-instructed external stop signal that might appear just after the go stimulus. The 
time between the ‘go’ and the ‘stop’ signals is defined as the stop signal delay (SSD). By 
varying this delay it is possible to manipulate the likelihood of a successful inhibition of the 
response. With a longer SSD the action program is interrupted later and stopping becomes 
more difficult. As a consequence commission errors are more likely to occur. This 
experimental manipulation allows to calculate the stop-signal reaction time (SSRT) which 
is a measure of efficacy of the inhibitory processes (Logan, 1994; Logan & Cowan, 1984). The 
SSRT provides information on how quickly the inhibition process can be applied 
successfully before action execution. A shorter SSRT means more effective inhibition. 
 
1.3.1.1. The neural correlates of stimulus-driven inhibition 
The electrophysiological correlates of response inhibition have been widely 
investigated. In the Go/Nogo task, go cues produce smaller N2 and P3 components than 
nogo cues (Eimer, 1993). A high false-alarm rate (i.e., acting when participants should 
inhibit) has been correlated with smaller nogo-related N2 components if compared with a 
lower false alarm rate. This suggests that the amplitude of the N2 component reflects the 
intensity of the inhibition capacity (Falkenstein, Hoormann, & Hohnsbein, 1999). In the 
same fashion, experiments using the SST indicated that N2 and P3 components are crucial 
for response inhibition meaning that stop signals increase the components’ amplitude 
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compared to the go trials (Kok, Ramautar, De Ruiter, Band, & Ridderinkhof, 2004). 
Moreover the N2 and P3 components related to stop signals are considerably larger when 
stop signals are infrequent: in this condition since the impulse toward action is stronger, 
inhibition processes need to be more powerful (Ramautar, Kok, & Ridderinkhof, 2004). 
Externally-driven inhibition has been commonly associated with increased activity 
in the fronto-basal ganglia network as revealed by fMRI studies (Duann, Ide, Luo, & Li, 2009; 
Jahanshahi, Obeso, Rothwell, & Obeso, 2015; see Fig. 1.2). In the SST, successful stopping is 
associated with activation in the dorsal prefrontal cortex (dPFC), the inferior frontal gyrus 
(IFG, mostly in the right hemisphere), the preSMA and the basal ganglia (most prominently 
the dorsal striatum and the sub-thalamic nucleus – STN; Aron, 2011; Bari & Robbins, 2013). 
Although the IFG, STN, and preSMA areas seem necessary for response inhibition, the 
nature of the functional connection among these areas is debated. While direct 
connections between IFG and STN are frequently reported (Aron, 2011), some studies 
suggest a direct connection exclusively between IFG and preSMA with further projections 
of the preSMA to the STN (Duann et al., 2009; Jahanshahi et al., 2015). SSRT strongly 
correlates with IFG, but less with preSMA (Aron et al., 2007), so the precise role of the latter 
area might be more general in response inhibition paradigms, reflecting processes of 
action monitoring and conflict-detection. 
Although we have extensive knowledge regarding the ‘stimulus-driven’ processes, 
we know little regarding the ‘intentional’ processes that can be involved with inhibitory 
control. 
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Figure 1.2: Panel ‘A’ depicts the fronto-basal ganglia pathway mediating inhibitory control 
according to Jahanshahi et al., (2015). Stimulus-driven inhibition, which is automatic and habitual, 
is proposed to be mediated by the hyperdirect cortico–subthalamic–pallidal–thalamo–cortical 
pathway. For clarity, some connections are not shown (modified from Jahanshahi et al., 2015). Panel 
‘B’ depicts the functional connections reported in Duann et al., (2009). The analysis showed that the 
preSMA and PMC are interconnected with the caudate head and the STN. The IFC showed reciprocal 
connection with the preSMA but not with other structures (taken from Duann et al., 2009). Image 
displayed in neurological convention. DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; GPi, internal segment 
of the globus pallidus; IFC, inferior frontal cortex; preSMA, pre‑supplementary motor area; PMC, 
premotor cortex; SNr, substantia nigra pars reticulata; STN, sub-thalamic nucleus. 
 
1.3.2. The study of intentional inhibition 
According to the ‘whether’ component of the ‘WWW’ model of voluntary actions 
(Brass & Haggard, 2008; Haggard, 2008), by means of the so-called ‘intentional inhibition’ 
we are able to make an endogenous self-determined decision to stop our actions (Filevich 
et al., 2012) up until the very last moment (Schultze-Kraft et al., 2016). Since, in everyday life 
we rarely receive an external stimulus telling us to withhold action, such decisions are most 
likely taken on a voluntary basis. In this view, intentional inhibition captures the ‘free’ 
process of deciding between intentionally performing or intentionally inhibiting a planned 
action without an immediate external signal instructing us to do so. 
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In sports such as volleyball, for example, we may see an approaching ball which 
automatically triggers the response to hit back. However, we may realise at the last moment 
that there is a possibility that the ball will land outside the court. We could then decide to 
inhibit our motor plan and let the ball pass with the hope it will land beyond the lines. 
During this sequence of events, since the signals from the environment are ambiguous the 
decision to inhibit is made endogenously. 
 
1.3.2.1. Challenges in intentional inhibition research 
Despite the extensive information concerning stimulus-driven inhibition, the 
concept of intentional inhibition has been relatively ignored in previous research. Two 
main reason could be at the basis of this evidence: first, because of the complexity in 
designing experiments capable of a rigorous study of intentional inhibition as a separate 
construct. Second, because previous research considered intentional inhibition and 
stimulus-driven inhibition as single and indivisible concepts. 
 
1.3.2.1.1. Making a free-choice 
To intentionally inhibiting an action participants must be able to make an 
intentional – free – choice to stop the ongoing action program. Arguably, this is rather a 
complex condition to reproduce in the laboratory. Scientifically rigorous experimental 
paradigms necessarily introduce a number of constrains on participants’ decisional 
processes and/or on the behaviour itself. Instructing participants to be ‘spontaneous’ is a 
quite counterintuitive request, and represents the one of the major criticisms for all the 
research in this field. Although this intrinsic limit, ‘free-choices’ to inhibit can still be 
objectively studied in the laboratory setting by contrasting intentional action and 
inhibition choices with responses in which one particular response must be made 
following an external instruction (Haggard, 2008). 
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1.3.2.1.2. Pre-decision and post-decisions 
Inhibition is conceptualized to be an active process. To be effectively studied 
however, the inhibition of a response must follow a prepotent action impulse to suppress. 
Intuitively, without an active ‘urge’ toward the action an active inhibition of the very same 
action cannot be studied. Stimulus-driven paradigms can manipulate this ‘tendency’ by 
increasing the number of go trials and presenting participant unexpected nogo, or stop, 
signals. However, intentional inhibition paradigm cannot include stop signals. For this 
reason, guarantee this prerequisite may represent a challenge for intentional inhibition 
research. Nevertheless experimental paradigms must somehow assure that an action has 
been prepared before the participants’ free decision of stopping it. One possibility could be 
push participants to act frequently, so that they can develop a strong impulse toward action, 
and then present well-defined ‘free-choice’ stimuli where participants have to take an in-
the-moment decision whether to act or to inhibit (Kühn & Brass, 2009; Parkinson & 
Haggard, 2014). Alternatively, to encourage action preparation experimental paradigms 
can provide strict time limits to responses or provide unpleasant consequences (e.g., an 
annoying sound) when an error is made in action trials (Kühn, Haggard, & Brass, 2009; 
Lynn, Demanet, Krebs, Van Dessel, & Brass, 2016). 
 
1.3.2.1.3. The lack of behavioural output 
The study of intentional inhibition is also challenging because as the action is 
inhibited does not produce measurable behavioural outcomes such as reaction times, error 
rates or movement kinematics. Due to these factors, intentional inhibition has been widely 
investigated through neuroimaging techniques with the aim to define whether intentional 
and externally-driven inhibition rely on the same neural mechanisms or not (Schel et al., 
2014). Imaging experiments however, are also difficult since it can be almost impossible to 
precisely time-lock the inhibition decision to the recorded data: although free-choice 
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stimuli can be presented, disentangling the intentional processes from the decision 
processes can be unlikely. This problem requires the implementation of a careful 
experimental design and appropriate control conditions. 
 
1.3.2.2. Gaps in the study of intentional inhibition 
The concept of intentional inhibition remains relatively unexplored. The main 
question regards whether intentional inhibition genuine cognitive function that should be 
studied on its own. For example it may be argued that intentional inhibition is simply a 
symmetrical response choice to action or that it may not be unique in comparison to 
stimulus-driven inhibition (Mostofsky & Simmonds, 2008). Otherwise, if intentional 
inhibition can be dissociated from other forms of inhibition, then its study could be 
extremely fruitful: by only focusing on stimulus-driven inhibition researchers may leave a 
large gap in how we make intentional decision to act and to inhibit, which can be very 
important for the understanding of everyday behaviour. Although the exploration of the 
behavioural and neural underpinnings of intentional inhibition has already begun, 
progresses are still necessary, in particular for the definition of the factors that ultimately 
modulate and determine our decision to inhibit actions. 
 
1.3.3. Past research on intentional inhibition 
Despite the significant challenges outlined above, several studies have attempted to 
circumvent these problems by means of specifically tailored experiments, in which 
participants were free to decide whether to execute or inhibit a particular behaviour (Kühn 
et al., 2009). Below is a description of some existing literature on intentional inhibition. 
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1.3.3.1. Behavioural investigations 
Standard behavioural paradigms able to study intentional inhibition have been not 
designed yet. As previously reported one approach is to adapt existing stimulus-driven 
inhibition paradigms including a ‘free-choice’ condition. Parkinson and Haggard (2014) 
used a Go/Nogo paradigm in order to explore whether the proportions of free-choices to 
inhibit or to act can be modulated by the presentation of subliminal primes. Free-choice 
targets were included in addition to standard instructed go and nogo response target and 
the effect of two types of priming latencies were exploited: positive compatibility effect 
(PCE) in which compatible primes facilitate responding, and negative compatibility effect 
(NCE) in which compatible primes inhibit responding (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2003). 
Results shown that go and nogo primes bias the probability that the behavioural response 
would be freely chosen according to the compatibility effect demonstrating that the 
unconscious mechanisms that concur to determine the free decision to inhibit the action 
can be unconsciously primed (Parkinson & Haggard, 2014). 
Higher-level beliefs represent another important influence on free decisions to 
inhibit actions. Participants who have been exposed to anti-free will messages, and 
therefore have been induced to reject the concept of free will, are less likely to exert self-
control and to inhibit actions when given the choice (Rigoni, Demanet, & Sartori, 2015; 
Rigoni, Kühn, Gaudino, Sartori, & Brass, 2012). Importantly, these influences on our free 
decisions to inhibit have only been apparent because intentional inhibition and stimulus 
striven inhibition have been studied as separate constructs. 
 
1.3.3.2. The neural correlates of intentional inhibition 
The neural correlates of intentional inhibition have been elucidated by means of 
fMRI studies. Although the activity related to intentional inhibition largely overlaps with 
the networks characterizing externally-driven inhibition (Schel et al., 2014), increased 
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activity within the dorsal part of the frontomedian cortex (dFMC) has also been reported 
(Brass & Haggard, 2007; Kühn, Haggard, et al., 2009; Lynn, Muhle-Karbe, & Brass, 2014; see 
Fig. 1.3). 
Brass and Haggard (2007) adapted the Libet task to study intentional inhibition. 
Alike the standard Libet task (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983), participants produced 
self-paced responses while watching a rotating clock. After, the time on the clock at which 
the ‘urge’ to respond was perceived by the participants was reported. In this version of the 
task, at the last moment participants could also choose to inhibit their urge to respond right 
before executing the intended action. Significant activation in the dFMC was reported for 
the first time when the response was inhibited in contrast to executed (Brass & Haggard, 
2007). 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Schematic overview of brain regions in the frontomedian wall, along with their assumed 
functions within the ‘WWW’ model of intentional actions (Brass & Haggard, 2008). Image displayed 
in neurological convention. dFMC, dorsal frontomedian cortex; RCZ, rostral cingulate zone; 
preSMA, pre-supplementary motor area; SMA, supplementary motor area. 
 
Subsequent studies have supported the involvement of the dFMC in intentional-inhibition. 
In the ‘marble task’ (Kühn et al., 2009), participants watch a marble rolling down a ramp. 
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An unpleasant sound was produced when the marble smashed at the bottom of the ramp. 
However, in some trials the marble turns from white to green and participants were 
requested to press a key as fast as possible to stop the marble and prevented from smashing 
it. When the marble remains white, participants were instructed to make a free decision 
whether to stop or not the marble from rolling down the ramp. Once again activation of the 
dFMC was reported when participants freely choose to stop rather than let the action to 
unfold (Kühn et al., 2009). Moreover increased effective connectivity was reported between 
the dFMC and the preSMA areas, when participants decide to inhibit rather than execute 
the action. Other studies using the same paradigm suggested intentional and stimulus-
driven inhibition largely overlap in their brain activations, and the contribution of the 
dFMC depended on previous trial history. With a high number of preceding consecutive 
action trials, the dFMC was less recruited in subsequent intentional inhibition trials (Schel 
et al., 2014) suggesting that the greater the automaticity of action the less the contribution 
of the dFMC to free-choices. Interestingly, greater action automaticity also reduces the 
likelihood that participants chose to inhibit the response. 
Initially thought of as a late ‘veto area’, with the ability to halt voluntary motor 
commands (Kühn, Haggard, et al., 2009), the dFMC has been recently indicated as a key 
region for self-control, allowing to disengage from strong impulses and intentions (Lynn et 
al., 2014). A point worth noting, however, is that whereas some studies failed to identify 
inhibition-related activity over the dFMC (Hartwell et al., 2011; Kühn & Brass, 2009), others 
found dFMC activation confined to externally-driven inhibition (Lynn et al., 2016; Severens 
et al., 2012). These inconsistencies make the role and underlying functioning of dFMC quite 
controversial. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATIONS OF FREE-CHOICES 
 
On the basis of the theoretical framework and the empirical work introduced in the 
first chapter of this thesis, at least three general considerations concerning volition can be 
drawn: 
i. Voluntary – free – choices to act and to inhibit can be dissociated from reflexed – 
stimulus driven – action and inhibition both at their behavioural and functional 
level. 
ii. Far from depending exclusively on conscious decisional processing, free choice 
decisions origin from brain mechanisms that precede – and intuitively cause – 
intention awareness. 
iii. Both the neural networks and the cognitive mechanisms that govern free choices 
can be experimentally manipulated. 
With this in mind, the present chapter will introduce the experimental manipulations that 
I have adopted in my experimental work: subliminal priming and the modulation of the 
level of arousal. First I will propose a general overview of the two concepts and how they are 
conceptualized within the field of cognitive psychology and neuroscience. Next I will 
provide some examples of how these variables can be manipulated to achieve a deeper 
understanding for the generation of free choices. 
 
2.1. Priming: an overview 
The term ‘priming’ is used in cognitive psychology, social psychology, motivational 
research, emotion research and other related fields with different interpretations (for a 
review see Bermeitinger, 2016). In its broader sense ‘priming’ describes the process by 
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which a stimulus or event B (typically named target) is preceded by a stimulus or event A 
(the prime) which has an hypothesized effect on B. In cognitive psychology, the term 
‘priming’ takes its narrowest interpretation and usually the effects of A on B lays in the time 
scale of milliseconds up to a maximum of few seconds. In sequential priming paradigms, 
participants are usually instructed to ignore the rapid presentation of the prime and must 
respond to targets, which appear in rapid successions. Although the precise response to the 
target may vary considerably depending on the subject of study (e.g., word choices, reaction 
times, actions choices, target classification, beliefs), primes modulates response options in 
a way that a condition is more likely to occur than another. For this effect to take place, 
primes and target generally share some common features (e.g., perceptual, semantic, 
conceptual) and this relation allows to infer the underlying cognitive process which is the 
dimension under investigation (Bermeitinger, 2016). One of the most employed priming 
paradigms is the ‘response priming’. In response priming paradigms the relation between 
primes and targets is determined by the elicited motor responses. Since primes and targets 
‘call’ for the same category of responses, the most common manipulation involves the set-
up of conditions were prime and target elicit the same motor responses (compatible 
conditions) or opposite motor responses (incompatible conditions). The dependent 
variables collected in this task are typically error rates and reaction times: compatible 
conditions elicits faster reaction times and lower error rates when compared to 
incompatible conditions. 
In response priming paradigms, albeit participants are not asked to make 
inferences about the content of the information provided by the prime, it cannot be always 
assumed that the effect of the latter does not play a role in participants’ implicit evaluations. 
Many studies reduced such confounding artefacts by presenting primes below the 
threshold of conscious processing, thus inducing subliminal priming effects (Schmidt, 
2008). To preclude conscious processing of primes researches employed paradigms where 
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primes’ timing is reduced drastically or, more sophisticatedly, where a masking stimulus is 
presented immediately after the prime stimulus precluding its conscious visibility 
(Lingnau & Vorberg, 2005; see Fig. 2.1). 
 
 
Figure 2.1: A schematic representation of a typical subliminal response priming paradigm (taken 
from D’Ostilio & Garraux, 2012) 
 
Crucially it has been demonstrated that, unbeknownst to participants, subliminal primes 
can be used to influence free decisions (Bodner & Mulji, 2010; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2003; 
Ocampo, 2015; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004). According to this literature, responses can be 
biased in the way that compatible prime-target response options are chosen more often 
than the incompatible ones. Recent interpretations suggest that the effects of primes in 
response priming paradigms arises from both motor and perceptual mechanisms (Krüger, 
Klapötke, Bode, & Mattler, 2013). For instance the rapid chase theory suggests that primes 
and targets elicit a race of activations of motor responses that move from visual to motor 
areas (Schmidt, Niehaus, & Nagel, 2006). In this race primes produce a pre-activation of a 
response option that is further affected by the activation produced later on by the target and 
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diverted accordingly. In this interpretation, simple feed-forward processing would govern 
the sequential activations of the motor responses elicited by the two types of stimuli. 
Activations related to subliminally presented primes can proceed undetected avoiding 
slower feedback processing from visual to motor areas (Schmidt et al., 2006). 
 
2.1.1. Subliminal priming of free-choices 
Recent evidence provided convincing support for the adoption of subliminal 
priming as a meaningful method to investigate the role of unconscious processes in human 
choice behaviour. In a typical implementation of this method subliminal primes are 
presented prior to free choice targets to investigate whether such priming has an influence 
upon which action is subsequently chosen. Here, the crucial question is whether 
unconscious information modulate the ‘what’ component of volitional control (Brass & 
Haggard, 2008). For example Schlaghecken and Eimer (2004) used a two-choice reaction 
time task in which some choices were instructed, since a visual stimulus (left or right 
pointing arrows) indicated which choice should be made (left or right button presses), 
whereas randomly interspersed ‘free choice’ targets (double headed pointing arrows) 
indicated that participants were free to choose either responses. Unbeknownst of the 
participants, targets were preceded by backward masked – subliminal – stimuli (left or right 
pointing arrows of the same shape of the targets) that created compatible and incompatible 
prime-target conditions which primed participants to choose one or the other response 
option. Results demonstrated that participants’ responses followed the ‘compatibility 
effects’ induced by the priming manipulation. Interestingly in a subsequent experiment the 
authors introduced only free choice trials, thus eliminating the task demands related to the 
instructed trials. In this version of the task free choices were no longer modulated by the 
primes suggesting that the impact of subliminal information on behaviour is mediated by 
currently active intentions and not by the mere solicitation of primes at the motor level 
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(Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004). This type priming research on free action alternatives has 
been carried out with relatively low-level constructs such as the priming of specific response 
options, like the abovementioned study, but also with implications at higher-level semantic 
representation (Gaillard et al., 2006; Ocampo, 2015) even generalizing to novel stimuli that 
therefore cannot trigger already acquired stimulus-response mappings (Ocampo, 2015). 
A recent line of research demonstrated that also free choices to inhibit can be 
subliminally primed providing support for the presence of neural processes operating 
outside conscious awareness in intentional inhibition tasks (Filevich et al., 2013; Parkinson 
& Haggard, 2014). In a novel version of a Go/Nogo paradigm with intermixing free choice 
trials, Parkinson and colleagues (2017) manipulated free choice decisions of ‘whether’ to 
produce an action or not, by subliminally presenting neutral, angry, fearful and happy 
emotional faces before instructed and free choice target. Interestingly angry faces lead 
participant to inhibit responses in free choice trials more often if compared with other 
emotional faces. Crucially, since they collected EEG recordings of brain activity during the 
task, they identified a frontal-midline EEG component during intentional decisions that 
was modulated by subliminal angry faces only (Parkinson, Garfinkel, Critchley, Dienes, & 
Seth, 2017). The modulation of the brain activity within this area of the frontal lobe converge 
with previous research on volition (Brass et al., 2013; Libet et al., 1983). This suggests that 
intentional control processes such as intentional inhibition can be modulated outside 
conscious awareness even by complex (high-level) information in the environment. 
To conclude priming has been proven to be a useful tool for the behavioural and 
neural investigation of free choices. Subliminal priming have been shown to avoid 
confounds related to participants’ implicit evaluation on the purposes of the study. 
Moreover subliminal primes have the ability to modulate the activity in those brain areas 
that predict the unconscious generation of a ‘free’ choice suggesting a reconsideration of 
the importance of free will, and free won’t. 
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2.2. Defining arousal 
The arousal construct, as discussed in this section, is confined to those instances 
that are associated with physical exercise. I will focus primarily on exercise-induced arousal, 
choosing not to discuss the potential roles of other types of arousal states, though a similar 
rationale might be applicable to a wider range of cases, from emotional arousal to caffeine’ 
consumption. 
Ever since its earliest definition as a psychological construct, researchers referred to 
arousal as if it represents a broad range of physiological manifestations (Hanoch & Vitouch, 
2004). Within this original conceptualization arousal typically implies a set of brain 
activations that affect the overall state of readiness to respond to any external or internal 
events (Hebb, 1955), which in turn cause energy mobilization within the organism (Duffy, 
1962). Given the experimental evidence that similar physiological and psychological 
manifestations, also called stressors, (e.g., emotions, exercise, stress, caffeine) caused 
similar arousal states, it was assumed that arousal represented a unidimensional 
phenomenon, a continuum from ‘low’ to ‘high’ energy, from sleep to wakefulness (Duffy, 
1962). Since the beginnings of experimental psychology it was also observed that arousal 
and performance share a peculiar relationship. For instance the ‘Yerkes-Dodson law’ (also 
named inverted-U theory) claimed that performance correlates with arousal following an 
inverted U-shaped function: at low level of arousal, performance will be poor but, as arousal 
rises to a moderate level, performance will become optimal. However, if arousal continues 
to rise, performance will return to decrease (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). Since arousal was 
considered a by-product of stressors that provoked it, a similar inverted-U function for 
stressor-performance was observed, as seen for physical exercise (Davey, 1973). According 
to the unidimensional perspective, these associations were mediated by the allocation of 
attentional resources during performance at different arousal levels (Easterbrook, 1959). 
Importantly, this perspective assumes that all cognitive abilities are maintained by a non-
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specific supply of energetic resources and the volume of available resources allocated to a 
specific task depends also on an individual’s arousal level (Kahneman, 1973). 
The perspective of a unidimensional arousal representing all arousal states has been 
criticised and empirical data did not give full support for the hypothesis that performance 
is an inverted-U function of exercise intensity (Chang, Labban, Gapin, & Etnier, 2012; 
McMorris & Graydon, 2000). First because it has been demonstrated that different measures 
of arousal are poorly correlated (Thayer, 1989). Second because neurophysiological 
evidence revealed that the thalamus and the ascending reticular formation, although 
known to play a critical role in the regulation of arousal since the earliest definitions 
(Moruzzi & Magoun, 1949), are not a uniform system but, rather, consist of several – 
interconnected – arousal systems, differentiated by specific neurotransmitters (Robbins, 
1997; Robbins & Everitt, 1995). On the basis of these evidences several theoretical accounts 
of arousal considered a multidimensional approach as more appropriate for describing the 
interactions between stressors and task (Pribram & McGuinness, 1975; Sanders, 1983). For 
instance, Sanders (1983) drawing from the neuropsychological model proposed by Pribram 
and McGuinness (1975), claimed that different, but interactive, energetic systems take 
place in order to affect the diversity of cognitive processing stages that are required during 
performance. He argued that arousal should be divided into arousal, activation and effort. 
‘Arousal’ was defined as the phasic energetic state at any particular time of the 
performance, which causes a general increase in alertness and attention. Task-related 
‘activation’ was seen as the tonic readiness to respond that causes a change in arousal state 
from baseline. Finally, the third mechanism, ‘effort’, receives information from both 
‘arousal’ and ‘activation’ states in order to coordinate performance outcome (Pribram & 
McGuinness, 1975; Sanders, 1983). What seems to be crucial here is that these models 
predicts that two modes of attentional and motor control sub-serves different aspect of the 
performance: an involuntary control mode accounts for the effects of arousal and 
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activation, while a voluntary control mode is driven by effort (Pribram & McGuinness, 1975). 
Effort disentangles the effects of arousal and activation to avoid undesirable reactions. 
Without a control system “behaving organisms would be constantly aroused by their 
movements and moved by arousing inputs” (Pribram & McGuinness, 1975, p. 439). 
In conclusion, task’ performance is assumed to be dependent on the allocation of 
energetic resources to specific cognitive processes. The volume of the energetic pool is 
determined by individual’ arousal and activation levels while the precise allocation is 
supervised by the effort. As physical exercise can be assumed to be a stressor (Davey, 1973), 
then exercise-induced arousal should be capable of affecting cognition likewise other 
stressors. As I will discuss in the next section, the distinction of voluntary-involuntary, or 
explicit-implicit, mechanisms laid the foundations for the understanding of how exercise 
and cognitive performance interact, both at the neural and behavioural level. 
 
2.2.1. Effects of exercise-induced arousal on cognition 
The effects of exercise on cognitive functions have been widely documented, 
demonstrating both positive and negative effects depending on the precise cognitive 
mechanism assessed, the timing and the intensity of the exercise selected and the variety of 
methodologies used to collect participants’ arousal levels. A number of studies have 
focused on measuring the effects of acute exercise on cognition employing study designs 
that required a single – relatively short – bout of exercise (Chang et al., 2012; Lambourne & 
Tomporowski, 2010). These studies have typically assessed predictions inherited from 
‘arousal’ theories under the common assumption that cognitive performance is dependent 
on the allocation of limited energetic and metabolic resources (Hockey, 1997; Kahneman, 
1973; Sanders, 1983; Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). Although individual studies generate 
inconsistent results, there is a general consensus that acute exercise would have a positive 
– thought small – effect on cognition for performances that stress information processing 
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at perceptual, decisional and motor stages. However cognitive tasks that recruit executive 
processing would be negatively affected. Accordingly, bottom-up, automatic and conscious 
processes would be improved while top-down, effortful and unconscious processes would 
be impaired (Audiffren, 2009; Tomporowski, 2003). This idea of a bidirectional continuum 
(e.g. automatic-effortful) is not new and closely resembles the previously descripted models 
of voluntary-involuntary allocations of energetic or attentional resources during 
information processing (Pribram & McGuinness, 1975). However Sanders’ model (1983) 
predicted positive effects of exercise in both bottom-up and top-down processes assuming 
that a better performance is associated with increased conscious effort allocated to the task, 
failing to recognize the negative effects observed for top-down processing. Since more 
recent empirical evidence gave support to the existence of opposing effects of exercise on 
cognition, new theoretical models have been put forward. 
At the basis of these new interpretations is the key notion that the brain utilizes two 
functionally distinct though interacting systems to manipulate and represent information. 
The content of the explicit system is rule-based, can be verbally expressed and it is tied to 
conscious awareness. In contrast, the content of the implicit system is devoted to 
experience, it cannot be verbalized (it can only be investigated through task performance) 
and it is unconscious (Dienes & Perner, 1999; Dietrich, 2006). The explicit system is sub-
served by prefrontal activity which is linked to higher order – conscious – representation of 
knowledge. The implicit system is mediated by basal ganglia and the cortical-subcortical 
connections to the motor cortex. This system does not hold higher-order representations 
but is fundamental for allocation of procedural knowledge. From an evolutionary 
perspective of motor control the coexistence of two systems has many implications. The 
main advantage of the implicit system is its efficiency and speed: since movements must be 
controlled ‘online’ the procedural knowledge of the implicit system can be accessed 
automatically without the need of further abstraction. The main advantage of the explicit 
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system is flexibility and coordination but it performs better ‘offline’ and it is slow (Sun, 
2006): when the execution of a movement is a matter of time, the implicit system must be 
handle it, deactivating the explicit system in a flexibility/efficiency trade-off, in order to 
perform smooth sensorimotor integrations of the kind that distinguish sport and exercise 
(Dienes & Perner, 1999; Dietrich, 2006; Dietrich & Audiffren, 2011). These sorts of 
interactions are real-life experience when the execution of a complex movement is 
transferred from the implicit to the explicit domain, leading to an inevitable detriment of 
the performance. 
But how does acute exercise manipulate the activity of the two systems while 
performing a cognitive task? Since the two systems appear modulating the activity on 
similar neural mechanism as those involved in the production of voluntary actions (explicit 
system) as opposed to stimulus-driven actions (implicit system), the answer to this question 
is crucial to the purposes of the present thesis. 
 
2.2.2. The reticular-activating hypofrontality model 
An integrative, neurocognitive model has been recently put forward to account for 
the detrimental and facilitating effects observed during acute exercise at moderate 
intensity. The reticular-activating hypofrontality (RAH) model (Dietrich & Audiffren, 2011) 
is based on the consideration that brain activity is fuelled by a constant but limited supply 
of metabolic resources. Since brain processes occurs in a competitive basis, increases in the 
activation of some brain areas must correspond to a concomitant deactivation of other 
areas (Dietrich, 2006). For instance, the RAH model recognizes the occurrence of two 
neurophysiological mechanisms during exercise: the activation of the arousal systems in 
the brainstem (the reticular-activating process) and the deactivation of neural structures 
that are not critically needed to maintain exercise (the hypofrontality process). 
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The reticular-activating process is composed of distinct thalamic and brainstem 
neurochemical circuits (Robbins & Everitt, 1995). More precisely three main systems of 
neuromodulators have been identified to influence cortical arousal: the noradrenergic, the 
dopaminergic and the serotoninergic systems. The activity of the noradrenergic axons 
mediates alertness, enhancing attention and the sensory processing of environmental 
challenges including novel stimuli (Aston-Jones, Chiang, & Alexinsky, 1991) maintaining 
discriminations processes under a high level of arousal. This system also innervates the 
prefrontal cortex helping detecting sensory signals reducing signal-to-noise ratio at the 
cortical level producing a modulatory influence on executive functions such as the 
inhibition of the processing of irrelevant stimuli (Ramos & Arnsten, 2007; Robbins & Everitt, 
2007). The dopaminergic system affects behaviour accounting for the strength and 
frequency of behavioural outputs (Robbins & Everitt, 2007). The serotoninergic system 
moderate the effects the preceding systems promoting behavioural inhibition and cortical 
deactivation. Although for classical ‘cognitive energetic’ models (Kahneman, 1973; 
Sanders, 1983) the activity of the ascending reticular activating system has been the only 
neural substrate called into question to account for the effects of exercise on cognition, the 
sole action of the three systems cannot justify every reported effects, especially those on the 
explicit system. The effect of this group of arousal mechanism is mostly restricted to the 
facilitation of implicit bottom-up processes, speeding up response times and improving 
detection accuracy (Dietrich & Audiffren, 2011; McMorris, 2016). 
As opposed to the reticular activating process, the hypofrontality process has been 
proven to be a solid account for the description of the inverse effects reported for the explicit 
system. The idea behind the hypofrontality process arises from the direct evidence that 
during exercise the brain is forced to a shift in the allocation of resources between regions 
required for emotional, cognitive, sensory and motor control (Ide & Secher, 2000). Since 
activation in some regions in the brain comes at the expense of other regions in the brain 
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(Miller & Cohen, 2001), during exercise the enormous demands of motor, sensory and 
autonomic structures (activated by the reticular-activating process) results in a diminished 
availability of resources for those cognitive and emotional processes that are not crucial for 
the implementation and maintenance of physical activity such as the frontal lobes 
(Dietrich, 2003, 2006). 
The RAH model has proven to explain some inconsistencies within the 
interpretation of previous literature, thus stimulating future research on the effect of 
exercise on cognition. Rather surprisingly, to my knowledge no studies have tested the 
effect of acute exercise on the generation of free choices to act and to inhibit. Since the 
hypofrontality process is tied with the generation and modulation of consciousness, that in 
turn is the aspect defining voluntary motor control, the RAH model represent a fertile 
theoretical and neuropsychological ground for the investigation of the unconscious 
mechanisms that precedes and intuitively causes free-choices. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SUBLIMINAL PRIMING OF FREE-CHOICES TO ACT AND TO INHIBIT 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 Response inhibition is a fundamental component of humans’ executive functions 
and refers to the ability of stopping the generation of unwanted behaviour up until the very 
last moment (Logan & Cowan, 1984), even when a motor plan have been already partially 
implemented (Logan, Cowan, & Davis, 1984; Schultze-Kraft et al., 2016). Although this 
component has been widely studied by means of Go/Nogo and SSTs (Logan, 1994), it has 
been recently proposed that such tasks cannot fully capture the complexity and the 
flexibility of humans’ behavioural inhibition. Since in daily life, ‘stop’ or ‘nogo’ signals are 
quite rare, most of the time people must generate and implement internal commands to 
halt ongoing responses (Filevich et al., 2012). As introduced in the first chapter of the thesis, 
the ‘WWW’ model of voluntary actions (Brass & Haggard, 2008), proposes that ‘intentional 
inhibition’ and ‘stimulus-driven inhibition’ can be functionally dissociated with the latter 
representing the intentional – free – choice between executing or inhibiting a particular 
behaviour (Kühn, Gevers, & Brass, 2009). To date, the extent to which free-choices are a by-
product of a conscious form of voluntary self-control is still a matter of debate (Baumeister, 
2008; Frith et al., 1991; Haggard & Lau, 2013; Schurger & Uithol, 2015).In this respect, by 
means of two-alternative forced choice paradigms, it has been demonstrated that stimuli 
presented below the threshold of awareness can systematically bias response decisions 
even when such choices appear to be internally generated and free (Ocampo, 2015; 
Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004; Teuchies et al., 2016). As a matter of fact, intentional decisions 
to act might not be taken as freely as one might think: to what extent intentional decisions 
to inhibit are necessarily based on a deliberate choice remains an open question (Parkinson 
& Haggard, 2014). For instance, Filevich and colleagues (2013) convincingly demonstrated 
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that free-choices to inhibit an action are anticipated by a specific pattern of neural activity 
that precedes the conscious decisional processes (Filevich et al., 2013) as demonstrated for 
free action choices (Libet et al., 1983; Soon et al., 2008). Their experimental manipulation 
permitted to differentiate the precursor activity related to free-decision to inhibit from the 
activity involved in the free-decision to act with the former producing significantly smaller 
pre-stimulus ERP amplitudes (Filevich et al., 2013). Arguably, the unconscious state of the 
brain that precede the decision appears to influence the outcome of the subsequent 
conscious decision, rather than vice versa, arguing against Libet’s (1983) dualistic notion of 
a ‘free won’t’. In summary, the concept of intentional inhibition is still poorly understood 
and further investigations are needed for the clear definition of an independent 
psychological construct. As suggested by previous studies exploring its relationship with 
conscious and unconscious mechanisms would add valuable information on how everyday 
‘free’ decision to stop behaviour are implemented. 
Therefore, the present study aims to explore whether intentional decisions can be 
unconsciously biased. I capitalized on a paradigm which has the ability to reveal whether 
the cognitive mechanisms concerned with both free-choices to act and free-choices to 
inhibit can be modulated by masked – subliminal – primes (Parkinson & Haggard, 2014). In 
particular, the paradigm is a modified version of the Go/Nogo task implemented by 
Lingnau and Vorberg (2005). Participants were required to respond to three possible target 
stimuli (arrows) in three different conditions: (i) cued action condition, in which the choice 
to act is indicated by a cue (cued go targets); (ii) a cued inhibition condition, in which the 
choice not to act is indicated by a cue (cued nogo targets); or (iii) a free-choice condition, in 
which participants were free to choose whether to act or not (free-choice targets). The 
targets were preceded by masked primes (arrows), whose orientation could be congruent or 
incongruent with the ‘go’ and the ‘nogo’ targets (i.e., pointing at the same or at the opposite 
direction), or be ‘neutral’ (i.e., a double arrow without direction). In line with this 
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interpretation, I expect reaction times (RTs) to action trials to be speeded up by congruent 
primes and slowed down by incongruent primes. Furthermore I predict accuracy to be 
reduced by incongruent, when compared to congruent, prime-target associations within 
cued conditions. By effect of the subliminal prime presented before the target, a 
comparable pattern of results should characterize response choices in the free-choice 
condition. More in detail, I expect ‘go’ primes to increase the proportion of choices to act, 
and ‘nogo’ primes to increase the proportion of choices to inhibit the action, when 
compared to neutral primes. 
 
3.2. Methods 
3.2.1. Participants 
A total of twenty-seven healthy volunteers participated in the study (16 female, M = 
24.13 years, SD = 3.55), after giving oral and written consent. Data of one participant were 
discarded because of an excessive tendency to prefer action in free-choice trials (98.9% > 2.5 
SD from sample mean). All analyses were conducted on the remaining twenty-six 
participants, whose mean age was 24.6 years (15 female, age range = 19-29 years). All 
participants had normal or correct-to-normal vision and were right-handed according to 
the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). None of the participants had a 
history of neurological or psychiatric disorder. The study was approved by the University of 
Padova Ethics Committee and carried out in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
3.2.2. Stimuli 
The paradigm was composed of three distinct prime stimuli and three distinct target 
stimuli (Fig. 3.1). Prime stimuli were small white arrows either pointing up, down or being 
neutral (overlapping up and down primes). The target stimuli followed the primes and were 
formed by the contour of either upward, downward or double headed pointing arrows. 
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Targets surrounded a metacontrast mask that superimposing the primes obstructed their 
visibility. Primes subtended a visual angle of 0.6° × 1.8°, targets of 1.4° × 3.8° and the mask 
of 1° × 2.2°. The stimuli were presented over a black background and always appeared 
aligned to the fixation cross in the middle of the screen. Stimuli shapes and dimensions are 
shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: A schematic representation of the stimuli used in the paradigm. Values indicate the 
visual angle subtended. 
 
3.2.3. Procedure 
Participants were seated in a dimly lit room at a distance of 60 cm from a PC-driven 
CRT monitor (resolution 1280 × 1024; 75 Hz refresh rate) positioned in front of them, with 
their eyes at a height corresponding to the center of the screen. Responses were given with 
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the index finger of the right (dominant) hand using the spacebar of the keyboard positioned 
along the body midline of the participant. All trials started with a fixation cross (subtending 
0.3°) that appeared in the center of the screen for 534 ms and was followed by a masked 
prime stimulus (from now on defined as ‘prime’) presented for 13 ms (1 frame at 75Hz ≈ 
13.3 ms). Following the presentation of the prime, a fixation cross of 39 ms duration and 
subsequently the target surrounding a meta-contrast mask appeared. Both the target and 
the mask lasted for 120 ms. (see Fig. 3.2 for the sequence of events). 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Stimulus sequence and timings in four examples of the possible masked prime/target 
combinations. 
 
Having the same luminance as the prime, this backward stimulus sequence has been 
shown to effectively obstruct the visibility of the prime stimulus (Lingnau & Vorberg, 2005). 
Between trials a fixation cross was continuously displayed and interrupted only by a blank 
screen lasting the duration of a refresh of the monitor that signaled the beginning of the 
new trial. In contrast to previous studies (Parkinson & Haggard, 2014), I decided to use 
upward/downward pointing arrows and right hand responses in right-handed participants 
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to control for the possibility that go primes and targets might, in principle, produce spatial 
incompatibility effects of the Simon type (Simon, 1969). According to the orientation of the 
target stimuli, the trials of each block consisted in: cued go, cued nogo and free-choice 
trials. Prior to the beginning of each experimental block, participants received instructions 
about the identity of the go target (upward or downward pointing arrow) and they were 
requested to respond as quickly and accurate as possible by pressing the response button. 
In the same block, the nogo target consisted of an arrow having the opposite orientation of 
the go target. At the sight of the nogo target, participants were required to refrain from 
responding. The labeling of go and nogo targets according to arrow’s orientation was 
counterbalanced between blocks and participants. Furthermore, they were told that a 
double-headed target arrow always represented a free-choice target to which they had to 
freely decide whether to answer or inhibit their response. They were asked to avoid the use 
of strategies (e.g., alternating between action and inhibition), differentiating their decision 
throughout the whole experiment. Since speed was stressed to lead participants preparing 
the action at the beginning of every trial, they had to decide at the very last moment whether 
to carry out their response or not. The response window was set at 1000 ms, starting from 
the appearance of the target. With regard to the prime stimuli, they were categorized in 
accordance with the orientation of the target stimuli. In particular, go primes had the same 
orientation of the go targets, nogo primes had the same orientation of nogo targets and 
neutral primes (overlapping up and down primes) served as control conditions. Task 
presentation and response registration were controlled using E-prime 2.0 experimental 
software (http://pstnet.com/eprime.cfm). Each experimental sessions was split in 4 blocks 
lasting approximately 6 min each, for a total of about 25 min. A total of 384 trials (96 trials 
per block) was administered, divided into: 25% go targets, 25% nogo targets and 50% free-
choice targets. Each target was preceded by go, nogo or neutral primes, with equal 
probability (33.3%). A higher proportion of cued go trials with respect to cued nogo or free-
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choice trials would have produced a tendency toward choosing to act in free-choice trials 
that would have been indistinguishable by the effect of the primes. Since there are also 
studies reporting inhibitory activity using equal probabilities for go and nogo stimuli 
consistent with studies using lower probability inhibitory cues (Konishi, 1999; Roth et al., 
2007), I opted to use the same frequency for go and nogo trials. Moreover an equal number 
of go and nogo stimuli has been adopted to avoid the ‘oddball’ effect of nogo stimuli 
(Stevens, Skudlarski, Gatenby, & Gore, 2000). The inter-trial-interval (ITI) was randomized 
and included duration between 2000 and 2500 ms. After the last experimental session was 
completed, participants were informed regarding the presence of the masked primes, and 
were then asked to take part in a short testing phase to verify primes discriminability. A total 
of 30 testing trials was administered (10 repetitions for each of the three prime stimuli): 
testing trials were identical to free-choice trials but participants were asked to focus on 
prime appearance and ignore the target, trying to decide whether the prime was pointing 
up, down, or was neutral, by making unspeeded but forced choices. The shape and the 
position of the prime were described to the participants prior to the beginning of the 
discrimination task. Participants did not receive feedback regarding their success or failure 
of detecting the prime. In case of uncertainty, they were instructed to simply guess. 
Participants were trained to familiarize with the task instructions during a training session 
prior to the beginning of the experimental session. 
 
3.2.4. Statistical analyses 
Statistical analyses on the effects of interest were computed by means of linear 
mixed-effects (LME) models for RTs, and generalized mixed-effects (GLME) models with a 
binomial link function for free-choice behavior and error rates (Pinheiro & Bates, 2000). As 
compared to traditional repeated-measures ANOVA approach, LME and GLME provide 
greater statistical power for the analysis of repeated observations and provide a robust 
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method of dealing with unbalanced data such as in the present experiments (Baayen, 
Davidson, & Bates, 2008). LME and GLME models allow to consider simultaneously the 
standard fixed-effects factors controlled by the experimenter and the random-effects 
factors. For the LME and GLME models used in this study, random effects consisted of 
participants, experimental block and gender. Models were fitted using restricted maximum 
likelihood (REML). For the computation of the models, R (R Core Team, 2017), lme4 (Bates, 
Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015), nlme (Pinheiro, Bates, DebRoy, Sarkar, & R Core Team, 
2017), and lmerTest (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2014) were used. Likelihood 
ratio tests of the full model with the effect in question against the model without the effect 
in question allowed to estimate p-values. The strength of evidence in favor of one model 
over the other is reported as the relative likelihood based on the models’ Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) computed as  =  	
  −  ∕ 2 where 
  represent the relative likelihood of the model with the effect in question, and the two 
models,  and , being compared (Akaike, 1987; Burnham & Anderson, 2010; 
Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004). As preliminary analysis, to guarantee that unconscious 
perception of the prime was preserved for all participants, the results from the prime 
discrimination test were calculated as the mean percentage of primes correctly 
discriminated compared against the chance level of 33.3% accuracy. For the main analyses, 
RTs were obtained from participants’ correct responses to go targets (cued go trials) and to 
free-choice targets when participants choose to press the button to answer (free-choice go 
trials). For RTs an LME model was computed with Prime (Go, Nogo, Neutral) and Target 
(Cued go, Free-choice go) as fixed effects. RTs outliers were removed following a two-steps 
procedure (Baayen & Milin, 2015): first, extremely shorts (< 200 ms) and extremely long (> 
1000 ms) RTs were removed (less than 1% of the data). Second, after the standardized 
residuals of the full LME model have been computed, trials with absolute standardized 
residuals exceeding ± 2.5 SD were discarded (about 2.6% of the data). Free-choice trials were 
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analyzed in order to uncover how masked priming influenced participants’ choice to 
execute or inhibit the actions in both low and high arousal conditions. The number of 
choices to act or to inhibit as a function of subliminal primes was computed by fitting a 
GLME model with Prime (Go, Nogo, Neutral) as fixed effect. Since participants were asked 
to avoid the use of strategies (e.g., alternating between action and inhibition), free-choice 
trials have been further explored by looking at sequential dependencies between trials in 
both low and high arousal conditions. Responses in the current free-choice trial (trial n) 
with those in the previous trial (trial n – 1, which could either be a cued trial or another free-
choice trial) were compared to see whether participants had a tendency to systematically 
respond the same (action - action; inhibition - inhibition) or the opposite (action - 
inhibition; inhibition - action) in trial n as in trial n – 1. A GLME model was computed with 
Previous choice (Action, Inhibition) as fixed effect and the choice at trial n as dependent 
variable. In conclusion, error rates within each cued condition (omissions in cued action 
trials and false alarms in cued inhibition trials) were computed for each session as function 
of the subliminal prime by fitting GLME model with Prime (Go, Nogo, Neutral) as fixed 
effect. For both GLME and LME models, post-hoc analyses were performed on the effects of 
interests by means of planned pair-wise comparisons (t-tests) and the α level was set at 0.05 
prior to Bonferroni correction. For all analyses the complete set of computed post-hoc t-test 
are reported. Cohen’s d indices are reported as measure of effect sizes (Cohen, 1988). 
 
3.3. Results 
3.3.1. Prime discrimination 
 The results of the prime discrimination test show that primes were not consciously 
detected, t(25) = 0.54, p = .472, tested against the 33.3% chance level (mean % correct: M = 
31.32, SD = 3.83). As measure of discriminability, d’ was computed for each 
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prime/participant. The obtained d' values were not significantly different from '0' (no 
discrimination possible), t(25) = 0.82, p = .962 (d' values: M = 0.23, SD = 0.09). 
 
3.3.2. Reaction times 
The analysis on RTs yielded a significant main effect of Prime, χ2(2) = 506.09, p < .001, 
AICRL > 100 and Target, χ2(1) = 251.01, p < .001, AICRL > 100. The main effect of prime 
indicates that response timing were faster if preceded by go primes when compared to 
neutral, t(25) = 9.28, p < .001, d = .26, or nogo, t(25) = 19.02, p < .001, d = .53, primes. 
Conversely, nogo primes slowed down the response if compared to neutral primes, t(25) = 
9.76, p < .001, d = .27. Following, the significant main effect of target indicates that 
responses to cued go targets were faster compared to the free-choice go targets overall, t(25) 
= 9.79, p < .001, d = .27. The interaction Prime × Target was significant, χ2(2) = 6.35, p = .041, 
AICRL = 2.35, indicating that the effect induced by go primes was stronger in the cued 
condition but the effect induced by nogo primes was stronger in the free-choice condition. 
In order to explore the interaction effect specific post-hoc comparisons were performed: 
cued neutral prime − cued go prime (mean difference: M = 40 ms), t(25) = 8.88, p < .001, d = 
.36; free-choice neutral prime − free-choice go prime (M = 31 ms), t(25) = 5.53, p < .001, d = 
.21; cued nogo prime – cued neutral prime (M = 36 ms), t(23) = 8.07, p < .001, d = .33; free-
choice nogo prime – free-choice neutral prime (M = 41 ms), t(25) = 6.68, p < .001, d = .26. 
Figure 3.3 summarizes the mean RTs for each type of target and prime. 
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Figure 3.3: Sample mean of response times (cued go and free-choice go trials). Error bars show 
standard error of mean. ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05. 
 
3.3.3. Free-choice behavior 
For the free-choice condition the analysis looked at how the primes biased the 
choices made by the participants. The response bias was defined as the percentage of free-
choice trials in which each participant choose to respond as a function of the preceding 
masked prime. The analysis showed a main effect of Prime, χ2(2) = 56.28, p < .001, AICRL > 
100, indicating that subliminal primes were biasing participants’ free-choices. Participants 
choose to respond after a go prime more often when compared to neutral primes: go – 
neutral (mean difference: M = 7%), t(25) = 3.70, p < .001, d = .10; or when compared to nogo 
primes: go – nogo (M = 13%), t(25) = 7.19, p < .001, d = .20; and choose more often to inhibit 
the response after a nogo prime if compared to neutral prime: neutral – nogo (M = 6%), t(25) 
= 3.49, p = .001, d = .10 (Fig. 3.4a). Looking at the sequential dependencies in free-choice 
trials, the Previous choice regressor was significant, χ2(1) = 28.96, p < .001, AICRL > 100 (Fig. 
3.4b). Participants choose to respond action (n) after an action trial (n – 1) about 58% of the 
times, and choose to respond inhibition (n) after an inhibition trial (n – 1) about 50% of the 
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times. The significant effect indicates that the response to trial n – 1 was slightly biasing the 
response at trial n by inducing a repetition of the same response (action). 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Mean percentage of free-choice trials in which participants chose to act rather than 
inhibit responses, as modulated by type of primes (go, nogo and neutral – panel A). Mean percentage 
of free-choice trials in which participants chose to act as a function of the preceding trial (panel B). 
Error bars show standard error of mean. *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05. 
 
3.3.4. Error rates 
 Errors in cued trials were generally few (see Fig. 3.5). Within cued inhibition trials 
the mean rate of false alarms was 8.7%. The GLME model on false alarms yielded a 
significant main effect of Prime, χ2(2) = 95.05, p < .001, AICRL > 100 that indicates that false 
alarms were more numerous after a go prime was presented (15.8.%) if compared to neutral 
(7.1%) or nogo primes (3.3%) intuitively reflecting the incompatibility between the response 
suggested by the prime (go) and the response required by the target (nogo – Fig. 3.5b). 
Within cued action trials participants were more accurate and the mean rate of omissions 
was 1.3%. The GLME model on omissions yielded a significant main effect of Prime, χ2(2) = 
6.20, p = .045, AICRL = 3.01, indicating that also in cued action trials the incompatibility 
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between primes and target was affecting the general level of accuracy: omissions were more 
numerous after a nogo prime was presented (2.1.%) if compared to neutral (0.9%) or go 
primes (0.9% – Fig. 3.5a). Mean values for each condition, percentage of errors in cued trials 
and percentage of responses in free-choice trials are reported in Table 3.1. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Mean percentage of omissions (panel A) and false alarms (panel B) as modulated by type 
of primes (go, nogo and neutral). Error bars show standard error of mean. 
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Table 3.1: Reaction time (RT) and standard deviation (SD) in milliseconds of both free-choice and 
cued trials, percentage of errors in cued go and cued nogo conditions, percentage of responses in 
free-choice condition, split for each prime (upper part), and collapsed across primes (lower part). 
PRIME TARGET RTs (±SD) % Errors % Go responses 
Go Cued go 383.2 (±16.5) 0.96  
Neutral Cued go 423.4 (±10.9) 0.96  
No Cued go 459.4 (±13.3) 2.16  
Go Cued nogo  15.8  
Neutral Cued nogo  7.09  
No Cued nogo  3.36  
Go Free-choice go 421.1 (±26.1)  60.2 
Neutral Free-choice go 452.6 (±23.2)  53.8 
No Free-choice go 493.1 (±20.1)  47.8 
Cued go trials 421.8 (±8.6) 5.60  
Cued nogo trials  1.36  
Free-choice go trials 452.9 (±11.2)  53.9 
 
3.4. Discussion 
The present study sought to investigate whether stimuli presented under the 
threshold of conscious awareness might produce a bias within participants’ voluntary 
decision processes. More in detail, participants were asked to respond to cued and free-
choice targets following the presentation of three varieties of masked primes that could 
elicit congruent or incongruent prime-response conflicts. Intentional action and inhibition 
responses were compared with stimulus-driven responses. Since voluntary actions and 
intentional inhibition might better describe everyday life situations, where no specific 
signals to stop are provided (Brass & Haggard, 2007; Filevich et al., 2012), defining its precise 
function is of utmost importance. 
In line with the hypotheses and previous findings (Parkinson & Haggard, 2014), go 
primes had the ability to shorten RTs when compared to neutral primes. On the opposite, 
nogo primes determined longer RTs when compared to neutral primes. The effect of go 
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(congruent) primes was more pronounced in the cued condition compared to the free-
choice condition, but the effect of nogo (incongruent) primes was more pronounced in the 
free-choice condition, as revealed by the interaction effect between primes and targets. As 
opposed to free-choice trials, in cued trials the response option (action) is automatically 
triggered by the appearance of the cued go target. The retention of the information at the 
low-level of direct motor execution leaves less space for higher-level attentional control to 
compensate for the bias induced by the subliminal primes boosting the execution of the 
response. In free-choice (go) trials instead, the (high-level) decisional processes involved 
(highlighted by the longer RTs for the free-choice go conditions in comparison to those for 
the cued go conditions) might mediate the effect of congruent primes but be more affected 
by incongruent information. This support the idea that primes were affecting free-choices 
at the decisional level and not merely modulating the motor threshold (Schlaghecken & 
Eimer, 2004). Accordingly incongruent primes produced more errors in both cued go and 
cued nogo conditions (omissions and false alarms) when compared to congruent or neutral 
primes. 
The primary goal of the study was to test whether it was possible to bias the free 
decision to withhold the response as demonstrated for free actions (Demanet, De Baene, 
Arrington, & Brass, 2013; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004; Teuchies et al., 2016). Results 
showed that masked primes were able to induce the free decision process, both toward a 
significant increase of choices to act in action-congruent conditions, and toward an 
increase of choices to inhibit in inhibition-congruent conditions. Although go and nogo 
targets with equal probabilities were presented, the finding that the overall rate of false 
alarms was higher than the overall rate of omission suggests that the experimental design 
was successful in inducing a robust urge toward the action. This also implies that the 
experimental manipulation proposed might be suited for the study of intentional 
inhibition. One of the major difficulties in the study of intentional inhibition is selecting a 
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paradigm that gives enough time to make a free-choice to inhibit under a strong impulse to 
act (Lynn et al., 2014): in the present paradigm participants were free to choose between the 
two response options. Moreover they were provided with enough time (1 second window) to 
decide whether to act or to inhibit but, importantly, such time-window was not too long for 
the participants to post-decide. In addition participants were previously instructed to be 
always ready to act at the appearance of each target and eventually inhibit the response. 
Although participants were requested to respond in a balanced and random way (to 
the best of their possibilities) their responses deviate from chance level, which does not 
represents pure randomness. Unexpectedly, results showed that participants were more 
prone of choosing to act in free-choice trials (trial n) when the preceding trial (n-1) was an 
action trial too (cued go or free-choice go). These trial-to-trial dependencies, albeit relatively 
small in their effects, have been commonly reported in voluntary actions studies (Lages & 
Jaworska, 2012). Previous research dealing with the production of random response 
sequences showed that naïve participants have difficulties to produce random sequences 
and sequential dependencies across trials are commonly observed in binary decisions. 
These dependencies may indicate an involvement of memory and possibly executive 
control (Lages, 2002; Lages & Jaworska, 2012). Moreover stimulus-driven inhibition studies 
reported that the ability of inhibiting actions depends on the preceding context (Durston et 
al., 2002). Similarly, a recent study of Schel and colleagues (2014) found that the volume of 
activity on the areas devoted to intentional inhibition processing (i.e., dFMC) depended 
strongly on the preceding context. Along the same lines of the present results, intentional 
inhibition responses were less likely to occur when there were more preceding action trials 
(Schel et al., 2014). These effects, albeit small, might represent a possible confounding 
effect and a major limitation of the present study. 
To sum up, as speculated by previous research, intentional decision to inhibit may 
be taken not as ‘voluntary’ as one might expect. In line with my hypotheses the present 
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findings shows that voluntary – free – choices to act and to inhibit might partially depend 
on the unconscious neural processes that precede and possibly determine the outcome of 
the decision. Since behavioural studies can provide only a limited and undirected 
description of the processes involved in intentional inhibition (no behavioural output is 
observable and the decisional process is not under the control of the experimenter) 
previous studies in this field of research typically make use of neuroimaging techniques. 
The experiment presented in Chapter 4 utilize fMRI providing further information on how 
the brain compute such decisions and how subliminal stimuli are processed within the 
network of brain areas involved in free-choices. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MODULATING THE FREE-CHOICE NETWORK: 
EFFECTS OF INTENTIONALITY AND SUBLIMINAL INFORMATION1 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The neural mechanisms involved in intentional inhibition have been tested by 
means of specifically tailored experiments, in which participants were free to decide 
whether to execute or inhibit a particular behaviour (Kühn, Haggard, et al., 2009). A 
peculiarity of these experiments relies on the fact that such tasks do not result in any overt 
behavioural response to be explored (since the action has been inhibited) and, more 
importantly, there is no external imperative signal that time-locks the voluntary decision to 
a precise moment. Due to these factors, intentional inhibition has been widely investigated 
through neuroimaging techniques with the aim to define whether intentional and 
stimulus-driven inhibition rely on the same neural substrates and mechanisms or not 
(Schel et al., 2014). Stimulus-driven inhibition has been commonly associated with 
increased activity in the fronto-basal ganglia network including the dPFC, the IFG (mostly 
in the right hemisphere), the preSMA and the basal ganglia (most prominently the dorsal 
striatum and the STN – Aron, 2011; Bari & Robbins, 2013). Although the activity related to 
intentional inhibition largely overlaps with the networks characterizing externally-driven 
inhibition (Schel et al., 2014), increased activity within the dFMC has also been reported 
(Brass & Haggard, 2007; Kühn, Haggard, et al., 2009; Lynn et al., 2014). Initially thought of 
as a late ‘veto area’, with the ability to halt voluntary motor commands (Kühn, Haggard, et 
                                                          
 
1Published: Dall’Acqua, T., Begliomini, C., Motta, R., Miotto, D., & Castiello, U. (2018). Effects of 
intentionality and subliminal information in free-choices to inhibit. Neuropsychologia, 109, 28–38. 
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al., 2009), the dFMC has been recently indicated as a key region for self-control, allowing to 
disengage from strong impulses and intentions (Lynn et al., 2014). A point worth noting, 
however, is that whereas some studies failed to identify inhibition-related activity over the 
dFMC (Hartwell et al., 2011; Kühn & Brass, 2009), others found dFMC activation confined 
to externally-driven inhibition (Lynn et al., 2016; Severens et al., 2012). These 
inconsistencies make the role and underlying functioning of dFMC quite controversial. In 
summary, since the concept of intentional inhibition is still poorly understood, further 
research is needed to investigate the role of specialized functional areas, such as the dFMC, 
in modulating these processes. 
Despite the specific neuroanatomical correlates, the extent to which free-choices are 
linked with a conscious form of voluntary self-control is still a matter of debate. For 
instance, free-choice action decisions made by patients with preSMA lesions show 
anomalous susceptibility to subliminal primes. Typically, healthy participants’ free-choice 
RTs are increased in congruent prime-target combinations when presented at NCE 
latencies (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2003; Parkinson & Haggard, 2014). By contrast, patients 
with a preSMA lesion, shows faster RTs in the same condition (Sumner, 2007) suggesting 
that a normal function of the preSMA is to suppress involuntary responding to subliminal 
stimulation, and patients with preSMA lesions are therefore hyper-responsive. Patients did 
not consciously perceive the primes, which however influenced their free behaviour. A 
recent study of Teuchies and colleagues (2016) utilized masked arrows as subliminal 
primes, showing that the activity over some areas of the ‘free-choice network’, specifically 
the RCZ, the left anterior insula (AI), the DLPFC and the supramarginal gyrus (SG), was 
modulated according to the congruency between the prime and the response. The study 
suggests an involvement of these areas in solving the conflict between the external 
unconscious information and the free response selection (Teuchies et al., 2016). These 
evidences suggest that testing whether subliminal clues in the environment are able to 
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modulate neural activity in areas such as the dFMC or regions of the choice network would 
add invaluable information on the mechanisms by which we make intentional decisions to 
inhibit or to act. 
To this aim in the present study I capitalize on the paradigm proposed in Chapter 3 
to explore whether the brain areas involved in making free-choices are elicited by 
participants’ responses to free-choice trials and whether the same neural activity is 
modulated by the presentation of congruent or incongruent subliminal primes. At the 
behavioural level, I expect that primes would affect participants’ responses as highlighted 
by the results of the previous experiment: RTs to action trials to be speeded up by congruent 
primes and slowed down by incongruent primes. Furthermore I predict accuracy to be 
reduced by incongruent, when compared to congruent, prime-target associations within 
cued conditions. By effect of the subliminal prime presented before the target, a 
comparable pattern of results should characterize response choices in the free-choice 
condition. The present study, however, allows to make further inferences on how 
subliminal primes are processed within these brain networks, untangling whether primes 
would affect the response at motor level or at the decisional level. Within the ‘decision 
making’ literature choice performances for this type of tasks are commonly described by 
race or diffusion models (Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Leuthold & Kopp, 1998). These models 
assume that participants accumulate independent evidence to support one decision versus 
another (in this case action or inhibition) until a decision threshold is reached (Hanes & 
Schall, 1996). Since the rate at which cortical activity grew toward that threshold is 
determined in part by ongoing stochastic fluctuations of neural activity (Schurger et al., 
2012), subliminal primes could influence the responses to go and nogo stimuli in different 
ways: on the one hand primes could enhance the excitability of post-decisional motor 
pathways, having a direct impact in the actual implementation of the action and thus 
modulating RTs to go trials (Smith, 2000). On the other hand, primes might also bias the 
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actual neural “free decision” in favour of initiating or inhibiting the action: by managing 
the noise level within action decision circuits, primes would change the level at which the 
threshold is reached. Accordingly, while still modulating RTs to go trials, subliminal primes 
would operate also on choices suggesting that the brain incorporates whatever information 
is available, even subliminal, into its decisions about whether to initiate an action or not. 
This interpretation is consistent with previous studies showing that the influences of 
subliminal primes at (low-level) automatic stages of motor processing are mediated by 
(high-level) current intentions and task set, or rather the set of stimulus-response mappings 
imposed by task instructions (Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004). 
Since I predict the present paradigm to be able to disentangle between forced and 
free components of response inhibition in relation to subliminal processing, I focused on 
a network of brain regions described by previous studies dealing with the generation of free-
choices (Kühn & Brass, 2009; Kühn, Haggard, et al., 2009; Teuchies et al., 2016). I expect that 
areas linked to the ‘free-choice network’, specifically the RCZ, that is the part of the medial 
frontal cortex extending posteriorly and dorsally from the ACC, the DLPFC, the inferior 
parietal lobule (IPL) and the AI to be more involved in intentional rather than in cued 
conditions, in both action and inhibition trials (Forstmann, Brass, Koch, & von Cramon, 
2006). Furthermore, to clarify the role of the dFMC – the ‘veto area’ – in voluntary choices to 
inhibit a response, I conducted a ROI analysis focused on this region, directly comparing 
brain activity related to inhibition trials. To conclude, I conducted another set of ROI 
analyses to test whether information provided by subliminal information conveyed by the 
prime might modulate the activity in the same set of regions of the network. Based on the 
aforementioned findings for intentional actions (Teuchies et al., 2016), I hypothesize that 
the RCZ, the DLPFC, the IPL and the AI would be affected by the priming manipulation: I 
expect these areas to be more involved in incongruent rather than congruent prime-
response mappings, given their specific role in overcoming inconsistent sources of 
72 
 
 
information (Teuchies et al., 2016). With regard to the specific involvement of the dFMC I 
conducted a ROI analysis focused on this region, as did for the first set of ROI analyses 
comparing free-choice inhibition trials only, among the three levels of congruency. 
 
4.2. Methods 
Concerning the behavioural component of the present experiment the methods, the 
procedures and the data analysis were identical to those described in Chapter 3 with the 
following exceptions. 
 
4.2.1. Participants 
 A total of twenty-eight healthy volunteers participated in the study (17 female, mean 
age: M = 23.53 years, SD = 2.86), after giving oral and written consent. Data of four 
participants were discarded: one participant was discarded because of an excessive 
tendency to prefer inhibition in free-choice trials (3.64%, < 2.5 standard deviations from 
sample mean), and three participants for head motion exceeded tolerance (> 3.5 mm in 
translation, and 3.5 degrees in rotation). All analyses were conducted on the remaining 
twenty-four participants, whose mean age was 23.8 years (16 female, age range = 19-30 
years). 
 
4.2.2. Procedure 
During stimuli presentation, participants were lying down in the scanner and wore 
MR-compatible LCD video goggles (VisuaStim XGA, Resonance Technology Inc.) with a 
resolution of 800 × 600 and 60 Hz refresh rate. Responses were given with the index finger 
of the right (dominant) hand using an MR-compatible response box (Evoke Response Pad, 
Resonance Technology Inc.) positioned along the body midline of the participant. Every 
trial started with a small fixation cross in the center of the screen for 560 ms followed by a 
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masked prime stimulus presented for 17 ms (1 frame at 60Hz ≈ 16.7 ms). The prime was 
immediately succeeded by a fixation cross of 35 ms duration, followed by the target 
surrounding a meta-contrast mask. Both the target and the mask lasted for 136 ms. 
 
4.2.3. Design 
 An event-related design was adopted and the entire task was split in 4 scanning runs, 
each of them lasting approximately 9 min and 40 s. ITI was jittered including duration from 
3000 to 9000 ms, and the software Optseq2 (http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/optseq) 
was used to optimally randomize the order and spacing between stimuli in order to ensure 
orthogonality of the stimulus conditions. ITI duration was independently randomized 
within each single experimental run. During the prime discrimination task the scanner 
acquired images, with the purpose of reproducing the same experimental conditions of the 
experimental session (images were not analyzed). 
 
4.2.4. MRI data acquisition and preprocessing 
 Data were acquired with a 1.5 T Siemens Avanto whole body MRI scanner (Siemens 
Medical Systems, Erlangen, Germany) equipped with a standard Siemens eight channels 
coils. Participants were positioned headfirst and supine in the magnet bore. The head was 
held in place with clamps to avoid head motion. Functional images were acquired with a 
gradient-echo, echo-planar (EPI) T2*-weighted sequence in order to measure blood 
oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) contrast throughout the whole brain (37 contiguous 
axial slices acquired with ascending interleaved sequence, matrix size = 56 × 64 voxels, 3.5 
mm × 3.5 mm × 4.0 mm resolution, FOV = 196 × 224 mm, flip angle = 90°, TE = 49 ms). 
Volumes were acquired continuously for each run with a repetition time (TR) of 3 s; 196 
volumes were collected in each single scanning run, resulting in 4 functional runs of 9 min 
and 48 s duration (39 min and 12 s of acquisition time in total). High-resolution anatomical 
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images were then acquired for each subject using a T1-weighted 3D magnetization 
prepared rapid acquisition gradient echo (MPRAGE) sequence (176 axial slices with no 
interslice gap, data matrix = 256 × 256, 1 mm isotropic voxels, TR = 1900 ms, TE = 2.91 ms, 
flip angle = 15°). Data were preprocessed and analysed using statistical parametric mapping 
(SMP12 – Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK) working in Matlab 
environment (MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA). The first three scans of each individual time 
series were removed because of the non-equilibrium state of the magnetization in order to 
allow for stabilization. The ArtRepair toolbox for SPM12 was used to detect slices corrupted 
by motion artifacts and/or signal spikes (Mazaika, Whitfield-Gabrieli, & Reiss, 2007). Then 
the data was slice time corrected taking the central slice as reference, realigned to the mean 
image by rigid body transformation, coregistered with the image of the gray matter 
obtained from the structural image segmentation, normalised to the montreal neurological 
institute (MNI) template, and smoothed using a 7 mm × 7 mm × 8 mm full-width-at half-
maximum (FWHM) Gaussian Kernel. Finally, the ArtRepair toolbox was applied again to 
detect outlier volumes concerning global intensity or large scan-to-scan movement 
(Mazaika et al., 2007). 
 
4.2.5. fMRI analyses 
 For first-level analyses, the preprocessed images were analyzed with a general linear 
model (GLM – Friston, Holmes, et al., 1994) for each subject. Trials were modeled according 
to the combination of prime Congruency (Congruent, Incongruent, Neutral) and the 
response to the Target (Cued action, Cued inhibition, Free-choice action, Free-choice 
inhibition), producing 12 different regressors of interests. Trials on which an error was 
made (omissions in cued go trials and false-alarms in cued nogo trials) were included as an 
additional nuisance variable (≈ 3.5% of all trials) and realignment parameters were 
modeled as regressors of no interest to account for motion artifact in the data. For each 
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participant, the four runs were modeled as separate session in the GLM. The fMRI time 
series were then analyzed by convolving a canonical hemodynamic response function 
(HRF) to the onset of the target and the duration of the events in the GLM was set to 0 s. One-
sample t-tests were performed in order to produce images for each single condition for each 
participant. First, a whole brain analysis has been conducted, to explore the specific role of 
intentionality on the response or in response inhibition. For this analysis primes were 
collapsed and the resulting matrix is a 2 × 2 factorial design with Response (Action, 
Inhibition) and Intentionality (Free-choice, Cued) as factors. Images for each of the four 
conditions were entered into a second level random effect analysis (RFX). First, at the whole 
brain level, cued vs free-choice trials were compared in order to reveal whether the ‘free-
choices network’ was significantly involved in the present task. As a second step, a ROI 
analysis was implemented in those areas commonly reported to be involved during 
voluntary choices. ROI analysis were performed using the MARSBAR toolbox 
(http://marsbar.sourceforge.net; Brett, Anton, Valabregue, & Poline, 2002) considering the 
following anatomical ROIs: RCZ, bilateral AI, bilateral IPL and bilateral DLPFC (Brodmann 
area 46 – BA46) as key areas of the network (Forstmann et al., 2006; Teuchies et al., 2016). In 
this analysis I first compared free-choice action and inhibition trials with cued action and 
inhibition trials respectively. Then the two free-choice conditions were mutually compared. 
For the definition of the RCZ, given no anatomical map is available, the average of 
coordinates reported in other studies comparing free-choices to cued choices was 
considered (Demanet et al., 2013; Forstmann et al., 2006; Kühn, Haggard, et al., 2009; Lynn 
et al., 2016; Mueller et al., 2007; Teuchies et al., 2016; Wisniewski, Goschke, & Haynes, 
2016). A 10-mm radius sphere was built around the resulting coordinates according to the 
MNI stereotaxic space (MNI x, y, z: 0 27 38). In addition, in order to test whether the task 
elicited intentional inhibition mechanisms as reported in previous work (Kühn, Haggard, 
et al., 2009), a ROI analysis focusing on the dFMC was conducted comparing cued and free 
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choice inhibition trials. To this extent I created a spherical ROI with 10 mm radius around 
the MNI coordinates for dFMC taken from on Kühn, Haggard, et al., (2009; MNI x, y, z: -7 42 
21). Finally, to verify how masked priming should influence free-choices, the four ROIs 
related to the ‘free-choice network’ (RCZ, AI, DLPFC and the IPL) and the dFMC were 
entered in a 3 × 4 factorial design with factors: Congruency (Congruent, Incongruent, 
Neutral) and Target (Cued action, Cued inhibition, Free-choice action, Free-choice 
inhibition). The congruence between primes and the response given to each different target 
produced twelve different conditions. For the dFMC analysis I focused on the effect of 
primes on free-choice inhibition trials only. I hypothesized that a go prime presented before 
a free-choice trial would produce an even stronger action tendency. In particular, this 
increase would require the activation of the neural mechanisms specifically related to 
intentional inhibition (i.e., dFMC) in those trials that were effectively inhibited 
(incongruent free-choice inhibition trials). Finally, to disentangle the possible mechanisms 
by which priming would affect choices and not just the motor state of responses, I 
conducted an exploratory ROI analysis on primary motor cortex (M1). If primes operate 
affecting participants’ responses by increasing preparatory activity of the motor neurons 
involved in producing the action, one would expect to find significant differential activity 
for incongruent vs congruent trials even in absence of an actual motor response. 
Alternatively if primes affect the activity of the neural representations of choices but not 
directly the motor processes one could predicts no differences within motor cortices. To 
this purpose I contrasted congruent versus neutral versus incongruent nogo trials (cued 
and free-choice) within primary motor cortex. For the definition of the ROI I computed the 
contrasts ‘action > inhibition’ at the whole brain level in conjunction with Brodmann area 
4 (BA4) as defined by the brain atlas automated anatomical labeling (AAL) (Tzourio-Mazoyer 
et al., 2002). For all ROI analyses, planned contrasts were performed using paired sample t-
tests in order to test for the effect of interests, adopting a significant level of α = 0.05 prior 
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to Bonferroni correction. For whole brain analysis all reported effects were thresholded at 
p < 0.05, family-wise error (FWE) corrected with cluster-extent based thresholding method 
with a low cluster-defining primary threshold, puncorrected < 0.001 (Woo, Krishnan, & Wager, 
2014). Cluster-extent threshold was estimated by gaussian random field theory (RFT) 
method (Friston, Worsley, Frackowiak, Mazziotta, & Evans, 1994) implemented in SPM12. 
 
4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Behavioral results 
4.3.1.1. Prime discrimination 
 A prime discrimination test was performed by computing the mean percentage of 
trials correctly discriminated, and comparing this value against the chance-level using 
single sample t-tests. Results show that primes were not consciously detected (mean % 
correct: M = 32.08, SD = 9.26), t(23) = 0.48, p = .632 tested against the 33.3% chance level. As 
measure of discriminability, d’ was computed for each prime/participant. The obtained d' 
values were not significantly different from '0' (no discrimination possible), t(23) = 0.48, p = 
.632 (d' values: M = 0.32, SD = 0.09) 
 
4.3.1.2. Reaction times 
Outliers were removed following a two-steps procedure (Baayen & Milin, 2015): first, 
extremely shorts (< 200 ms) and extremely long (> 1000 ms) RTs were removed (less than 1% 
of the data). Second, after the standardized residuals of the full LME model have been 
computed, trials with absolute standardized residuals exceeding ± 2.5 SD were discarded 
(about 2.4% of the data). The analysis on RTs yielded a significant main effect of Prime, χ2(2) 
= 248.47, p < .001, AICRL > 100 and Target, χ2(1) = 61.25, p < .001, AICRL > 100 but not a 
significant interaction Prime × Target, χ2(2) = 2.28, p < .319, AICRL = 2.35. Since the 
interaction between factors was not significant I looked at the post-hoc comparisons for go 
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RTs (cued go, free-choice go combined) comparing go and nogo primes conditions with the 
neutral prime condition. The main effect of prime indicates that response timing was faster 
if preceded by go primes when compared to neutral, t(23) = 5.88, p < .001, d = .17, (neutral − 
go ≈ 26 ms), or nogo, t(25) = 12.66, p < .001, d = .38, (nogo − go ≈ 57 ms), primes. Conversely, 
nogo primes slowed down the response if compared to neutral primes, t(23) = 6.76, p < .001, 
d = .20, (nogo − neutral ≈ 31 ms). Following, the significant main effect of target indicates 
that responses to cued go targets were faster compared to the free-choice go targets overall, 
t(23) = 5.32, p < .001, (cued − free-choice ≈ 20 ms). Figure 4.1 summarizes the mean RTs for 
each type of prime. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Mean reaction time in milliseconds (ms) for Go trials (cued and free-choice trials 
combined). Error bars show standard error of mean. *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05. 
 
4.3.1.2. Free-choice behaviour 
For the free-choice condition the analysis looked at how the primes biased the 
choices made by the participants. The response bias was defined as the percentage of free-
choice trials in which each participant choose to respond as a function of the congruency 
with the preceding masked prime. The total proportion of actions in free-choice trials was 
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51%. Unlike the results reported for the study described in Chapter 3, the results show that 
in free-choice trials the response was not influenced by the presentation of the prime χ2(2) 
= 4.69, p = .095, AICRL = 1.41. Participants did not choose to act significantly more often after 
a go prime (M = 53%; SD = 11; congruent trials), neither when compared to neutral, t(23) = 
1.973, p = .061 nor as expected by chance t(23) = 1.329, p = .197. Similarly, participants did 
not show a significant reduction in the proportion of free-choice responses after a Nogo 
prime (M = 49%, SD = 14; incongruent trials) when compared to neutral trials, t(23) = .171, p 
= .865, or to chance level, t(23) = .181, p = .858 (Fig. 4.2a). Looking at the sequential 
dependencies in free-choice trials, the Previous choice regressor was not significant, χ2(1) = 
1.03, p = .31, AICRL = 1.21. Participants choose to respond action (n) after an action trial (n-
1) ~ 52% of the times, and choose to respond inhibition (n) after an inhibition trial (n-1) ~ 
49% of the times. The lack of significance indicates that the response to trial n-1 was not 
biasing the response to trial n neither by inducing an increase of switches nor by 
systematically repeating the same response. This result supports the conclusion that 
participants have been responding in a balanced and random way to the best of their 
possibilities as requested by the experimenter (see Fig. 4.2b). 
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Figure 4.2: Mean percentage of free-choice trials in which participants chose to act rather than 
inhibit responses, as modulated by type of primes (go, nogo and neutral – panel A). Mean percentage 
of free-choice trials in which participants chose to act as a function of the preceding trial (panel B) 
Error bars show standard error of mean. ns = non-significant. 
 
4.3.1.3. Error rates 
 Within cued inhibition trials the mean rate of false alarms was 8.6% (Fig. 4.3b). The 
GLME model on false alarms yielded a significant main effect of Prime, χ2(2) = 14.259, p < 
.001, AICRL > 100, indicating that false alarms were more numerous after a go prime was 
presented (12.8.%) if compared to neutral (8.1%) or nogo primes (7.9%) intuitively reflecting 
the incongruence between the response suggested by the prime (go) and the response 
required by the target (nogo). Within cued action trials participants were more accurate 
(mean rate of omissions 5.6% − see Fig. 4.3a ) and the GLME model on omissions did not 
yield a significant main effect of Prime, χ2(2) = 0.454, p = .796, AICRL = .16, indicating that in 
cued action trials the incompatibility between primes and target did not affect the general 
level of accuracy. 
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Figure 4.3: Mean percentage of omissions (panel A) and false alarms (panel B) as modulated by type 
of primes (go, nogo and neutral). Error bars show standard error of mean. 
 
In summary, congruent primes have the ability to shorten RTs when compared to 
neutral primes. The incongruent, when compared to neutral primes, determined longer 
RTs. Overall, RTs for the cued go conditions were shorter than those for the free-choice go 
conditions, reflecting the possible underlying decisional processing. In addition to this, 
incongruent prime-target associations produced more errors (false alarms) in the cued 
inhibition condition. In contrast to my hypotheses and differently from the previous study 
(Chapter 3), subliminal priming was unable to bias the participants’ choices towards either 
acting or inhibiting the response. Mean values for each condition, percentage of errors in 
cued trials and percentage of responses in free-choice trials are reported in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: Reaction times (RTs) and standard deviation (SD) in milliseconds of both free-choice and 
cued trials, percentage of errors in cued go and cued nogo conditions, percentage of responses in 
free-choice condition, split for each prime (upper part), and collapsed across primes (lower part). 
PRIME TARGET RTs (±SD) % Errors % Go responses 
Go Cued go 410.6 (±17.5) 5.21  
Neutral Cued go 425.9 (±15.9) 5.99  
No Cued go 453.8 (±14.5) 5.60  
Go Cued nogo  12.8  
Neutral Cued nogo  8.07  
No Cued nogo  7.94  
Go Free-choice go 422.6 (±23.1)  53.9 
Neutral Free-choice go 451.1 (±21.3)  49.9 
No Free-choice go 476.8 (±19.1)  49.5 
Cued go trials 430.1 (±9.42) 5.60  
Cued nogo trials  9.49  
Free-choice go trials 450.2 (±12.3)  50.8 
 
4.3.2. fMRI results 
4.3.2.1. Whole brain activation of the choice network 
 At the whole brain level I looked at the brain regions that showed significant activity 
when contrasting free-choice and cued trials (see Fig. 4.4 and Table 4.2 for all main 
contrasts). Concerning the main effect of Intentionality, the direct comparison ‘free-choice 
> cued’ highlighted activity within the ‘free-choice network’ (Fig. 4.4a and Table 4.2a), 
including the bilateral IPL, a large cluster extending from the preSMA to the ACC (defining 
the RCZ), the left AI, the superior frontal gyrus (SFG) and the bilateral DLPFC (minimum k 
> 69, height threshold t = 3.119). These activations closely resemble previous findings in 
which free-choices and cued choices were contrasted (Demanet et al., 2013; Lynn et al., 
2016). The opposite contrast (cued > free-choice) returned activity on the P and Angular gyri 
bilaterally (minimum k > 109, height threshold t = 3.119 – see Table 4.2b). The effects of 
response’ type (action, inhibition) were also computed to reveal the activation related to 
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action and inhibition trials. We observed significant activity for the contrast ‘action > 
inhibition’ in the bilateral cerebellum, the bilateral primary and secondary somatosensory 
cortices, the AI and the ACC. In addition, significant activity was also detected in the left 
thalamus and in the left putamen (see Fig. 4.4b and Table 4.2c). The opposite comparison 
(inhibition > action) did not reveal any significant results. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Renderings of the whole-brain contrasts, comparing free-choice versus cued trials (panel 
A) and comparing action versus inhibition trials (cued and free-choice collapsed). The contrast 
inhibition > action did not determine significant activation at the whole brain level. Activation maps 
were thresholded at p < .05, family-wise error rate (FWE) corrected with cluster-extent based 
thresholding method with a low cluster-defining primary threshold, p < .001. The colour bar 
represents t values. Images are displayed in neurological convention. IPL: Inferior Parietal Lobule; 
SFG: Superior Frontal Gyrus; AI: Anterior Insula; RCZ: Rostral Cingulate Zone; DLPFC: Dorsolateral 
Prefrontal Cortex; PO: Parietal Operculum; ACC: Anterior Cingulate Cortex; PoG: Postecentral 
Gyrus. 
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Table 4.2: Results of the whole-brain analysis for free-choice > cued trials (Table 4.2a); cued > free-
choice trials (Table 4.2b), action > inhibition (Table 4.2c) and free-choice action > free-choice 
inhibition trials (Table 4.2c). p value < .05, corrected for multiple comparisons (FWE; Family Wise 
Error). Side: L: Left, R: right; k: cluster extent; MNI: Montréal Neurological Institute. Adopted cluster 
extent varies according to the reported comparison. 
Region Side Cluster level Peak level MNI 
  p(FWE) k t-value X Y Z 
Table 4.2a – Free-choice > Cued (k > 69) 
Rostral Cingulate Zone (RCZ) R 0.000 173 6.36 1 18 42 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) L   5.13 -6 32 22 
Superior Frontal Gyrus (SFG) R 0.000 81 5.78 19 14 62 
Superior Frontal Gyrus (SFG) R   4.27 29 11 54 
Inferior Parietal Lobe (IPL) R 0.000 116 5.40 43 -46 46 
Supramarginal Gyrus (SG) R   5.10 54 -32 46 
Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex (DLPFC) R 0.000 98 5.30 36 32 26 
Middle Frontal Gyrus (MFG) R   4.64 33 42 18 
Middle Frontal Gyrus (MFG) R   4.23 47 42 18 
Anterior Insula (AI) L 0.000 77 5.03 -48 14 -6 
Anterior Insula (AI) L   4.78 -34 14 2 
Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex (DLPFC) L 0.000 114 4.90 -38 49 6 
Middle Frontal Gyrus (MFG) L   4.46 -41 32 30 
Middle Frontal Gyrus (MFG) L   4.38 -41 39 18 
Inferior Parietal Lobe (IPL) L 0.000 69 4.74 -38 -49 46 
Table 4.2b – Cued > Free-choice (k > 109) 
Angular Gyrus (AG) L 0.000 175 5.32 -38 -77 30 
Angular Gyrus (AG) L   4.22 -41 -56 22 
Precuneus (P) L 0.000 139 5.31 -3 -63 22 
Precuneus (P) R   4.84 8 -60 22 
Angular Gyrus (AG) R 0.000 109 5.12 40 -63 14 
Angular Gyrus (AG) R   5.06 40 -77 26 
Table 4.2c – Action > Inhibition (k > 31) 
Parietal Operculum (PO) L 0.000 598 6.81 -59 -18 14 
Anterior Insula (AI) L   6.51 -41 -4 6 
Postcentral Gyrus (PoG) L   6.13 -48 -32 54 
Cerebellum (I  IV Lobules) R 0.000 427 6.75 26 -60 -22 
Cerebellum R   5.98 5 -67 -10 
Cerebellum R   4.72 47 -60 -30 
Cerebellum L 0.000 147 5.52 -20 -63 -22 
Cerebellum L   4.93 -31 -70 -26 
Cerebellum L   4.22 -38 -60 -26 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) L 0.001 63 5.50 -3 11 34 
Cerebellum (VIII  X Lobules) R 0.000 104 5.45 12 -63 -46 
Cerebellum R   4.56 22 -53 -50 
Cerebellum R   3.83 5 -67 -34 
Putamen L 0.008 41 4.55 -24 0 -14 
Thalamus L 0.026 31 4.51 -13 -18 6 
Parietal Operculum (PO) R 0.014 36 4.38 54 18 -10 
Table 4.2d – Free-choice Action > Free-choice Inhibition (k > 56) 
Parietal Operculum (PO) L 0.000 234 5.93 -59 -18 14 
Postcentral Gyrus (PoG) L   5.49 -48 -32 54 
Anterior Insula (AI) L 0.000 99 5.70 -41 -4 6 
Parietal Operculum (PO) L   4.99 -55 7 10 
Cerebellum (I  IV Lobules) R 0.000 260 5.66 26 -60 -22 
Cerebellum R   4.48 8 -70 -14 
Cerebellum (VIII  X Lobules) R 0.001 56 4.52 12 -63 -50 
Cerebellum L 0.000 82 4.36 -38 -74 -22 
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4.3.2.2. Increased ROIs activity for free-choices 
 Since I was primarily interested in the activity related to the ‘free-choice network’, I 
looked at the specific comparisons between the levels of the two factors within the five ROIs 
selected on the basis of prior hypotheses: the RCZ, the AI, the IPL, the DLPFC and the dFMC. 
The main effect of Response (Action, Inhibition) was significant in the bilateral AI, left: 
F(1,23) = 17.72, p < .00, right: F(1,23) = 4.83, p = .029, and left IPL, F(1,23) = 10.64, p = .001, 
whereas the main effect of Intentionality (Free-Choice, Cued) highlighted significant 
results in the left AI, F(1,23) = 5.07, p = .025, the RCZ, F(1,23) = 22.71, p < .001, right IPL, 
F(1,23) = 5.04, p = .026, and the bilateral DLPFC, left: F(1,23) = 5.07, p = .025, right: F(1,23) = 
5.47, p = .020. The interaction Response × Intentionality yielded no significant results in any 
of the considered ROIs. The post-hoc analysis concerning inhibition effects revealed that 
the RCZ, t(23) = 4.52, p < .001, the left AI, t(23) = 2.68, p = .004, the right IPL, t(23) = 1.98, p = 
.024 and the left DLPFC, t(23) = 1.83, p = .041, were significantly more engaged by free-
choices inhibition trials (free-choice inhibition > cued inhibition; Fig. 4.5a). In general, the 
considered ROIs appeared to be more engaged in action than in inhibition trials: 
concerning the effect of intentionality, free-choice action trials appeared to elicit higher 
activity in respect to cued action trials (free-choice action > cued action; Fig. 4.5b) within 
the bilateral DLPFC, left: t(23) = 1.72, p = .044, right: t(23) = 2.16, p = .016, and the RCZ, t(23) 
= 2.21, p = .014. The comparison between free-choice trials (free-choice action > free-choice 
inhibition; Fig. 4.5c) highlighted significant increased activity within the bilateral AI, left: 
t(23) = 2.61, p = .005, right: t(23) = 1.98, p = .037, and left IPL, t(23) = 2.78, p = .003, however 
no further results were observed in the opposite contrast. The main findings of the ROI 
analysis are reported in Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5: Comparison between free-choice and cued conditions within the considered ROIs: A) 
free-choice action > free-choice inhibition action; B) free-choice action > cued action; C) free-choice 
inhibition > cued inhibition. Images are displayed in neurological convention. RCZ: Rostral 
Cingulate Zone; AI: Anterior Insula; DLPFC: Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex; IPL: Inferior Parietal 
Lobule; dFMC: Dorsal Frontomedian Cortex. ROIs are mapped to an MNI render provided with the 
MRIcroGL software. Charts represent mean percent signal change. Error bars show standard error 
of mean. *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05. 
 
In summary, free-choice conditions systematically produced activation on both the RCZ 
and the bilateral DLPFC. This pattern emerges more clearly when the two conditions are 
mutually compared (free-choice action vs. free-choice inhibition): both RCZ and DLPFC 
show a similar activation level for both conditions. This evidence was further supported 
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when the contrast ‘free-choice action > free-choice inhibition’ was conducted at the whole 
brain level: the analysis yielded activation of motor (bilateral cerebellum) and left 
somatosensory areas (parietal operculum extending to the postcentral gyrus and to the AI), 
as expected given the implementation of the response in free-choice action trials 
(minimum k > 56, height threshold t = 3.119), however no other decision-related clusters of 
activation survived. On these bases, the two free-choice conditions seem to rely on an 
overlapping network of activity. Notably, the ROI analysis over the dFMC did not reveal 
significant higher activity relative to free-choice inhibition trials when compared to cued 
inhibition trials (free-choice inhibition > cued inhibition; see Fig. 4.4c and Table 4.2d). 
 
4.3.2.3. Primes did not modulate the choice network 
To further examine the predictions on how the masked priming modulates the 
activity on the areas of interest during free-choices, I conducted a second set of ROI 
analyses. The regions related to the ‘free-choice network’ (RCZ, AI, DLPFC and the IPL) were 
submitted to a factorial design based on Congruency (Congruent; Incongruent; Neutral) 
and Targets (Cued action; Cued inhibition; Free-choice action; Free-choice inhibition). 
Neither the main effect of Congruency nor the interaction Congruency × Target revealed 
significant effects within any of the four ROIs, indicating that subliminal prime stimuli 
were unable to modulate the activity within this areas, neither by increasing the activity for 
incongruent trials nor reducing the activity for congruent trials. Furthermore, masked 
primes were unable to modulate the activity of the dFMC within free-choice inhibition 
trials. Incongruent primes (go prime) did not engaged dFMC more than congruent, t(23) = 
0.53, p = .701 or neutral t(23) = 1.33, p = .908 primes. To conclude, the ROI analysis on the 
activity of M1 in nogo trials (cued and free-choice combined) did not reveal a significant 
increase of activity for incongruent (go) primes when compared to congruent (nogo), t(23) 
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= 0.28, p = .390, or neutral primes t(23) = 0.82, p = .792, neither when congruent primes are 
compared with incongruent, t(23) = 0.28, p = .609, or neutral primes, t(23) = 1.04, p = .851. 
 
4.4. Discussion 
Previous research suggested that activity of some neural structures in the 
frontomedian wall, such as the RCZ, might account for the voluntary choices of response 
alternatives (Kühn, Gevers, et al., 2009). Beyond the RCZ, making voluntary action choices 
involve a broader network including AI (Brass & Haggard, 2010; Droutman, Bechara, & Read, 
2015), the IPL and the DLPFC (Forstmann et al., 2006; Mueller et al., 2007). Implementing 
the paradigm presented in Chapter 3, I compared intentional action and inhibition trials, 
with stimulus-driven trials. Since alike free actions, voluntarily inhibiting an action 
requires the explicit decision not to implement a pre-potent action (Lynn et al., 2014) I 
hypothesized that such a decision would trigger activity on the same network of areas plus 
those regions involved with intentional inhibition directly (dFMC; Brass & Haggard, 2008; 
Lynn et al., 2014). In this respect, when contrasting free-choice versus cued trials at the 
whole brain level, activity on a network including the RCZ, the bilateral IPL, the right SFG, 
the bilateral DLPFC and the left AI was detected. These activations closely match previous 
findings comparing free and cued choices (Forstmann et al., 2006; Lynn et al., 2014; Schel 
et al., 2014; Wisniewski et al., 2016). 
 
4.4.1. Making voluntary choices 
To further explore the findings obtained at the whole brain level and to better 
examine the neural pattern underlying intentional situations, I conducted a ROI analysis 
on the key areas identified in previous literature (Forstmann et al., 2006; Schel et al., 2014). 
I found that the level of intentionality had the ability to modulate their activity: specifically, 
when contrasting free-choice action trials with cued action trials significant activity in the 
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RCZ and bilateral DLPFC was observed, which was not detectable for the opposite 
comparison. The same ROIs, together with AI and right IPL, were significantly more 
activated by free-choice inhibition trials if compared with cued inhibition trials. 
Furthermore, when comparing free-choice actions with free-choice inhibition neither the 
RCZ nor the DLPFC showed an effect. Rather, bilateral AI and left IPL showed significant 
differential activity. A similar pattern emerged at the whole brain level. Altogether, these 
findings suggest that ‘intentional’ trials recruit RCZ and DLPFC, independently from the 
choice’s outcome (action or inhibition). 
The RCZ has been shown to support various cognitive processes such as response 
conflict (Orr & Banich, 2014) voluntary control of actions (Forstmann et al., 2006) and even 
decision-making (Lau, Rogers, Ramnani, et al., 2004). In all these studies RCZ activation 
arises when participants deal with uncertainty while voluntary deciding a plausible 
response. With respect to RCZ, the present findings are in agreement with the idea that 
intentionally deciding to inhibit the response is the functional synonymous of evaluating a 
response option. Therefore, this process might not require the support of a specialized 
functional area such as the dFMC (Kühn & Brass, 2009). Kühn and Brass (2009) employed a 
modified version of a SST adding a free-choice condition, to demonstrate that the activity 
of the ‘free-choice network’ was comparable for voluntary action and non-action decisions. 
Since in their paradigm participants took the decision in advance, such as an unbiased 
choice between responding or not, they preferred to dissociate between an early whether 
and late whether component in intentional inhibition (based on the ‘WWW’ model of Brass 
& Haggard, 2008). Here results demonstrate that RCZ is not solely involved when the 
decision to inhibit an action occurs in early stages (Kühn & Brass, 2009), but its contribution 
is crucial also during late inhibition processes. 
Also other brain areas were more engaged by free-choice conditions, namely the 
DLPFC, the IPL and the AI. The activation of the DLPFC is thought to reflect attention and 
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working memory related processes due to random generation of button presses allowing to 
keep track of previous choices (Hadland, Rushworth, Passingham, Jahanshahi, & Rothwell, 
2001; Jenkins et al., 2000). Since the task for the participants was to decide as freely as 
possible at the appearance of the free-choice target, and try to respond/inhibit the action 
‘in a random but balanced manner’ this might have determined its involvement. This is 
further supported by behavioural results on sequential dependencies between trials that 
showed how, indeed, participants were responding randomly to the best of their 
possibilities. Nevertheless, DLPFC activity might equally reflect a general preparatory 
process like increased demands on conflict monitoring (Brass & Haggard, 2007; Lau et al., 
2006). Teuchies et al. (2016) found activity in the DLPFC in free-choice trials, but the ROI 
did not show the conflict activation pattern found in other areas (i.e., RCZ and AI). This 
evidence supports the view that the DLPFC might be involved in attention to the selection 
of the response rather than in the actual response selection (Lau, Rogers, Ramnani, et al., 
2004). It must be said, however, that divergent results might be partly due to the differences 
in tasks, stimuli and designs across studies. 
The insular cortex, and more precisely the left AI, has been commonly reported in 
tasks requiring intentional demands (Brass & Haggard, 2007; Droutman et al., 2015; 
Mueller et al., 2007) and response inhibition studies (Aron, 2006; Swick, Ashley, & Turken, 
2011). Despite its well-established role in interoceptive awareness (Craig, 2009) the 
description of the specific function elicited by various cognitive tasks is often explicitly 
neglected. In this study the bilateral activation of AI was involved in action trials, both free-
choice and cued, when compared with inhibition trials, and in free-choice inhibition when 
compared with cued inhibition conditions. A recent perspective suggests that the AI may 
play a role in monitoring and evaluating action-outcomes by signalling whether an action 
was successful or not. The feedback information may reinforce action representations to 
make them more or less available in future occasions (Brass & Haggard, 2010). In this light, 
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it is possible that the AI evaluates the outcomes of the responses when performed, and 
identifies the consequences of not acting in intentional inhibition. Likewise AI, the same 
pattern of activation was observed for the IPL: the right IPL in particular, showed 
differential activity in free-choice inhibition trials when compared with cued inhibition 
conditions and the left IPL in both free-choice and cued action trials compared with 
inhibition trials. The activation of the left IPL in both free-choice and cued action trials is 
consistent with the evidence for a role of this region within the fronto-parietal action 
control network (Forstmann et al., 2006) and for the visuomotor processing required in 
action planning. 
 
4.4.2. Masked priming of free-choices 
The study presented in Chapter 3 suggested that alike for free actions, also 
intentional inhibition is subjected to non-conscious cognitive processes. The fact that the 
‘free-choice network’ is shown to be sensitive to non-conscious information in the 
environment (Teuchies et al., 2016), raised the question of whether such decisions are truly 
voluntary or might be the result of neural preceding unconscious neural activity (Filevich et 
al., 2013). Driven by this curiosity the main goal of the study was to test whether it was 
possible to bias the free decision to withhold the response as demonstrated for free actions 
and whether such bias corresponded to a modulatory activity at the cortical level. Although 
results show that nogo primes slowed down RTs in both cued and free-choice action 
conditions and go primes induced more errors in cued inhibition condition, primes were 
unable to bias the free decision process, neither toward a significant increase of choices to 
act in action-congruent conditions, nor toward an increase of choices to inhibit in 
inhibition-congruent conditions. To test whether the lack of a behavioural result further 
extended to neural data, I conducted another set of ROI analysis including the congruency 
of the priming as effect of interest. In line with behavioural results the selected brain areas 
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appear not to be modulated by the congruency between prime and participants’ responses 
(i.e., to press or not to press). The null effects elicited by the present subliminal priming 
manipulation (though of the exact nature of previously used paradigms) are in contrast with 
what has been reported by Teuchies et al. (2016). Though, it must be said, that the paradigm 
by Teuchies and colleagues (2016) requested a choice between action alternatives, and not 
the choice of whether acting or not. Speculatively, subliminal effects might produce weaker 
effects in a Go/Nogo task compared to a situation where a direct stimulus-response 
mapping is set and the direction of the response is primed. 
 
4.4.3. The role of dFMC 
Similar to studies failing to reveal an involvement of the dFMC in intentional 
inhibition tasks (Hartwell et al., 2011; Kühn & Brass, 2009) or to those observing dFMC 
activity in cued-choice trials (Lynn et al., 2016; Severens et al., 2012), the present findings 
did not collect evidence in favour of an activation of the dFMC in intentional inhibition 
trials. The interpretation of its function in the context of ‘disengagement from strong 
impulses’ (Lynn et al., 2014) may partially explain the lack of dFMC found here. Lynn et al. 
(2014) describes three critical determinants to engaging the dFMC in intentional inhibition 
paradigm. First, the response must be given under the circumstance of choice. Second, 
there must be enough time permitting to take the decision in order to avoid pre-decisions 
or post-decisions to inhibit the response. Third, the decision must be taken under a strong 
urge to act (Lynn et al., 2014). In the present study a balanced frequency of cued go and nogo 
trials might have produced a weaker response tendency if compared with previous 
paradigms that used a higher proportion of go trials with respect to nogo trials. Here 
however, participants were explicitly instructed to always prepare the response but 
eventually decide to withhold it by taking an in-the-moment decision and this was further 
stressed by giving a very short response window (1 sec) in order to avoid post-decisions. 
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Crucially, even if participants were instructed to avoid such behaviour, I did not control 
explicitly for the possibility that they took the decision before the start of the trial, thus 
producing pre-decisions. Nevertheless, RTs in the free-choice go trials were significantly 
slower than those in the cued go trials implying that the two conditions were elaborated 
differently, with free-choice go trials requiring further decisional processing. This suggests 
that participants decided whether to act or not at time of the appearance of the stimulus, 
not in advance. Moreover, the higher rate of errors in cued nogo compared to go trials 
indicate that this paradigm was successful to induce a robust urge toward the action. 
Taking into account these considerations, I cannot rule out that a lack of significant 
differential activity in the dFMC was necessarily produced by a weakened impulse toward 
action. Supported by the results of false alarms in cued inhibition trials, the second ROI 
analysis capitalized on the effect of incongruent primes to boost the urge toward acting in 
free-choice inhibition trials. Although I hypothesized that this manipulation would have 
produced additional activation of the dFMC this was not the case. These mixed findings 
point to the fact that at present no clear conclusions can be drawn on the validity of 
subliminal priming for the determination of the psychological mechanisms and neural 
substrates of intentional inhibition. 
To sum up, the present fMRI study aimed at investigating the neural correlates of 
intentional choice between acting and inhibiting within the same behavioural paradigm. 
In agreement with previous studies the BOLD activity of brain areas concerned with 
voluntary decision processes was modulated by the degree of intentionality of the response 
(Lynn et al., 2016; Schel et al., 2014; Teuchies et al., 2016). The RCZ and the DLPFC in 
particular, were equally active in both voluntary conditions. This finding confirms the 
possible key role of both structures in making voluntary choices, suggesting that 
intentional inhibition and voluntary action might be considered two side of the same coin, 
or rather two possible outcomes of the same decisional process. In contrast with the 
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findings of the previous study however, present results did not give support for the efficacy 
of subliminal stimuli as possible modulators of the cognitive and neural mechanisms 
linked to volition. A reasonable explanation lies on the vulnerability of the effects usually 
reported in subliminal priming paradigms (Bermeitinger, 2016). To circumscribe this 
possibility, the study presented in the next chapter (Chapter 5) investigates the importance 
of arousal in enhancing the efficacy of subliminal stimuli and, in turn, to determine the 
origin of voluntary choices. 
  
  
95 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
THE EFFECT OF EXERCISE INTENSITY ON FREE-CHOICES TO ACT AND 
TO INHIBIT2 
 
5.1. Introduction 
It has been demonstrated that exercise-induced arousal has selective effects on 
cognitive functions. Exercise appears to facilitate certain aspects of processing such as 
response speed and accuracy and enhances the processes involved in problem-solving and 
goal-oriented actions (Chang et al., 2012; Tomporowski, 2003). One of the questions 
attracting considerable interest is whether modulating the level of arousal could influence 
higher-level cognitive functions such as response inhibition. For instance, Weinbach and 
colleagues (2015) included an alerting cue (i.e., an irrelevant stimulus) in a SST to increase 
participants’ level of arousal for a short period of time. Interestingly, the increase of the 
arousal induced by the alerting cue RTs to go stimuli on one hand and shortened SSRT 
(which is a measure of efficacy of the inhibitory processes) on the other, indicating an 
improvement in response inhibition. In authors’ perspective, the results highlight the role 
of basic, lower-level, mechanisms in modulating complex, higher-level, cognitive 
processes, such as inhibitory control, in order to produce high-coordinated action 
performances (Weinbach, Kalanthroff, Avnit, & Henik, 2015). Along the same lines, a study 
by Chu and colleagues (2015) tested the effects of acute exercise on the inhibitory aspect of 
executive function using behavioral and electrophysiological approaches. To examine the 
effects of exercise-induced arousal on motor response inhibition, college students 
                                                          
 
2Published: Dall’Acqua, T., Li, C., Ceccarini, F., Grigoletto, D., Marcolin, G., Paoli, A., & Castiello, U. 
(2018). Exercise-induced arousal affects free-choices to inhibit. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 35, 
89–97. 
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underwent a stop-signal task following acute aerobic exercise. In this study the level of 
exercise was determined via the ‘submaximal treadmill walking test’ carried out prior to 
behavioral testing. A sedentary control session, that involved reading, was also included. 
The main findings from this study suggest that acute exercise results in a shorter SSRT, but 
does not alter the go RTs (Chu, Alderman, Wei, & Chang, 2015). 
Overall, the aforementioned studies suggest that exercise-induced arousal have the 
ability to modulate cognitive functions just like response inhibition. Depending on the 
different moderators that are taken into account (e.g., type of cognitive performance, 
fitness level, task duration), mixed finding are reported for cognitive abilities tested during 
exercise. Much of the existing work examining the association of exercise and cognitive 
functions derives from ‘arousal theories’ (e.g., Hockey, 1997; Kahneman, 1973; Sanders, 
1983; Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). However a more recent account has been proposed. The RAH 
model proposes that during exercise, higher-order computations of prefrontal cortices and 
the actual motor implementation compete for the allocation of limited metabolic resources 
(Dietrich, 2006; Dietrich & Audiffren, 2011). Since cognitive processing is set to a lower 
priority during exercise, available resources are drawn from the brain regions that are not 
essential to perform the exercise, provoking a decline in complex mental processing. On 
the other hand, cognitive performances that rely on more automatic brain processing (e.g., 
reaction times, response accuracy, stimuli detection) would be enhanced due to 
downregulation of the frontal cortex and consequent disinhibition of the arousal networks 
in the brainstem. It must be said however, that some results support the RAH model 
(Lambourne & Tomporowski, 2010) whereas others do not (Chang et al., 2012). 
So far, the effects of arousal on response inhibition have been investigated with 
paradigms concerned with inhibition driven by external stimuli (Logan & Cowan, 1984; 
Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). However, the study presented in Chapter 4 proposed that 
intentional inhibition might rely on cortical mechanisms partially distinguishable from 
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those characterizing stimulus-driven inhibition (Kühn, Gevers, et al., 2009; Schel et al., 
2014). Moreover, the results provided in Chapter 3 strongly suggest that the cognitive 
mechanisms responsible for generation of free-choices to act and to inhibit significantly 
depend on unconscious processing and can be modulated by subliminal stimuli 
accordingly. To my knowledge no studies have previously explored the role of arousal in 
determining the generation of free-choices. The present study capitalized on the very same 
paradigm to investigate whether arousal has the ability to modulate intentional inhibition 
as previously reported for external kind of inhibition (Chu et al., 2015; Weinbach et al., 
2015). By asking participants to perform the task while pedaling on a cycle ergometer, the 
paradigm was administered at a different level of workload intensities with the specific 
purpose of eliciting different levels of exercise–induced arousal. 
Although I hypothesize the main results to be in line with those of Chapter 3, the 
specific effects of the arousal manipulation are predicted to be twofold. On the one side 
arousal would modulate low-level processing enhancing RTs and accuracy. On the other 
side, according to the RAH model (Dietrich & Audiffren, 2011) free-choice performance 
should be disrupted by the arousal manipulation due to an impairment of high-level 
executive functions responsible for the decisional and attentional processing. Likewise, 
this is expected to boost the effect of subliminal primes. RTs of cued and free-choice trials 
would to be shortened in the high arousal condition when compared to the low arousal 
condition. Further, the pattern induced by subliminal priming is expected to be consistent 
between low and high arousal conditions, namely faster RTs after a go prime and slower 
RTs after a nogo prime. In line with previous evidence, an increase of arousal is predicted 
to improve response accuracy reducing the number of errors in cued conditions (omissions 
and false alarms). With respect to the proportion of choices to act or to inhibit in free-choice 
trials I predict a general increase of choices to act in high arousal condition, due to 
enhanced impulsiveness and disinhibition of brainstem circuits. Although I expect an 
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improvement in the accuracy for cued trials in the high arousal condition, when no specific 
control is required (i.e., in free-choice trials where no right or wrong response is given by 
the experimenter) priming might affect responses differently. The impulsiveness and 
disinhibition of attentional resources elicited by the heightened arousal would produce a 
stronger effect of subliminal priming on the proportion of free-choices: go primes would 
increase the proportion of actions and nogo primes would increase the proportion 
inhibition choices more in the high compared to the low arousal condition. 
 
5.2. Methods 
Methods of the present experiment were identical to those described in Chapter 3 
with the following exceptions. 
 
5.2.1. Participants 
Given the absence of previous studies to rely on for the determination of the 
appropriate sample size, for this study a priori power analysis was conducted using a freely-
available software (G*Power 3.1.9; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). The effect-size 
calculation was based on a recent review on the effect of acute exercise on cognitive 
performances (Chang et al., 2012). The optimum sample size of 15 participants was 
calculated by fixing the probability of a type 1 error at an alpha of 0.05, to yield 0.80 power 
for an effect size of 0.23. Because of the possibility that a small number of participants 
would produce unreliable free-choice data within this kind of paradigms (Parkinson & 
Haggard, 2014) a total of 20 healthy volunteers participated in the study after giving oral and 
written consent. Data of one participant were discarded because of an excessive tendency 
to prefer inhibition in free-choice trials (2.34 %, < 2.5 SD from sample mean) which render 
free-choice data potentially unreliable. All analyses were conducted on the remaining 
nineteen participants (13 female, M = 25.36 years, SD = 0.67). All participants had normal or 
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correct-to-normal vision and were right-handed according to the Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). Despite the low-risk physical effort required by the test the 
following exclusion criteria were adopted to ensure the homogeneity of the sample: 
hypertension, diabetes, heart diseases and obesity (Body Mass Index, BMI > 30) or severe 
underweight (BMI < 16). This information was collected with a self-report questionnaire. 
Demographic and fitness data are presented in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1: Demographic and fitness characteristics of study participants (mean ± SD). 
Variables Female (N = 13) Male (N = 6) Total (N = 19) 
Age (years) 24.92 (±3.15) 26.33 (±2.42) 25.36 (±2.95) 
Height (cm) 162.85 (±5.96) 176.83 (±5.74) 167.26 (±8.80) 
Weight (kg) 57.96 (±8.63) 73.33 (±11.52) 62.82 (±11.85) 
BMI (kg/m2) 21.84 (±2.96) 23.41 (±3.16) 22.33 (±3.03) 
Handedness (Oldfield, 1971) 0.79 (±0.21) 0.87 (±0.15) 0.82 (±0.19) 
HRmax (bpm) 195.07 (±3.14) 193.66 (±2.42) 194.63 (±2.94) 
Loadmax (watt) 148.52 (±31.21) 200.21 (±24.67) 164.84 (±37.7) 
30% of Loadmax (watt) 44.55 (±9.36) 60.06 (±7.40) 49.45 (±11.33) 
 
5.2.2. Design 
The study was divided into an assessment session and two experimental sessions: 
baseline and physical-load. In the assessment session the experimenter gave only a brief 
introduction to the study and participants filled the informed consent and exclusion 
criteria form. All participants that met the criteria underwent the ‘sub-maximal workload 
test’ during the same session. The assessment session was separated at least 24 hours from 
the other two sessions. During both the baseline and the physical-load sessions, 
participants completed the computer-based task while cycling the cycle-ergometer under 
two different workload conditions in order to elicit two different level of arousal. In the 
baseline session the experimenter put the heart rate monitor on participants’ chest and ask 
them to start cycling at 60 rpm (rate per minute) with 25 watt load. While warming-up 
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participants read the instruction on the monitor in front of them. About 2 min of warm-up 
was ensured for each participant. After this time participants were allowed to start 
whenever they felt ready by simply pressing the response button. During the whole session 
participants needed to maintain the speed constant while the watt remained unchanged 
and the heart rate frequency was monitored throughout. At task completion they were 
asked to continuing pedaling for a cool-down phase at a lower work rate up until their heart 
rate significantly decreased and they felt ready to stop the exercise. The experimental 
setting and procedure for the physical-load session was the same as the baseline session, 
the only difference regarded the heightened watt load intensity which caused an increase 
of the exercise-induced arousal. Based on the performance on the ‘sub-maximal workload 
test’ a customized watt load was assigned to each participant for the physical-load session. 
Since they were asked to maintain the cadence of 60 rpm constant, the physical effort 
required in this session was considerably higher compared to the baseline session. During 
both experimental sessions the heart rate frequency was collected at the beginning of the 
task and at the end of each block. The sequence of the baseline and physical-load sessions 
was randomly assigned across participants on the second and third visit to eliminate 
possible biases based on order and learning effects. For all participants the two sessions 
occurred approximately one week apart. 
 
5.2.3. Sub-maximal workload test 
Since equivalent workload intensities might correspond to a different level of 
fatigue depending on participants’ individual fitness level, personalized workload 
intensities were calculated corresponding to the 30% of the predicted maximal load 
(Loadmax) for each participant. In order to determine this percentage of Loadmax participants 
underwent to the YMCA sub-maximal cycle ergometer test (Beekley et al., 2004; Pescatello 
& American College of Sports Medicine, 2014). This test allowed to determine the predicted 
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Loadmax at the age-predicted maximum heart rate (HRmax; e.g., 220 minus age). The protocol 
for this test consisted of four three-minute stages (12 min in total) with increasing workload 
intensities starting at 25 watt for the first stage. At the second stage, the workload intensity 
was raised to a specific value based on the stabilized heart rate frequency collected at the 
end of the first stage. If the heart rate frequency was lower than 90 bpm the second stage 
was set to 100 watt, if it was higher than 90 bpm but lower than 100 bpm it was set to 75 watt 
and if it was higher than 100 bpm to 50 watt. The third and the fourth stages consisted of 
increments of 25 watt each. Throughout the whole test participants were required to 
maintain a cadence of 60 rpm. Heart rate data were collected through a chest band (Polar, 
Kempele, Finland) and subjective experience of exertion throughout the test was recorded 
by means of a 6–20 Borg scale (Haile, Gallagher, & J. Robertson, 2015) at the end of each 
stage. Before the test, participants were asked to warm-up for two min pedaling at 25 watt 
gradually reaching the cadence of 60 rpm. At the end of the test a cool-down period was 
ensured consisting of a continuation of the exercise with watt load equivalent to that of the 
first stage of the test protocol gradually decreasing cadence. Heart rate was monitored for a 
surveillance period until stabilized. 
 
5.2.4. Procedure 
 A representation of the experimental setup and an example of a trial sequence are 
shown in Figure 5.1. Participants were seated in a dimly lit room on a cycle ergometer 
(Ergoselect 200, Ergoline GmbH, Germany) at a distance of 60 cm from a PC-driven CRT 
monitor (resolution 1280 × 1024; 75 Hz refresh rate) positioned on a tripod, with their eyes 
at a height corresponding to the center of the screen. Responses were given with the index 
finger of the right (dominant) hand using a response button fixed on the handlebar of the 
cycle ergometer. During the prime discrimination task participants were asked to continue 
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cycling, with the purpose of reproducing the same experimental conditions of the 
experimental sessions. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: A schematic representation of the experimental setup and the stimulus schema 
including the timing and the masked prime/target combinations. In the proposed example the 
upward arrows indicate the cued go target; rpm: revolution per minute. 
 
5.2.5. Statistical analyses 
 Statistical analyses on the effects of interest were computed by means of LME 
models (for RTs and heart rate variability) and GLME models with a binomial link function 
(for free-choice behavior and error rates; Pinheiro & Bates, 2000). As preliminary analysis, 
individual heart-rate variability within each experimental session was controlled to ensure 
that participants’ heart rate frequency was kept constant throughout the blocks, indicating 
that a stable level of exercise-induced arousal was maintained during the whole session. 
Each level of the independent variable consisted of five time-points, one at the beginning 
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of the experiment and four at the end of each block. A LME model on heart rate frequency 
with Time (T1, T2, T3, T4, T5) and Session (Baseline, Physical load) as fixed effects was 
computed. For RTs an LME model was computed with Prime (Go, Nogo, Neutral), Target 
(Cued go, Free-choice go) and Session (Baseline, Physical load) as fixed effects. RTs outliers 
were removed following a two-steps procedure (Baayen & Milin, 2015): first, extremely 
shorts (< 200 ms) and extremely long (> 1000 ms) RTs were removed (less than 0.5% of the 
data). Second, after the standardized residuals of the full LME model have been computed, 
trials with absolute standardized residuals exceeding ± 2.5 SD were discarded (about 2.5% 
of the data). Free-choice trials were analyzed in order to uncover how masked priming 
influenced participants’ choice to execute or inhibit the actions in both low and high 
arousal conditions. The number of choices to act or to inhibit as a function of subliminal 
primes was computed by fitting a GLME model with Prime (Go, Nogo, Neutral) and Session 
(Baseline, Physical load) as fixed effects. Since participants were asked to avoid the use of 
strategies (e.g., alternating between action and inhibition), free-choice trials have been 
further explored by looking at sequential dependencies between trials in both low and high 
arousal conditions. Responses in the current free-choice trial (trial n) with those in the 
previous trial (trial n-1, which could either be a cued trial or another free-choice trial) were 
compared to see whether participants had a tendency to systematically respond the same 
(action-action; inhibition-inhibition) or the opposite (action-inhibition; inhibition-action) 
in trial n as in trial n-1. A GLME model was computed with Previous choice (Action, 
Inhibition) and Session (Baseline, Physical load) as fixed effects and the choice at trial n as 
dependent variable. In conclusion, error rates within each cued condition (omissions in 
cued action trials and false alarms in cued inhibition trials) were computed for each session 
as function of the subliminal prime by fitting GLME model with Prime (Go, Nogo, Neutral) 
and Session (Baseline, Physical load) as fixed effects. For both GLME and LME models, post-
hoc analyses were performed on effects of interests by means of planned pair-wise 
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comparisons (t-tests) and the α level was set at 0.05 prior to Bonferroni correction. For all 
analyses the complete set of computed post-hoc t-test are reported. Cohen’s d indices are 
reported as measure of effect sizes (Cohen, 1988). 
 
5.3. Results 
5.3.1. Preliminary analyses and prime discrimination 
As preliminary control measure, heart rate frequency collected during the sub-
maximal workload test correlated positively with participants’ responses to the Borg scale, 
r(74) = 0.73, p < .001. Regarding the experimental sessions, the preliminary analysis on heart 
rate variability revealed a statistical significant effect of Session, χ2(1) = 149.63, p < .001, 
AICRL = 5.85, but not of Time, χ2(4) = 1.99, p = .737, AICRL = .05, and neither the interaction 
Session × Time, χ2(4) = 0.44, p = .978, AICRL = .02. On average heart rate frequency was 
modulated by the low and the high arousal condition (baseline: M = 100.42, SD = 12.1; 
physical load: M = 114.53, SD = 8.69), but within each condition the frequency was 
maintained constant (see Fig. 5.2). The results of the prime discrimination test show that 
primes were not consciously detected, t(18) = 0.66, p = .689, tested against the 33.3% chance 
level (mean correct: M = 30.6%, SD = 5.23). As measure of discriminability, d’ was computed 
for each prime/participant. The obtained d' values were not significantly different from '0' 
(no discrimination possible), t(18) = 0.57, p = .722 (d' values : M = 0.31, SD = 0.06). 
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Figure 5.2: Mean participants’ heart rate frequency acquired during the four stages of the YMCA 
sub-maximal test (panel A) and during both experimental sessions (panel B). Error bars show 
standard error of mean. 
 
5.3.2. Reaction times 
 Figure 5.3 summarizes the mean RTs for each type of prime and for both 
experimental sessions. The analysis on RTs yielded a significant main effect of Prime, χ2(2) 
= 392.79, p < .001, AICRL > 100, Target, χ2(1) = 398.03, p < .001, AICRL > 100, and Session, χ2(1) 
= 53.89, p < .001, AICRL > 100. Although the main effect of Session indicates that in the high 
arousal condition (Physical load) the RTs were faster, t(18) = 3.60, p < .001, d = .09, the lack 
of the significant interactions Prime × Session, χ2(2) = 3.06, p = .216, AICRL = .62, and Target 
× Session, χ2(1) = 1.66, p = .196, AICRL = .84, indicates that primes and targets were elaborated 
in the two conditions by the participants similarly. The main effect of prime indicates that 
response timing were faster if preceded by go primes when compared to neutral, t(18) = 
7.72, p < .001, d = .21, or nogo, t(18) = 16.86, p < .001, d = .48, primes. Conversely, nogo 
primes slowed down the response if compared to neutral primes, t(18) = 9.02, p < .001, d = 
.28. Following, the significant main effect of target indicates that responses to cued go 
targets were faster compared to the free-choice go targets overall, t(18) = 14.38, p < .001, d = 
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.34. The interaction Prime × Target was significant, χ2(2) = 8.54, p = .013, AICRL = 9.69, 
indicating that the effect induced by go primes was smaller in the cued condition but the 
effect induced by nogo primes was smaller in the free-choice condition: cued neutral prime 
− cued go prime (mean difference: M = 26 ms), t(18) = 6.56, p < .001, d = .27; free-choice 
neutral prime − free-choice go prime (M = 28 ms), t(18) = 5.63, p < .001, d = .22; cued nogo 
prime − cued neutral prime (M = 36 ms), t(18) = 8.74, p < .001, d = .39; free-choice nogo prime 
− free-choice neutral prime (M = 26 ms), t(18) = 4.95, p < .001, d = .22. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Mean RTs in milliseconds (ms) for go trials (cued and free-choice trials) split for each 
type of prime (go, no-go and neutral) in both experimental sessions (baseline and physical load). 
Error bars show standard error of mean. *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05. 
 
5.3.3. Free-choice behavior 
 For the free-choice condition the analysis looked at how the primes biased the 
choices made by the participants. The response bias was defined as the percentage of free-
choice trials in which each participant choose to respond as a function of the preceding 
masked prime. The analysis showed a main effect of Prime, χ2(2) = 98.72, p < .001, AICRL > 
100 and a main effect of Session, χ2(1) = 17.67, p < .001, AICRL > 100, but not a significant 
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interaction Prime by Session, χ2(2) = 3.29, p = .193, AICRL = .69, indicating that once again 
the effect of priming, although present, was similar for both low and high arousal 
conditions (see Fig. 5.4a). Participants choose to respond after a go prime more often when 
compared to neutral primes: go minus neutral (mean difference: M = 9%), t(18) = 6.43, p < 
.001, d = .179; or when compared to nogo primes: go minus nogo (M = 13%), t(18) = 9.22, p < 
.001, d = .261; and choose more often to inhibit the response after a nogo prime if compared 
to neutral prime: neutral minus nogo (M = 4%), t(18) = 2.79, p = .015, d = .081. Interestingly, 
overall participants were less prone to inhibit the response in the physical load condition 
when compared to the baseline condition: physical load minus baseline (M = 5%), t(18) = 
4.10, p < .001, d = .098. Looking at the sequential dependencies in free-choice trials, neither 
the Previous choice regressor, χ2(1) = 3.20, p = .073, AICRL = .54, nor the Previous choice by 
Session interaction, χ2(1) = .23, p = .626, AICRL = .41, were significant. Participants choose to 
respond action (n) after an action trial (n-1) 52% of the times, and choose to respond action 
(n) after an inhibition trial (n-1) 50% of the times (Fig. 5.4b). The lack of significance 
indicates that the response to trial n-1 was not biasing the response to trial n neither by 
inducing an increase of switches nor by systematically repeating the same response. This 
result supports the conclusion that participants have been responding in a balanced and 
random way to the best of their possibilities as requested by the experimenter. The main 
effect of Session was significant χ2(1) = 18.02, p < .001, AICRL > 100, replicating the result of 
the previous analysis showing that participants choose to respond more in the physical load 
condition overall. 
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Figure 5.4: Mean percentage of free-choice trials in which participants chose to act rather than 
inhibit responses, as modulated by type of primes (go, nogo and neutral) and experimental sessions 
(baseline and physical load – panel A). Mean percentage of free-choice trials in which participants 
chose to act as a function of the preceding trial in both experimental sessions (panel B) Error bars 
show standard error of mean. *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; ns = non-significant. 
 
5.3.4. Error rates 
 Looking at both experimental sessions, errors in cued trials were generally few (see 
Fig. 5.5). Within cued inhibition trials the mean rate of false alarms was 8.6%. The GLME 
model on false alarms yielded a significant main effect of Prime, χ2(2) = 47.80, p < .001, AICRL 
> 100, but not of Session, χ2(1) = 1.16, p = .279, AICRL = .66, or the interaction Prime × Session, 
χ2(2) = .77, p = .678, AICRL = .19. The main effect of prime indicates that false alarms were 
more numerous after a go prime was presented (12.9%) if compared to neutral (7.3%) or 
nogo primes (5.7%) intuitively reflecting the incompatibility between the response 
suggested by the prime (go) and the response required by the target (nogo). Within cued 
action trials participants were more accurate and the mean rate of omissions was 4%. The 
GLME model on omissions yielded a significant main effect of Session, χ2(1) = 4.27, p = .038, 
AICRL = 3.11, but not of Prime, χ2(2) = 2.50, p = .286, AICRL = .47, or the interaction, χ2(2) = .89, 
p = .638, AICRL = .21. In cued action trials the incompatibility between primes and target did 
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not affect the general level of accuracy, however participants make significantly less errors 
in the physical load condition (3.4%) compared to the baseline condition (4.6%). Mean 
values for each condition, percentage of errors in cued trials and percentage of responses 
in free-choice trials are reported in Table 5.1. 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Mean percentage of omissions (panel A) and false alarms (panel B) as modulated by type 
of primes (go, nogo and neutral) and experimental session (baseline and physical load). Error bars 
show standard error of mean. 
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Table 5.2: RTs and Standard Deviation (SD) in milliseconds of both free-choice and cued trials, 
percentage of errors in cued conditions, percentage of responses in free-choice condition, split for 
each prime (upper part), and collapsed across primes (lower part). Data are presented for each 
session separately (central columns) and collapsed across sessions (right column). 
 Baseline Physical load Baseline & Physical load 
PRIME TARGET RTs (±SD) 
% 
Errors 
% Go 
responses 
RTs 
(±SD) 
% 
Errors 
% Go 
responses 
RTs 
(±SD) 
% 
Errors 
% Go 
responses 
Go Cued go 406 (±109) 4.21  
390 
(±94) 3.75  
398 
(±102) 3.98  
Neutral Cued go 432 (±101) 4.06  
416 
(±84) 2.81  
424 
(±93) 3.43  
Nogo Cued go 468 (±101) 5.62  
452 
(±80) 3.59  
460 
(±91) 4.60  
Go Cued nogo  14.06   11.71   12.89  
Neutral Cued nogo  7.65   7.03   7.34  
Nogo Cued nogo  5.62   5.78   5.70  
Go Free-choice go 440 (±141)  60.7 
442 
(±132)  62.5 
441 
(±136)  61.6 
Neutral Free-choice go 474 (±126)  49.3 
464 
(±115)  55.1 
469 
(±120)  52.2 
Nogo Free-choice go 502 (±117)  44.7 
487 
(±105)  51.6 
494 
(±111)  48.2 
Cued go 435 (±107) 4.63  
419 
(±89) 3.38  
427 
(±99) 4.01  
Cued nogo  9.11   8.17   8.64  
Free-choice go 470 (±132)  51.5 
463 
(±120)  56.4 
466 
(±125)  54.0 
Cued & Free-choice go 453 (±121)   
443 
(±109)   
448 
(±115)   
 
5.4. Discussion 
 The present study sought to investigate whether performing or inhibiting responses 
depended on the physical exertion in a cycle ergometer test. More in detail the study 
explored whether cued and free-choices among alternatives outcomes (action or inhibition) 
are modulated differently by non-consciously perceived visual information in conditions of 
low and high exercise-induced arousal. While cycling, participants were asked to respond 
to cued and free-choice targets following the presentation of three varieties of masked 
primes that could elicit congruent or incongruent prime-response conflicts. Intentional 
action and inhibition responses were compared, with stimulus driven responses. To 
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introduce the arousal manipulation, personalized workload intensities were calculated 
according to participants’ fitness level prior to the experiment. To my knowledge this is the 
first study attempting to explore the role of arousal as mediator in these processes. 
In line with the hypotheses the behavioural results reported in Chapter 3 have been 
replicated: for both baseline and physical load conditions, go primes had the ability to 
shorten RTs when compared to neutral primes. On the opposite, nogo primes determined 
longer RTs when compared to neutral primes. This effect was more pronounced in the cued 
condition compared to the free-choice condition as revealed by the interaction effect 
between primes and targets. As opposed to free-choice trials, in cued trials the response 
option (action or inhibition) is automatically triggered by the appearance of the cued go 
target. The retention of the information at the low-level of direct motor execution, leaves 
less space for higher-level attentional control to compensate for the bias induced by the 
subliminal primes. This is further cleared up by the shorter RTs for the cued go conditions 
in comparison to those for the free-choice go conditions, intuitively reflecting the (high-
level) decision processes involved in free-choices. Further, the study explored whether it was 
possible to bias the free decision to withhold the response as demonstrated for free actions 
(Demanet et al., 2013; Teuchies et al., 2016). Results shows that masked primes were able 
to induce the free decision process, both toward a significant increase of choices to act in 
action-congruent conditions, and toward an increase of choices to inhibit in inhibition-
congruent conditions. 
The primary interest of the present study was testing the impact of arousal on 
intentional action and inhibition, therefore the differences in participants’ performances 
between the experimental sessions were investigated: RTs were shorter in the physical load 
session compared to the baseline session, for both cued and free-choice trials. 
Furthermore, the pattern evoked by each subliminal prime was consistent in the two 
arousal conditions. In line with previous literature indicating that exercise-induced arousal 
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benefits performance on cognitive tasks (Tomporowski, 2003; Weinbach et al., 2015), not 
only participants responded faster but also were more accurate as demonstrated by the 
analysis on error rates (at least for the omissions). It has been suggested that improvements 
in information processing during exercise are driven by alterations in brain 
neurotransmitter systems. A neuroendocrinological model has been put forward to explain 
how diverse cognitive functions might be either facilitated or obstructed by specific exercise 
conditions (McMorris, Tomporowski, & Audiffren, 2009). According to this model, the onset 
of physical activity triggers a chain of hormonal responses that gradually escalate as 
exercise increases in intensity. Norepinephrine and dopamine, in particular, are thought to 
influence pre-frontal lobe attentional systems by altering background neural noise relative 
to target saliency (Mesulam, 1990). An enhanced signal-to-noise ratio may improve 
stimulus encoding, decisional processes and response activation, and explain the 
reductions in participants' response times during exercise (Lambourne & Tomporowski, 
2010). 
Concerning free-choice behaviour results suggests that the number of choices to act 
or to inhibit were influenced differently by low or high arousal conditions. In particular 
participants made more ‘action’ choices in the physical load condition overall. This result 
is in accordance with the RAH model (Dietrich & Audiffren, 2011) suggesting that, during 
exercise, the physical effort drawn important metabolic resources from the cortical areas 
responsible for executive functioning, disinhibiting low-level motor impulses originating 
in the brainstem. Moreover the behavioral effects may be further strengthened by the 
disinhibition of the arousal systems in the brainstem fostering impulsiveness in the 
decisional process linked to free-choice trials. This is in line with the evidence for reciprocal 
enhancing effects between arousal and impulsiveness in perceptual decision making 
(Murphy, Vandekerckhove, & Nieuwenhuis, 2014), time perception (Wittmann & Paulus, 
2008), economic decisions (Jahedi, Deck, & Ariely, 2017) and sexual behaviour (Ariely & 
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Loewenstein, 2006). In contrast with the hypotheses for free-choices, the lack of a 
significant interaction effect between prime and session, did not support the hypotheses of 
a strengthen effect of subliminal priming in the higher arousal condition. Although, an 
increase in arousal did not correspond to an increase in the magnitude of the priming 
effect, subliminal primes preserved their modulatory pattern in both conditions. A possible 
reason for this lack of effect may be found on the level of exercise intensity that was selected 
for the physical load condition. According to the ‘ACSM guidelines for exercise testing and 
prescription’ (Pescatello & American College of Sports Medicine, 2014) the 30% of Loadmax 
is considered a light exercise intensity. At this intensity, attentional resources may still 
preserve enough control on participants’ free decisions as for the baseline condition, 
without being further disrupted by physical effort. Another possibility regards the moderate 
magnitude reported for subliminal priming’ effects (Bermeitinger, 2016). A recent review 
on the effect of exercise on many cognitive domains indicated that acute exercise 
influenced participants' performance on some cognitive tests but not in others (Chang et 
al., 2012). Performance on tests that stressed information-processing speed and response 
speed was dependent on exercise demand, while tasks that required participants to make 
choice responses on the basis near-threshold perceptual discrimination were not (Chang et 
al., 2012). Accordingly, also the effects elicited by the subliminal manipulation may have 
not been robust enough to be dependent on exercise demands. 
To sum up, in contrast with studies suggesting that an increase in arousal have the 
ability to improve the stopping of an already initiated response when driven by external 
stimulus (Chu et al., 2015; Weinbach et al., 2015), intentional inhibition did not benefit 
from the effect of arousal: the effect of subliminal primes was not reduced in the higher 
arousal condition as expected following an improvement of the executive control. On the 
contrary, arousal biased free-choices by increasing action choices overall, heightening 
impulsiveness and disinhibition of higher-order attentional control. In this circumstance 
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free decisions to inhibit seemed less voluntary determined if compared to the baseline 
condition. The effect of arousal on neurophysiological processes during exercise may 
account for the impact on basic bottom-up processes but have minimal or no effect on 
higher-level, top-down processes such as the control of the interference of subliminal 
irrelevant information. In light of this, I speculate that intentional inhibition and stimulus-
driven inhibition might rely on partially distinct cognitive mechanism. 
To conclude, the present study is the first to examine the effect of exercise–induced 
arousal on intentional action and inhibition. It extends previous literature by showing that 
not only externally driven processing benefit from an optimal exercise intensity. Under 
specific conditions exercise help individuals to perform the tasks rapidly and efficiently 
even when task’ requirement are entirely internally driven. On the other hand, higher-order 
cognitive computations, such as making a free action or inhibition choices, might be 
impaired. When compared to previous experimentation (for review see: Chang et al., 2012; 
Lambourne & Tomporowski, 2010) the experimental setup adopted in the present study 
considers some novel features that allow to draw firm conclusions on the issues at stake 
here. First, instead of employing a pre- and post-exercise measurement design, the task is 
performed in concomitance of the physical effort under different workload intensities. 
Second, this study includes a test of maximal fatigue capacity and utilize intensities that are 
relative to each participant's maximum exercise workload. Third, the sample included a 
sufficient number of both male and female. It should be noted that females are widely 
underrepresented in this literature (Lambourne & Tomporowski, 2010). The present study, 
however, suffers from some technical limitations. In particular, an implicit limit of every 
study concerning free-choices lays in the instructions that are provided to the participants: 
there is a delicate balance between letting participants to truly choose freely and the 
experimental requirement of sampling enough data from all possible responses. Another 
limitation relates to the physiological recordings: arousal data were sampled only few times 
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for each participant to control for heart rate variability, but this aspect was no further 
analysed. Future studies should overcome at least this limitation by introducing a 
continuous recording of physiological data, allowing for a direct link between arousal 
intensity and the performance at the single trial. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DECODING CONSCIOUS MOTOR PREPARATION IN PRIMARY MOTOR 
CORTEX3 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The concept of agency plays a profound role during voluntary decision making 
(Haggard, 2008; Haynes, 2011b) and has an impact on mental health (Haynes, 2011a; Ryan 
& Deci, 2000). Subjectively, performing a motor action is preceded by a conscious impulse 
that initiates the action (Hurley, 2002). The causal role of the conscious decision on simple 
motor actions was challenged by Libet et al. (1983) where the ‘readiness potential’ was 
recorded shortly before a formed a conscious decision to perform an action (see also 
Castiello & Jeannerod, 1991; Castiello, Paulignan, & Jeannerod, 1991). A controversy 
followed about how this observation relates to the causal role of consciousness for motor 
actions and the implications of free will (Breitmeyer, 1985; van de Grind, 2002). To 
investigate whether activity in decision related areas in the human brain predict the specific 
outcome of a choice beyond mere unspecific preparatory activation (Lau, Rogers, Haggard, 
et al., 2004), in two independent studies, Soon et al. (2008) and Bode et al. (2011) presented 
their participants a free-choice between pressing one of two buttons and asked them to 
indicate the time point when a decision for one action was consciously formed. fMRI 
activity was collected before, during and after the decision process showing that predictive 
patterns of brain activity in the precuneus and frontopolar cortex emerged up to 7 s prior to 
conscious decision to act, indicating that these brain areas encode information about 
                                                          
 
3 In preparation: Staib, M.*, Dall’Acqua, T.*, Christophel, T., Haynes, J-D (2018). Conscious motor 
preparation in primary motor cortex under uncertainty. 
*Shared first co-authorship 
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upcoming decisions before they enter consciousness. Once the decision was made, 
preparatory motor activation was observed in primary and secondary motor areas (Bode et 
al., 2011; Soon et al., 2008; Toni, Schluter, Josephs, Friston, & Passingham, 1999), consistent 
with observed engagement of different motor areas during consecutive task stages (Bode & 
Haynes, 2009). 
One conceptual limitation of any experimental design using volition is the lack of 
experimental distinction of neuronal processes that contribute to the behavioral outcome 
(Frith, 2013; Haggard, 2008) precluding an independent observation of conscious decision 
making and unconscious biases. For instance the studies described in the previous 
chapters (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) explored how the presentation of a prime affected the 
subsequent response to a target stimulus. These studies however cannot provide a direct 
evidence of the manner by which the information provided by the prime influences the 
subsequent elaboration of targets. Indeed these studies implicitly assumed that primes 
would modulate some non-specified decisional and/or motor processes that in order would 
influence the decisional and/or motor state of the response. Crucially, the experimental 
designs proposed so far, are not able to disentangle the neural preparatory mechanism that 
contribute to the behavioral outcome (action or inhibition in these studies) from the 
preparatory activity linked to intention. As a consequence an independent observation of 
the unconscious biases elicited by subliminal primes (that are the main interest of the 
present thesis) cannot be provided. For example in free-choice trials participants reported 
that they had not made a conscious decision before the presentation of the free-choice 
target (as required by the instruction of the experimenter). However the authenticity of this 
information is up to their subjective experience. It is possible, for example, that participants 
had already a conscious preference for one of the two alternative outcomes of the choice 
(action or inhibition), but this has not yet been evaluated as a decision up until the 
presentation of the free-choice target. Since the control of one's own conscious thoughts is 
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only conditional to the subject (Logan & Cowan, 1984), the possibility of spontaneous 
decision by participants, despite the instruction, must be taken into account. For example 
it cannot be ruled out that the activity related to intention at the moment of the choice could 
represent the even longer-term, or distant, intentions associated with the task (Haggard, 
2008). In the same terms, the study by Soon et al. (2008) could not differentiate whether 
early activity patterns in frontopolar and parietal brain regions preceding the conscious 
decision truly reflect the unconscious formation of action intention or a general bias 
towards one of the possible motor outcomes. Given that is not possible to control all 
alternative interpretations simultaneously in a randomized experiment, the individual 
scenarios should be tested separately. 
Here the possibility that these findings originate from a bias towards a specific 
motor action is eliminated by inducing a conscious tendency toward a one (of two) possible 
response outcomes. The (contractually formulated) argument of the present work is: if the 
decision to give a specific response, before the actual implementation of the latter, is 
conscious, then this mental event would have been identifiable by specific neural 
correlates. Since Soon et al. (2008) found that significant information about the specific 
motor outcome was collected only at the moment of participants’ reported conscious 
intention and only in M1, then a significant activation of this region is predicted. This study 
sought to replicate these findings maximizing the comparability with Soons' results by 
using a similar experimental paradigm. Differently from Soon et al., (2008), the present 
study aims also to investigate how the motor preparation is carried on once a specific 
conscious tendency is experimentally set. To this end, participants observed the 
presentation of a cue stimulus that indicate which of two possible response options would 
be required 10 seconds later. The accuracy of the suggestion provided by the cue was varied 
and could diverge from the subsequent required response. The validity of the cue varied in 
blocks of 60%, 90% and 100% (deterministic) accuracy so that the predictive power of each 
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cue was previously determined. I applied MVPA to decode the content of the motor task in 
M1 in relation to the validity of the cue. 
 
6.2. Methods 
6.2.1. Participants 
Ten healthy volunteers participated to the experiment (5 female: M = 24.6 years, SD 
= 3.8). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were right-handed 
according to the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). None of the 
participants had a history of neurological or psychiatric disorder and none of them had 
structural brain abnormalities. All participants gave written informed consent and were 
financially reimbursed for participation. The study was approved by the local ethics 
committee. 
 
6.2.2. Stimuli and task procedure 
Each participant completed a training session outside the MRI scanner and an 
experimental session in the MRI scanner. The two sessions took place on different days (see 
Fig. 6.1a). On day 1, participants received written instructions and filled the consent form. 
In the first training task (‘target only’), participants familiarized with four abstract visual 
stimuli (Fig 6.1b) of which two indicated to press a button with the right index finger while 
the other two symbols indicated a button press with the left index finger, (the order was 
randomized across participants). For the creation of the stimuli, the focus was on (i) being 
as abstract as possible so that each participants could not consistently associate the target 
with other objects as verified by the experimenter in a debriefing session. During 
debriefing, participants reported no consistent associations with the abstract symbols. 
Moreover, in order to minimize systematic visual effects, (ii) stimuli were chosen to have 
similar physical features and to be equally complex: it was ensured that the color 
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distribution and complexity of the symbols were similar. Two visual symbols were 
associated to each possible response to ensure that the content of visual processing would 
have been dissociated from the content of motor preparation during the MVPA decoding. 
Training blocks were repeated until the participant pressed the correct button in 95% trials 
or more. As a second part of day 1, participants trained on the cueing tasks they would have 
performed in the MRI scanner on day 2. In the ‘deterministic cueing task’ (Fig. 6.1c), each 
trial started with a 2 s presentation of a circle containing one of the four symbols (cue), 
followed by a 0.5 s presentation of an empty square 6 s later (target) – i.e., 8 s of ISI. 
Participants were instructed to observe the cue, but withhold their response until the target 
appeared. The ‘probabilistic cueing task’ resembled the ‘deterministic cueing task’, except 
the target square now contained a symbol which could either prompt the same button press 
as the cue (‘congruent’) or the other button (‘incongruent’). The chance of cue and target to 
indicate the same button (‘cue validity’) was displayed on the screen at the beginning of 
each block and could be low (60%) or high (90%). In the low validity condition, the target was 
congruent in 12 of 20 trials (60%) and incongruent in the remaining 8 trials (40%). In the 
high condition, 18 of 20 trials were congruent whereas 2 trials (10%) were incongruent. In 
half of the congruent trials, the visual symbol of cue and target were identical, and different 
in all other trials. All timings in the probabilistic cueing task were identical to the 
deterministic task. Training was repeated for four blocks per cue validity. The order of 60% 
and 90% validity blocks was randomized. Participants were instructed to respond as fast 
and accurately as possible. After 25% of all trials were presented, participants had to recall 
the cue symbol (‘memory question’) to ensure that the cue was not ignored. Between blocks, 
participants were encouraged to improve their reaction time to the target in the upcoming 
blocks, to motivate utilizing the cue during the task. On day 2, the participant was 
positioned in the MRI scanner and first repeated one training block of 20 trials displaying 
target symbols only. Next, 15 blocks of 20 trials of the main task were completed, with 5 
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blocks per cue validity (60%, 90% or deterministic). Each trial lasted 14 s on average. Similar 
to the training, participants were asked to utilize the cue as much as possible in order to 
improve response speed. Accuracy and RTs to the target stimulus were recorded for all 
trials. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Stimuli and procedure of the cueing task. (A) Participants were introduced to the task 
outside the MRI scanner (day 1) and completed 5 blocks per cue validity (60%, 90% and 
deterministic) of 20 trials in the MRI scanner on day 2. (B) Abstract symbols were associated with a 
button press of the right or left index finger, randomized across participants. (C) In the deterministic 
cue paradigm (red), a cue symbol (circle) prepared the participant to press right or left when the 
target (square) appeared 6 seconds later. In the probabilistic cue paradigm, the target was either 
similar (congruent) or dissimilar (incongruent) to the cue. Cue validity was indicated at the 
beginning of each block to be 60% (blue) or 90% (green). Participants were asked to respond quickly 
and accurately to the target symbol. At the end of 25% of all trials, the participant was asked to recall 
the cue symbol in a memory question. 
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6.2.3. Behavioral data acquisition an analysis 
To analyze how RTs and response error rate reflected information processing 
mechanisms for different cue validities, a drift diffusion model (DDM) was employed 
(Ratcliff, 1978). According to this model, during a two-alternative forced-choice task, 
sensory information of uncertain stimuli is assumed to be integrated over time and a 
decision is made when sufficient evidence for one option is accumulated. At the beginning 
of this integration process, an observer might initiate evidence accumulation with a bias 
towards one of the options. If, for example, prior knowledge exists that favors one option 
over the other, this bias is captured by the model as an unequal distance from the initial 
state (z0) to the thresholds representing each option. In the paradigm used here, sensory 
uncertainty of the target stimulus is low, however, in each trial the cue introduces a bias 
towards a target direction, reducing the RTs and the error rate when cue and target are 
congruent. In turn, if cue and target are incongruent, the RTs and the error rate are 
increased. Cues with 90% validity were assumed to induce a stronger bias towards the 
congruent target direction. Here, using the DMA toolbox (Vandekerckhove and Tuerlinckx, 
2007), this proposed effect was quantified by estimating how cue validity affects the initial 
bias (z0) and its between-trial variability (sZ). 
 
6.2.4. fMRI data acquisition 
Data was acquired with a 12-channel 3 T Siemens Trio (Siemens Medical Systems, 
Erlangen, Germany) whole body MRI scanner. Participants were positioned headfirst and 
supine in the magnet bore. Functional images were acquired using a T2*-weighted EPI 
sequence (33 descending axial slices separated by a gap of 0.75 mm, matrix size = 64 × 64 
voxels, 3 mm × 3 mm × 3.75 mm resolution, FOV = 192 × 192 mm, flip angle = 78°, TE = 30 
ms, TR = 2 s) covering prefrontal, parietal, and most of temporal cortex. On average, ~140 
volumes were collected in each single scanning run, resulting in 15 functional runs of 4 min 
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and 66 s duration (70 min of acquisition time in total). High-resolution anatomical images 
were then acquired for each subject using a T1-weighted MPRAGE sequence (192 axial slices 
with no interslice gap, data matrix = 256 × 256, 1 mm3 isotropic voxels, TR = 1900 ms, TE = 
2.52 ms, flip angle = 9°). For each participant, a whole brain magnetic field mapping 
sequence (3 mm slice thickness; 33 slices) was recorded to reduce image distortions during 
preprocessing. 
 
6.2.5. fMRI data preprocessing 
 Preprocessing of EPI data was performed using standard procedures in SPM12 
(Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK). Images were corrected for 
geometric distortions caused by susceptibility induced field inhomogeneity (Cusack, Brett, 
& Osswald, 2003). A combined approach was used which corrects for both static distortions 
and changes in these distortions due to head (Andersson, Hutton, Ashburner, Turner, & 
Friston, 2001; Hutton et al., 2002). The static distortions were calculated for each subject 
from a B0 field map that was processed using the FieldMap toolbox as implemented in 
SPM12. Using these parameters, functional images were then realigned and unwarped, a 
procedure that allows the measured static distortions to be included in the estimation of 
distortion changes associated with head motion. Slice time correction was performed to 
correct for differences in acquisition time of individual brain slices (Sladky et al., 2011). No 
participant moved more than 4 mm in any direction during scanning. The motion-
corrected images were then coregistered to the individual's anatomical T1 image using a 
12-parameter affine transformation. 
 
6.2.6. Definition of primary motor cortex 
After pre-processing, BOLD responses to the target stimulus in the ‘deterministic 
cueing task’ was estimated for each voxel using a GLM. To do that, regressors was created 
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for left and right button presses per block by convolving the HRF with a stick function that 
is 1 at the time of an experimental event and 0 anywhere else, as implemented in SPM12. 
Cues were modelled as 2 s boxes, convolved with the HRF. Additionally, movement 
estimates and discrete cosine functions as regressors of no interest were added to reduce 
head motion induced artifacts and slow drifts from fMRI data. The linear contrasts left 
minus right and right minus left was computed for button presses in the deterministic 
paradigm only, to identify right and left M1, respectively. To exclude activation outside M1, 
the analysis was constrained to bilateral precentral gyrus (PG), as defined by the brain atlas 
AAL (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) in conjunction with co-activation from “finger tapping” 
obtained from the online database Neurosynth (http://neurosynth.org). Thus, for each 
participant, masks for left and right primary motor cortices were created separately and 
forwarded to the MVPA. 
 
6.2.7. Multivariate pattern analysis of individual time windows 
In the MVPA the data from the probabilistic paradigm were analyzed, independent 
of the data used for defining the ROIs. First, for each voxel and block, BOLD responses were 
estimated for seven successive 2 s time windows (one per TR) starting 2 s before cue onset 
until 2 s after target onset. Definition of time windows was constrained to the 2 s TR of the 
fMRI scanning protocol. Analyzing individual time windows allows to assess time 
dependency of motor preparation relative to the cue presentation. A finite impulse 
response (FIR) model was evaluated in SPM, with one regressor per time point and target 
direction, separately for the cue validities 60% and 90%, summing up to 7 time points × 2 
cue directions (left and right) × 2 cue validities (60% and 90%) conditions. Since all 
regressors included the same number of trials, confounding in decoding due to different 
sampling number was avoided (Ariani, Wurm, & Lingnau, 2015). Next, BOLD estimates in 
M1 for each condition were forwarded to MVPA, where each experimental block serves as 
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independent observation (i.e., 5 data points per condition). Support vector classification 
(Chang & Lin, 2011) was employed, as implemented in the Decoding Toolbox (Hebart, 
Görgen, & Haynes, 2015). The direction of the cue (left or right) was decoded for each validity 
and each time window separately using a leave-one-block-out cross-validation scheme. In 
this method, data from 4 out of 5 blocks was used to train the classifier, which was then 
tested on the remaining block, repeatedly for all 5 blocks as test data. Test accuracies were 
then forwarded to a repeated measurement ANOVA and directed one-sample t-tests against 
chance performance. 
 
6.3. Results 
6.3.1. Cue validity is retrieved from response behavior by a drift diffusion model 
Consistent with the hypothesis, a main effect of congruency for reaction times, 
F(1,35) = 39.5, p < .001, and error rate, F(1,35) = 49.9, p < .001, was found in a congruency × 
cue validity repeated-measurement ANOVA, showing that participants responded faster 
and more accurately to the target if it was preceded by a valid cue, across cue validities (Fig. 
6.2b). The benefit of a valid cue, as opposed to a cue signaling an opposing button press, 
was stronger for the 90% cue validity than for the 60% cue validity condition, as shown by a 
significant interaction of congruency and cue validity for reaction times, F(1,35) = 16.5, p = 
.0032, and error rate, F(1,35) = 7.1, p = .0285. RTs and error rate from congruent and 
incongruent trials (total number of trials with a response: 1981, from all participants) were 
included separately for the 60% and 90% cue validities into a DDM (Fig. 6.2). Trials in which 
no button was pressed were excluded from the analysis. The initial biases z0 and their 
variance for each condition (60%; 90%) was estimated separately (see Table 6.1 for an 
overview of all parameters). Boundary separation a was modelled one per validity and 
constrains z0 by 0 < z0 < a. The remaining parameters (drift rate and its within-trial and 
between-trial variability) describing the temporal evolution of the evidence accumulation 
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were assumed to be identical across conditions and therefore were estimated only once for 
all data. Per cue validity (60% or 90), the starting parameters by dividing z0 congruent by (z0 
congruent + z0 incongruent) were combined to calculate one bias that represents the bias induced by 
the cues. For the low validity (60%) condition, the computed bias (65.4%) slightly exceeds 
the expected bias of 60% by 5.4%, whereas for the high validity (90%) condition, the 
computed bias (82.3%) falls behind by 7.7%. These errors are within 1.6 times the standard 
deviations sZ for low validity cues and 1.2 times sZ for the high validity cues. 
 
Figure 6.2: Reaction time and response accuracy. (A) A drift diffusion model (DDM) describes how 
information about the target direction is integrated over time and retrieves the initial biases induced 
by cues with 60% (blue) and 90% (green) validity for trials with congruent or incongruent targets. 
Upper panels: accuracy and reaction time of all participants from four conditions (cue validity × 
target congruency) was entered, and the initial bias z0 (and its variance sZ, not shown) was estimated 
for each condition. The histograms show reaction times for correct (top) and wrong (bottom) 
responses, respectively. Lower panel: z0 parameters from the congruent and incongruent condition 
are normalized for each cue validity, forming biases towards the congruent target. (B) Normalized 
reaction time and accuracy for 60% and 90% cue validities, and deterministic trials. 
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Table 6.1: Parameters of the drift diffusion model; z0, initial bias; sZ, between-trial variability of z0; 
a, boundary separation; ν, within-trial variability in drift rate; eta, between-trial variability in drift 
rate; Ter, nondecision time; st, between-trial variability in nondecision time. 
Parameter 60%, congruent 60%, incongruent 90%, congruent 90%, incongruent 
z0 0.0478 0.0252 0.0629 0.0135 
sZ 0.0025 0.0026 0.0526 <0.0001 
a 0.0909 0.0897 
ν 0.2503 
eta 0.1322 
Ter 0.2986 
st 0.1491 
 
 
6.3.2. Early multivoxel patterns encode direction of motor preparation 
 A classifier was trained to predict cue direction (left or right) based on BOLD 
estimates from a FIR model, for 7 time windows starting 2 s before cue onset, separately for 
the 60% and 90% cues. The multivoxel analysis was spatially constrained to left and right M1 
(Fig. 6.3a). To investigate how neurons in motor cortex engage in motor preparation before 
a button press, a Cue validity × Time window ANOVA was computed. For this analysis, time 
window 1 was excluded because was recorded before cue onset and thus does not contain 
any information about the cue direction of the current trial. In left M1, the ANOVA revealed 
a main effect of Time window F(5,45) = 4.55, p = .001, but no main effect of Validity, F(1,9) = 
0.12, p = .73, or interaction between Time window and Validity, F(5,45) = 1.47, p = .22. 
Similarly, in right M1 a main effect of Time window was found, F(5,45) = 3.32, p = .012, 
Validity, F(1,9) = 10.59, p = .01, but no interaction, F(5,45) = 1.37, p = .25. One-sample t-tests 
for left or right M1 showed that for the 60% valid cue direction, above-chance accuracy was 
reached 10 s after cue onset, but never in right M1. For 90% valid cues, direction could be 
decoded after 6 s in left and right M1 (see Figure 6.5 for statistics). To investigate the spatial 
extent of action preparation across M1, the analysis was repeated including all voxels in left 
and right PG (Fig. 6.3b). A similar temporal pattern of decoding accuracies emerged where 
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above-chance was reached 6 s after cue onset in both hemispheres for 90% cues. In left PG 
the 60% cue was decoded 6 to 8 s after cue onset. For the PG, the direction for the 
deterministic cue was additionally decoded, because the atlas that defined the ROI is 
independent of the data used for MVPA. For the deterministic cue, decoding accuracy was 
above chance after 6 s in left and 4 s in right PG. Classification accuracies was then tested 
in four additional brain regions that were previously associated with voluntary and 
unconscious decision process (Bode et al., 2011; Soon et al., 2008b), i.e. the FP and the P in 
the left and right hemispheres, respectively. Although no above-chance classification in 
these regions during motor preparation was expected, above-chance accuracy 8 and 10 s 
after cue onset was found in FP and P. Figure 6.4 summarize all decoding accuracies for 
each considered ROI. 
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Figure 6.3: Decoding results for cue direction in seven time windows (left panels show results from 
left hemispheres and vice versa) with chance level at 50%. Vertical dashed lines indicate cue onset (0 
s) and target (8 s). Multivariate classification was computed (A) in a functionally defined region 
within primary motor cortex (M1) and (B) in the precentral gyrus (PG). The analysis of PG included 
trials from the deterministic cue since this region was anatomically defined, independently from 
the target response. Note that for each cue direction, two different visual symbols could appear. 
Images are displayed in neurological convention. 
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Figure 6.4: T-statistics from a directed one-sample t-test of decoding accuracies against chance 
level. Dashed line marks significance of p = .05. 
 
To explore for further brain regions that are engaged in motor preparation, a searchlight 
analysis was performed on the whole brain of each participant in MNI space, and repeated 
a classification of cue direction for different time windows and cue validities. Classification 
accuracy maps for each participant were then smoothed and entered into a second level 
model. A one-sample t-test was performed separately for each time window and cue validity. 
Resulting statistical maps were thresholded at puncorrected < .001 and surviving clusters are 
reported if their cluster-level FWE-corrected p-value < .05 (Fig. 6.5). Notably, for this 
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exploratory analysis, the threshold for statistical significance was more conservative than 
for the previously reported ROI-based analyses. For the deterministic cue only, cluster of 
significant above-chance decoding accuracy was found in the SMA, at the MNI coordinates 
(MNI x, y, z: 8 -14 56). Additionally, significant classification performance in primary motor 
areas was confirmed as expected from the previous ROI based analyses. No above-chance 
decoding accuracy was found for 60% and 90% cue validities. 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Searchlight analysis revealed above-chance accuracy in the supplementary motor area 
(SMA) across participants in time windows 6 and 7, i.e. 8 and 10 s after presentation of a 
deterministic cue. Lateral significant clusters show primary motor cortex (M1). Color bar indicates 
t-value. Images are displayed in neurological convention and thresholded at puncorrected = .0001 for 
visualization. 
 
6.4. Discussion 
In this study, I showed participants cues for a left or right button press that predicted 
a target button 8 s later, governed by varying validities. Each direction is indicated by one of 
two abstract visual symbols to separate responses to visual stimulation from motor 
preparation. In the experiment described here, low (60%), high (90%) and perfect 
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(deterministic) cue validities were employed to investigate the relation between motor 
certainty and pattern representations in primary motor cortex.  
Motor preparation based on cue validity was reflected in overt behavior of 
participants. A DDM was used to retrieve the bias towards a target direction introduced by 
the cue. The DDM combines participant’s response error and RT to model how information 
is integrated during visual presentation of the target, until a response is made. In this 
model, the starting bias was computed for each validity. The model could retrieve the 
impact of the highly valid cue on the tendency towards the predicted target, whereas the less 
predictive cue imposed a weaker bias. The strategy to prepare according to predictions from 
the highly valid cue (90%), but disregarding predictions from a low valid cue (60%) reflects 
an optimal strategy in a task where both response error and speed are relevant. Importantly, 
the gain in response accuracy and speed for targets following the highly valid cue is 
consistent with the assumption that the multivariate patterns representing cue direction 
emerge as a consequence of action preparation. 
My main goal was to investigate how motor preparation is encoded in the left and 
right M1, P and FPC, which are all part of an extended motor network. To achieve that, I split 
the time interval between cue and target into individual time bins of 2 s each and used 
multivoxel classification to decode the cue direction for each time bin separately. I found 
that the direction of motor preparation after cue onset is encoded in M1 as temporally 
stabilizing multivoxel pattern. Classification accuracy increased steadily over the course of 
11 s after cue presentation, following the slow temporal evolution of the BOLD signal 
(Grammont and Riehle 1999), with significant above-chance classification accuracies 7 s 
after cue onset for the highly valid and deterministic cue in left and right M1, and after 11 s 
for the low valid cue in left M1. In FP and P, I observed above-chance accuracy 9 and 11 s 
after cue onset. I then used a searchlight analysis to explore additional brain areas from 
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which preparatory signals can be decoded and was able to significantly decode the cue 
direction in bilateral SMA, consistent with earlier findings. 
The present data identifies brain areas associated with conscious motor preparation 
towards a specific target. These results are put into perspective to the findings of Soon et al. 
(2008), where free decision making of an upcoming motor choice was associated with 
activity in FP and P even before the outcome entered consciousness, but not with activity in 
primary (Jeannerod, 1995; Schnitzler, Salenius, Salmelin, Jousmäki, & Hari, 1997) or 
supplementary motor areas (Ikeda, LüDers, Burgess, & Shibasaki, 1992). Instead, the 
authors found activity in M1 only after the motor action was performed. This is in keeping 
with the author’s distinction of processes of unconscious decision making on the one hand, 
and conscious motor preparation on the other (Brass & Haggard, 2008; Castiello et al., 1991; 
Soon et al., 2008). The findings suggest that cued action preparation engages a motor 
network that is distinct from the network of unconscious free decision making (Assal, 
Schwartz, & Vuilleumier, 2007; Castiello & Jeannerod, 1991; Desmurget & Sirigu, 2009; 
Jahanshahi et al., 1995), and that both processes result in locally constrained, but spatially 
distributed patterns in M1, once a motor intention has entered consciousness. 
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CHAPTER 7 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
As adult individuals we all experience a sense of voluntary control over most of our 
daily actions so that we perceive our actions as if ‘we are deliberately choosing’ to execute 
them. The experience of action as by product of conscious intention has always stimulated 
considerable scientific interest because of is explicit convergence with the concept of “free 
will” (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2014). As much as individuals’ are capable of producing action 
based on internal set of criteria, it is also anecdotal evidence the capacity of “stopping 
oneself from doing something at the very last moment”. This ability has been considered as 
form of volitional cognitive inhibitory control – or intentional inhibition – that allows for 
more flexible cognition and behaviour. Voluntary actions thus demonstrate a “freedom 
from immediacy” (Shadlen & Kiani, 2013). Related to this is the controversy regarding 
whether intentionally inhibiting an action requires conscious effort and control. Since 
Libet’s (1983) well known experiment, several accounts have tried to replace the concept of 
“free will” with the capacity of a “free won’t” proposing an implausible dualism, in which a 
form of conscious causation would provide an ultimate veto over action. This dualism 
however, is just as problematic as the idea of a conscious generation of action since could 
itself be a consequence of some preceding unconscious neural activity (Haggard, 2008). In 
this respect it has been recently proposed that also the intentional generation of a decision 
to inhibit is preceded by unconscious brain activity (Filevich et al., 2013) and, alike for 
voluntary actions (Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004), also free decisions to inhibit can be biased 
outside conscious awareness (Parkinson & Haggard, 2014). 
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Starting from these evidences, the experimental work included in the present thesis 
aimed at extending what is known about the generation of voluntary action and inhibition 
choices. I defined voluntary – free – choices by contrasting them with stimulus-driven 
action and inhibition responses. This experimental approach allowed me to introduce two 
novel manipulations to examine the relative effects on voluntary processing: subliminal 
priming (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) and the modulation of the exercise-induced arousal (Chapter 
5). While Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 investigate free-choices from a behavioural perspective, 
the study presented in Chapter 4 further looked at the neural circuits involved in making 
free-choices to act and to inhibit by means of fMRI. Chapter 6 was specifically tailored to 
explore the temporal dynamics of neural motor preparation and how they dissociate from 
those involved in response intentionality. 
 
7.1. Unconscious determinant of a free-choice 
 What makes a voluntary act different from a reflexed action? Or, more ecologically: 
“What is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?” 
(Wittgenstein, 1968; page 84). Whereas stimulus-driven actions and inhibition responses 
are determined by a precise form of stimulation, the occurrence and the timing of voluntary 
action and inhibition responses are not directly specified by any external stimulus which 
make them quite impenetrable to study experimentally. Although we feel voluntary actions 
as a product of our will, more convincingly their origin is determined by underlying 
unconscious decisional processing (Libet et al., 1983; Soon et al., 2008), upon which 
however, the experimenter has little or no control. To bypass the problem an ingenuous 
solution would be asking participants to produce responses following their, perceived, will 
but in the meantime implicitly manipulating the unconscious decisional processes that 
concur to produce the response. In this thesis, as in previous research (Parkinson & 
Haggard, 2014; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004; Teuchies et al., 2016), subliminal priming has 
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been used to modulate participants “free” response choices in order to infer the dynamics 
of the decisional processes that determined the choice, in this case whether to act or to 
inhibit. In Chapter 3 I designed and tested a paradigm that has demonstrated to be a 
suitable method for the purposes of my research question. The paradigm was a modified 
version of a Go/Nogo task that together with cued targets, also included a free-choice 
condition. Crucially, targets were preceded by a subliminal – masked – primes that were 
congruent or incongruent to the required response. As well as participants’ reaction times 
and error rates also the number of free-choices to act or to inhibit were biased following 
primes suggestion. Finding that the mechanisms responsible for the choice to inhibit can 
be unconsciously biased suggested that the origin of the very same mechanisms might me 
partially unconscious to the individual, thus confirming that intentional inhibition cannot 
be identifiable as a “conscious veto” (Libet et al., 1983). These findings are in accordance 
with previous research reporting the unconscious neural underpinnings of free-choices to 
inhibit (Filevich et al., 2013). 
 A major limit in the study of voluntary action control must be specified however: 
instructions in experiment such as the one proposed in Chapter 3, typically tell participants 
to decide spontaneously but in a random and balanced manner (see methods section at 
page 56, Chapter 3). Although ‘instructing spontaneity’ is quite counterintuitive, this type 
of instructions are a necessary compromise to investigate free-choices. In particular, the 
tradition of linking volition to the capacity for randomness is based on the capacity of 
producing innovative behaviour (Haggard, 2008). The presence of embedded neural 
systems capable of unpredictable – random – behaviour makes great sense from an 
evolutionary perspective since they produce a clear survival advantage. Animal’s survival 
depends both on the exploitation of known sources of food thought stereotyped behaviour 
and on the exploration of possible new resources through innovative actions, but also 
trough the capacity of inhibit the new action that results maladaptive. Since voluntary 
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actions are internally produced and independent by external stimuli they can be closely 
associated with exploratory processes rather than exploitation processes. It has been 
proposed that intrinsic neural noise may account for randomness in actions (Schurger et 
al., 2012), which in turn explain why response choice is chosen versus another (in this case 
action or inhibition). Theoretical models assume that participants accumulate 
independent evidence to support one decision versus another until a decision threshold is 
reached (Hanes & Schall, 1996). I proposed (page 70, Chapter 4) that subliminal primes, as 
presented within the paradigm used, could influence the responses to go and nogo stimuli 
in two different ways: or by enhancing the excitability of post-decisional motor pathways, or 
biasing the actual neural “free decision” in favour of initiating or inhibiting the action. 
There could be valid reasons to speculate that primes would induce their effect at a 
decisional level. First, Schlaghecken and Eimer (2004) showed that the effect of subliminal 
primes on free-choices are mediated by (high-level) current intentions and task set, or 
rather the set of stimulus-response mappings imposed by task instructions (Schlaghecken 
& Eimer, 2004). Although this clearly supports that primes cannot be effective solely by 
modulating the motor threshold of the response, the effects of the subliminal primes on 
free-choices can be attributed simply to visual congruency between prime and target 
stimuli, facilitating or inhibiting the appropriate response choice. Thus, the mechanism 
underlying those effects may not lie at high cognitive level. Second, Parkinson and 
colleagues (2017) avoided such confounding manipulating free-choices (to inhibit) with 
ecologically valid and socially relevant stimuli (i.e., emotional human faces) for which 
salience for volition cannot be accounted for in terms of low-level properties of congruence 
or incongruence (because the emotional face primes were not visually congruent with 
targets; Parkinson et al., 2017). 
 In the present thesis the behavioural study proposed in Chapter 3 could not directly 
assess whether primes were producing their effects in motor or decisional mechanisms. 
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However the study proposed in Chapter 4 measured the performance within the same 
paradigm (as described in Chapter 3) by means of fMRI. Therefore this study was more 
suited to address this question since it allowed to explore whether the effect or primes were 
detectable within motor or decisional areas of the brain. Neuroimaging techniques have 
been employed by the majority of studies that sought to investigate intentional inhibition, 
mainly because of two intrinsic limits in the investigation of the construct itself: (i) 
intentional inhibition does not results in any overt behaviour to explore, since the action 
has been inhibited; (ii) there are not external stimuli that time-locks precisely the related 
decisional processes, since intentional inhibition is stimulus-independent by definition. 
The aim of the study presented in Chapter 4 was threefold. First it intended dissociating the 
neural networks that are specifically engaged in making free-choices from those engaged 
in stimulus-driven responses: the whole-brain results revealed that a well-known “free-
choice network” was crucially involved in free-choices both to act and to inhibit when 
contrasted with the cued counterparts. The network included the activation of the RCZ, the 
DLPFC, parietal cortices and AI. These areas closely match previous findings in studies 
contrasting free with cued choices (Forstmann et al., 2006; Lynn et al., 2016; Teuchies et al., 
2016). Among this network of areas, the RCZ and the DLPFC were particularly related to the 
decision-making processes underpinned by free-choices, beyond the specific outcome that 
was then implemented (action or inhibition). Previous studies found these areas playing a 
similar evaluative role in free-choices between action alternatives (Demanet et al., 2013; 
Mueller et al., 2007; Teuchies et al., 2016). This suggests that the intentional inhibition or 
the intentional execution of an action might be evaluated as response alternatives by 
specialized areas as the RCZ and the DLPFC, at least for tasks as formulated in the present 
study. The second purpose of the study was to assessing whether intentional inhibition 
processes was supported by specialized areas such as the dFMC as previously reported 
(Kühn, Haggard, et al., 2009). Results did not support this notion by showing a lack of 
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differential activity in this area neither when contrasted with intentional action trials or 
cued inhibition trials, nor when evaluated looking at the congruency effects of primes. It 
must be noted however that priming effects on intentional inhibition were absent also in 
behavioural responses making the latter result less reliable. In general the RCZ and the 
DLPFC were better predictors of intentional inhibition processes suggesting that 
specialized mechanism might not be needed. The third, above-mentioned, aim of the study 
was to define whether primes would affect free-choices by modulating the activity within 
decisional areas, such as the “free-choice network”, or by a direct influence on the motor 
pathways. This curiosity was driven by the evidence that in previous research subliminal 
priming effects were detectable in the modulation of activity within areas of the “free-choice 
network” (Teuchies et al., 2016). However, in these previous studies (Teuchies et al., 2016; 
Wenke et al., 2010), the task was to select between alternate actions. So, the differences 
between primes acting on decisions versus on motor processes were confounded, making 
it difficult to assess if the primes acted to modify choices rather than motor state (i.e., 
choice biases are due to interference between the alternate actions in primary motor areas). 
In contrast, the paradigm used in the current study actually cleanly allows these two 
alternative priming mechanisms to be distinguished in a better way than these prior 
studies. That is, the paradigm used seems better suited to pin down why primes are able to 
influence free-choices. However, in contrast to my hypotheses and to the findings reported 
in Chapter 3, the present study did not revealed a behavioural effect of priming in free-
choices and this was reflected in the neural patterns accordingly. Although I proposed that 
this lack of an effect was produced by the instability of subliminal priming effects, in this 
study primes were able to bias the speed of responses in free-choice action trials and the 
rate of omissions. These results suggested that an evaluation of priming effects in M1 was 
still possible. Since also the motor activity in M1 was not modulated by primes, the 
  
141 
 
 
inconsistency of these result did not allowed to draw a firm conclusion leaving this question 
unsolved. 
In this regard the study presented in Chapter 6 attempted to further deepening this 
interrogative by taking the opposite perspective. The study aimed to explore the neural 
underpinning of motor preparation in M1 when the decision to give a specific behavioral 
response is conscious. The study capitalized on a paradigm that was previously used to infer 
unconscious intentional preparation of a free-choice (Soon et al., 2008) to decouple the 
neural activity related to the choice from the neural activity related to motor preparation. 
Results showed that when the cue (i.e., the stimulus that informed about the upcoming 
required response) was almost at chance and highly invalid (60% condition; being almost 
uninformative) motor preparation in M1 was detectable only when the response was almost 
initiated and the target stimulus (signaling the actual required response) was already 
shown. In another condition the accuracy of the suggestion provided by the cue was 
increased (90% condition; being very informative) and motor preparation in M1 was 
detectable well before the presentation of the target stimulus, suggesting that automatic 
motor processing was triggered in advance. These findings allowed to conclude that cues 
(like primes) might have very different effects depending on whether task demands require 
internally selected motor choices or whether the required action is already specified. 
I propose that future studies should address this question by looking at the effects 
of presenting cues under the threshold of conscious awareness in order to explore the 
temporal dynamics of unconscious motor preparation. Hypothetical results may provide 
meaningful insight on how free-choices are biased by unconscious perception. 
 
7.2. The modulatory effect of physical exercise 
Positive effects on cognition induced by moderate physical exercise are commonly 
reported in sport psychology’s literature (Chang et al., 2012; Lambourne & Tomporowski, 
142 
 
 
2010). The majority of reported effects however, considered the beneficial effect of acute 
exercise in low-level motor processing such as the increase of reaction times or the 
improvement of signal detection and accuracy. Discussion of these findings usually 
capitalized on the dis-inhibitory effects that exercise-induced arousal would produce in the 
brain stem and the “arousal systems” (Robbins & Everitt, 1995). On the other hand the 
effects regarding high-level processing are more inconsistent reporting both slightly 
positive (Chang et al., 2012; Chu et al., 2015) but mostly negative (Dietrich, 2006; 
Lambourne & Tomporowski, 2010; Tomporowski, 2003) effects. This inconsistencies on the 
effects of exercise have been recently suggested to arise because together with the activation 
of the reticular-activating processes (the arousal systems), a downregulation of the frontal 
areas might concurrently occurs. Since brain processed compete for a limited number of 
metabolic resources those processes that are not directly involved in producing the motor 
act, such as executive functions, would be less fuelled by energetic resources (Dietrich & 
Audiffren, 2011). 
Guided by this argumentation the study proposed in Chapter 5 aimed to uncover 
whether these double effects of exercise in cognition could be elicited my means of the 
paradigm described in Chapter 3. In particular, I was primarily interested in looking how 
exercise would affect voluntary actions and intentional inhibition processing. Crucially, to 
date no studies investigated these effect in the realm of volition. Since previous research 
enumerated voluntary motor control as one of the most unique human feature (Frith, 2013) 
clearly supported by neural processes located in the frontal cortex (e.g., see Chapter 4), 
defining the effect of arousal on these mechanisms is of utmost importance for everyday 
functioning. In the experiment I asked participants to perform the paradigm while 
pedalling on a cycle-ergometer at two level of workload intensities eliciting different level 
of arousal and fatigue accordingly. As primary result I was able to replicate the effects 
reported in Chapter 3 in both exercise conditions. Regarding the more interesting effects of 
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exercise in free-choice behaviour, results showed that the high arousal condition produced 
more action choices overall suggesting that intentional inhibitory mechanisms were 
overcame by the impulsivity induced by the exercise. Crucially also stimulus-driven 
inhibition mechanisms were not enhanced by the effect of exercise as demonstrated by the 
undifferentiated rate of false alarms between the two conditions. On the other side results 
reported also positive effects in low-level motor processing as demonstrated by the decrease 
of reaction times in both stimulus-driven and free-choice action conditions. 
The double dissociation raised by these results has been recently conceptualized 
within a model – the RAH model – that accounts for both effects (Dietrich & Audiffren, 
2011). In particular the model provides a clear description of downregulation of the frontal 
areas (hypofrontality process) and thus of the inverse effects reported for higher cognitive 
functioning. Importantly this downregulation is forcibly tied to the reduction of states of 
consciousness that commonly occurs during exercise, such as the ‘experience of flow’ 
(Dietrich, 2004). Moreover it is able to explain the positive (anxiolytic) effects on mood 
perceived during acute exercise due to a reduction in over-activity in frontal areas. The 
hypofrontality process predicts a downregulation of multiple brain areas that proceed in 
hierarchical fashion (Dietrich, 2003, 2006). Downregulation occurs in a five-stage hierarchy 
of consciousness: a the first stage higher-order processes are impaired by downregulation 
of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; at the second stage self-representation, sense of 
agency and emotional processes are impaired by downregulation of the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex; at the third, memory, learning and basic emotions, supported by the 
limbic system, are impaired; at the fourth stage sensory processing in the thalamus are 
degraded; and at the end it occurs within arousal systems in the brainstem (Dietrich, 2006). 
Put in these terms even a subtle downregulation in the frontal cortex may be enough to 
impact top-down, explicit, responses and voluntary processing. A greater deregulation may 
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further limit the capacity of the frontal cortex to inhibit and coordinate the reticular 
activating process thus boosting bottom-up, implicit, activity (Dietrich & Audiffren, 2011). 
Since the study proposed in Chapter 5 could only account for the behavioural effects 
of exercise on voluntary motor control, a direct evidence of the hypofrontality process can 
only be speculative. Future studies may overtake this limitations by using neuroimaging or 
electrophysiological techniques. As found in Chapter 4 free-choice behaviour appears 
being supported by a specialized network of brain areas. Would be of extreme interest to 
see whether the activity over this network can be gradually decreased while increasing 
exercise intensity thus giving direct support to the RAH model. By using the paradigm 
proposed in the present thesis it would be also possible to elucidate whether primes would 
works affecting free-choices at the motor or rather at the decisional level. As suggested by 
the RAH model if priming effects arises because of direct, low-level, visuo-motor 
congruency mechanisms, than an increase in exercise would increase the relative effect of 
congruent and incongruent primes. Since the ascending activating processes are 
particularly activated, on the one hand the motor threshold would be more easily reached 
with congruent primes, on the other hand incongruent primes would rapidly decrease pre-
motor activation thus producing more choices to inhibit. Importantly all these effects 
would be reflected in the relative activity in primary motor cortices. However if priming 
effects arises because of congruency effects at the decisional level, then the hypofrontality 
produced by the increase in exercise would disrupt priming effects, and decrease the 
activity within the “free-choice network”. 
 
7.3. Concluding remarks 
The experience of action as by product of conscious intention has always stimulated 
considerable scientific interest because of is explicit convergence with the concept of “free 
will” and moral responsibility (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2014). The capacity for voluntary action 
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is so fundamental to our existence that all known human cultures define individuals as an 
autonomous agents and thus responsible for what they do. Nevertheless defining how the 
conscious intention and the physical action interact, and how this would relate to 
normative and moral responsibility is as problematic as important. In particular, the 
decision whether to act or inhibit a misguided action is especially relevant for responsibility 
because of its concerns on the reasons that triggered the brain processes that produced the 
action and eventually, on the reason why other brain mechanisms did not intervene in 
withholding it. An effective balance between action and inhibition is a very important factor 
to prevent the execution of inappropriate motor plans and any of its causal external effects. 
In these circumstances a deeper understanding of the cognitive mechanisms that govern 
the capacity to inhibit urges and actions would be of utmost importance. 
In this regard, the results provide by the experimental work I have conducted might 
have potentially interesting implications for self-control. Since individuals are not aware 
and cannot control many factors that unconsciously bias their free-choices to inhibit, 
should societies consider them responsible for their own failures to inhibit? 
In this thesis subliminal priming of free decisions to inhibit have been evaluated 
within the restricted circumstances of the experimental setting and such type of effects are 
hardly generalizable to everyday motor control. Thus remains unclear whether the 
mechanisms involved are determinant for real life situations. Nevertheless the obtained 
results point out some intriguing considerations regarding team sports. Football athletes 
for example, continuously regulate their interactions with other players by both deciding 
on their own initiative 'the best athletic feat' for that specific game phase, but also through 
being able to inhibit the motor plan in reaction to an opponent's unexpected move. 
Concurrently, players are under great pressure caused by the physical exertion (the high 
level of arousal) and in that contingencies even a subtle change in the environment (like the 
prime) might be misinterpreted triggering an automatic but inappropriate move. Moreover 
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as proposed by the RAH model, the downregulation of frontal lobes is forcibly tied to the 
reduction of states of consciousness that commonly occurs during sport, such as the 
“experience of flow”. Recalling the infamous bite of Luis Suarez proposed in the incipit of 
my thesis, I might now provide a clearer picture to understand why such “accidents” 
occasionally occurs: shall we consider him responsible for what he did? 
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